Bulk Jupiter sinking: A stark reminder of bauxite cargo risks

The incident 

On 2 January 2015, the Bahamas-flagged Bulk Jupiter, with 19 crew members onboard, was carrying 46,400 tonnes of bauxite from Malaysia to Hong Kong.

While off Vietnam on New Year’s Eve, the vessel received an email from their weather routing provider highlighting adverse weather conditions expected in the region.

In the next day, the vessel started rolling more heavily as the weather started to deteriorate.

At approximately 0640, the general alarm was sounded followed by an announcement by the Master directing all crew to proceed to the bridge.

While in his cabin, the chief cook felt the vessel suddenly starting to roll more heavily, particularly to starboard.

He left his cabin in order to make his way to the port side lifeboat, at this point the vessel suffered a black out, emergency lights then came on, and the vessel stopped rolling and adopted approximately a 45o list to starboard.

Due to the angle of list, the Chief Cook was unable to make his way to the port side access door and decided to utilize the internal staircase and proceed up to ‘C’ deck, where he met the Master.

He instructed the Chief Cook to follow him and together they exited the accommodation block via the starboard side access door. No other crew were seen onboard after that time.

Having exited the accommodation area of the vessel, both men found themselves on a small platform on the starboard side, aft external stairway with the waves washing over them.

The Master, wearing his lifejacket, jumped into the sea followed shortly after by the Chief Cook who at this point had donned his lifejacket - neither were wearing an immersion suit.

The two men stayed together while swimming away from the vessel prior to it sinking.

As they looked back from a safe distance, despite the heavy seas, they could just see that the vessel had almost disappeared beneath the waves.

At 1410, the good Samaritan container ship ‘Zim Asia’ reported sighting the two persons and believed them both to be alive.

The tugboat ‘OLNG Muttrah’ headed to assist and by 1556 the two crew were recovered onboard, but only the Chief Cook was alive. Two more crew members were recovered deceased.

A total of 9 vessels and 3 aircraft were assisting with the SAR operation to find the remaining crew. Search and rescue efforts continued for a further 2-3 days, but no further crew were located.

Findings

The official investigation report underlines that:

1. The Bulk Jupiter’s Master and senior crew members were well versed in dry bulk cargo operations, while the company’s management and SMS procedures were also adequate.

The Company provided adequate guidance and direction to the Master and maintained a level of management enough to allow normal operations to be conducted safely.

However, three factors failed to raise adequate awareness or warning signs:

• the uncharacteristic speed reduction en route,
• the results of the requested ‘Can Test’ and
• the incomplete noon reports that should have informed the Company on the condition of the cargo in the holds.

2. Additionally, there was significant evidence to identify that the 46,400t of bauxite loaded over the course of the 13-day period had an average moisture content of 21.3%.

Despite this, there is no physical evidence to confirm what caused the vessel to adopt an unrecoverable list to starboard and subsequent capsize.

It was noted that a total of 186.55 hours of loading was lost due to rainfall - the equivalent of 7 days of loading over the period. The infrastructure available to adequately store and transport bauxite in Kuantan increased the exposure of the bauxite to the elements.

Despite the crew’s diligent response to the rain by continually opening and closing the hatch covers to reduce the ingress of water, the cargo remained exposed whilst on the quay side, in stockpiles and in the trucks.

An independent inspection was not requested by the Master to verify the properties of the cargo prior to loading onboard. The absence of an independent inspection resulted in the cargo being loaded without its physical properties and moisture content being verified against the parameters of the IMSBC Code schedule or the cargo declaration form.

Considering the extreme weather conditions and storage facilities available it was acknowledged that the cargo was very wet and that measures to protect the cargo on shore from further rain were not effective in preventing further wetting.

3. The previous class and special survey inspections indicate no structural integrity failures, so the possibility of a catastrophic structural failure is considered low.