ATSB issued an investigation report on the fire onboard the self-unloading bulk carrier ‘Iron Chieftain’ at Port Kembla, in June 2018, which resulted from a failed bearing in the ship’s conveyor system. The investigation highlighted the inadequacy of fire safety regulations and standards for the cargo handling spaces on such ship types.
The incident
On 18 June 2018, during cargo discharge operations while alongside at Port Kembla, New South Wales (NSW), a fire broke out in the internal cargo handling spaces of the self-unloading (SUL) bulk carrier Iron Chieftain.
The ship’s crew initiated an emergency response but shipboard efforts to control the fire were ineffective. The fire soon established itself and spread to the exterior of the ship, setting the discharge boom on deck alight.
The ship’s crew were evacuated and shore firefighting services from Fire and Rescue New South Wales (FRNSW) took charge of the response to the fire. The fire was contained and eventually extinguished about 5 days after it started.
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The ship sustained substantial structural damage, including breaches of two fuel oil tanks, and key components of the SUL system were largely destroyed. The ship was declared a constructive total loss and subsequently dispatched to be recycled. There were no serious injuries or pollution.
Probable causes
The ATSB investigation concluded that the fire originated in Iron Chieftain’s C-Loop space and was likely the result of a failed bearing in the ship’s conveyor system which created the heat necessary to ignite the rubber conveyor belt.
The ATSB also determined that the ship did not have an emergency contingency plan for responding to fire in the ship’s SUL spaces and that there were technical failures of the ship’s alarm systems during the emergency response to the fire. Furthermore, some aspects of the shipboard response likely aided the fire’s development while others increased risk by removing shipboard capability.
Key findings
- The fire onboard Iron Chieftain originated within the C‑Loop space of the ship’s self-unloading system. The fire was probably the result of a failed conveyor idler bearing, which created the necessary heat for the ignition of the rubber conveyor belt.
- The officer of the watch’s immediate response to being notified of an irregularity in the self‑unloading system was to stop the cargo discharging process including stopping the conveyor belts. This action, and other aspects of the shipboard response, aided the fire’s development and increased the risk of damage, injury, and loss of life.
- Iron Chieftain’s operators had formally identified the fire risk in the ship’s cargo self-unloading system spaces, particularly the C-Loop, as being unacceptably high 5 years before the fire due to the absence of fire detection or fixed fire extinguishing system. However, at the time of the fire, the prevention and recovery risk mitigation measures had not reduced the risk to an acceptable level.
- The cargo handling spaces of specialized self-unloading bulk carriers continue to present a very high fire risk due to the inadequacy of standards or regulations for self‑unloading systems, including for conveyor belts, and dedicated fire detection/fixed fire‑extinguishing systems. This has been a factor in at least three major fires over a 25‑year period, including Iron Chieftain’s constructive total loss.
Other factors that increased the risk and were identified as key safety issues are, among others:
-Iron Chieftain’s Emergency Contingency Plan did not include a response plan for fire in the high fire risk self-unloading system spaces. Consequently, there was no clear plan or practiced sequence of actions that could aid emergency preparedness.
-Port Kembla’s local emergency response plans had not adequately integrated key elements of the state’s guidelines for responding to a fire on a vessel.
-The capability of Fire and Rescue New South Wales to effectively respond to a shipboard fire in Port Kembla, was limited by:
- a lack of specialized marine firefighting expertise
- outdated marine training for firefighters
- relative inexperience in shipboard firefighting associated with the rarity of major shipboard fires
an absence of marine-specific firefighting resources and aids for use by first responders.
-Regulatory safety oversight of Iron Chieftain, which comprised flag State audits, surveys, and inspections had not identified safety deficiencies with respect to the ship’s fire safety, risk management, emergency preparedness and emergency response.
Actions taken
In response to this accident, the CSL Group initiated a fire risk mitigation project across its global fleet with the aim of:
- improving fire detection and suppression technology
- reviewing firefighting policy
- setting minimum fire safety standards for early fire detection and suppression at the ship design and build stage.
The ship’s managers advised that linear heat detection systems and/or closed circuit television camera systems integrated with video analytics to provide or enhance the capability for early fire detection were installed onboard six conveyor belt-equipped SUL ships operated by CSL Australia with the installation of similar systems planned for a seventh ship. A CSL Australia-operated SUL ship with internal conveyor spaces was equipped with a Hi-Fog water mist fixed fire-extinguishing system covering the ship’s internal SUL spaces. In addition, one ship with external conveyor systems was equipped with a deluge system and installation of a deluge system is intended for at least one other ship. Additionally, ship‑specific emergency contingency plans for fires in the SUL spaces have been developed and implemented across the CSL Australia fleet.
AMSA and Lloyd’s Register have undertaken to approach the IMO and IACS respectively, to raise the identified safety issue related to the inadequacy of fire safety standards or regulations for SUL system spaces.
With respect to the regulatory oversight of SUL bulk carriers, AMSA has provided its inspectors and delegated organizations with updated guidance related to the focus of audits and inspections particularly with regard to the fire safety risk aspects associated with these ships. In addition, AMSA is progressing an inspection campaign concentrating on SUL bulk carriers operating in Australian waters, with a focus on fire safety and emergency preparedness.
Fire and Rescue New South Wales has advised that work is underway through the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council (AFAC) Working Group for Marine Firefighting to produce a nationally consistent approach to marine firefighting which will inform the development of new FRNSW standard operating guidelines. In addition, FRNSW continues to undertake familiarisation and training exercises to improve marine firefighting capability and awareness. While welcoming the safety action, the ATSB has issued a recommendation that FRNSW takes further action to address the safety issue related to marine firefighting capability.
The PANSW advised that the Port Kembla Marine Oil and Chemical Spill Contingency Plan and the Crisis Management Plan were to be updated to reflect the guidelines for responding to fires on a vessel as described in the NSW State Waters Marine Oil and Chemical Spill Contingency Plan.
In addition, the MoU in relation to Hazardous Material Incidents on Inland and State Waters between Transport for NSW (NSW Maritime), FRNSW and the PANSW was being updated, with changes including specific handover arrangements being considered.
Lessons learned
The investigation into the fire on board Iron Chieftain has highlighted the inadequacy of fire safety regulations and standards for the cargo handling spaces onboard self-unloading bulk carriers.
The effectiveness of a shipboard response to fire depends primarily on the ability to detect the fire at an early stage and quickly extinguish it at the source. Where it has been identified that the lack of such systems has resulted in the risk of a fire in a space being unacceptable, suitable control measures need to be implemented in order to reduce the risk to an acceptable level.
The introduction of mandatory minimum standards for suitable fire detection and extinguishing systems, to address the known high fire risk spaces of self-unloading bulk carriers, can significantly reduce the risk of major fires in these spaces.
Additionally, the introduction of standards governing the fire resistance properties of conveyor belts used in shipboard systems can help reduce the likelihood of ignition in the first place.
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