The Incident

During morning hours with clear skies and light wind, the vessel had picked the piot and was approaching the fairway to the port. Located on the bridge were the Master, the pilot the OOW and the helmsman. The Third Officer was the OOW and had completed the pre-arrival checklist.

It is stated that the vessel was in hand steering mode and the pilot had the conn. Although the Master gave the pilot a pilot card, they did not conduct a pilot briefing. In the meantime, the pilot asked for 7 knots in the fairway and lined up the vessel between the buoys.

Moreover, the OOW was responible for monitoring the vessel's position on the radar and the ECDIS and was filling out the logbook. The vessel passed the first buoys, and everything seemed in order to the Master when he looked outside.

Suddenly, the vessel heavily vibrated and its speed rapidly decreased until it was completely stopped. That was when the master logbook. The vessel passed the first buoys, and everything seemed in order to the Master when he looked outside.

At the same time, when the pilot understood that the vessel had run aground, he started to talk on the VHF in the local language. The vessel had run aground on a bank which was outside the fairway.

The vessel was clearly visible outside of the channel on the ECDIS and radar. This was also confirmed when the position was plotted. The Master began to deballast the vessel and carried out engine manoeuvres in an attempt to get the vessel off the bank.

Following, the Chief Engineer contucted the Master and told him that the steering gear was not responding.

Conseqently, the Mater halted the engines and asked the Chief Officer to sound all tanks and also take soundings around the vessel. The pilot told him that two tugs were coming from the port to assist the vessel.

Although the master hadn't signed any salvage contract, but the two tugs began to attempt to refloat the vessel with the assistance of the pilot and authorities. The tugs removed the vessel from the bank the following day.

The Club reports that there was a leading line for the approach, but for some reason it was disregarded. The passage plan was not berth to berth. If the plan had been berth to berth there would have been a planned route into the port which would have highlighted the discrepancy in the vessel’s position on the ECDIS. The bridge team did not monitor the vessel’s progress with all the available means.

 

See also