The UK MAIB issued an investigation report on the sinking of the fishing vessel ‘Solstice’, approximately 7 miles south of Plymouth, England, in September 2017, that resulted in one fatality. The report highlighted stability issues, noting that the weight of the catch in the net was excessive and that the height of the lifting point at the stern was high.
The incident
At 1938 on 26 September 2017, the 9.9m fishing vessel Solstice capsized in calm weather conditions about 7 miles south of Plymouth. The skipper and crewman were rescued from the vessel’s upturned hull about 5½ hours later, but the vessel’s owner was trapped and drowned in the wheelhouse. The vessel later sank.
The scallop dredger had recently been modified to operate as a stern trawler and its owner, skipper and crewman were in the process of hauling a heavy catch on board when the capsize occurred. The net’s cod-end was full of fish, moss and sand, and started to roll uncontrollably along the transom as the vessel heeled in the light swell.
The crew did not have time to raise the alarm before they entered the water. As the vessel was not equipped with an Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB) and the crew did not carry Personal Locator Beacons (PLBs), they were wholly reliant on family and friends realising they were overdue and alerting the coastguard.
Probable causes
Solstice capsized in benign sea conditions because it did not have sufficient transverse stability to safely lift the contents of its net on board over the stern. This was primarily because:
- The weight of the catch in the net was excessive.
- The height of the lifting point at the stern was high.
Key conclusions
- Other factors that contributed to capsize included:
● The free surface effect generated by trapped water sloshing on the aft deck.
● A reduction in buoyancy due to the vessel’s limited underwater volume aft. - Lifting the catch on the centreline made it difficult to assess the effect of the load on the vessel’s transverse stability.
- Solstice’s owner had no stability data for his vessel and relied on his experience as a fishing boat skipper and the knowledge that Solstice had proved to be a stable boat in the past. A thorough stability assessment would have given him a clearer understanding of the vessel’s limits.
- Solstice’s owner did not follow the stability advice and guidance provided by the MCA and fishing industry bodies; he modified his vessel and changed its mode of fishing without consultation and without conducting stability assessments.
- Solstice did not have any risk assessments for stern trawling and the method adopted to recover the catch following the net drum failure was adhoc in nature and inherently hazardous.
- Excessive weight in the net was a foreseeable hazard and capsize was an obvious consequence, but the crew remained determined to lift the high value catch on board.
- The vessel’s owner lost his life because he was trapped in the wheelhouse by the inrush of water.
- The skipper and crewman were fortunate that the capsized vessel remained afloat and provided a safe haven as it is unlikely they would have survived without the buoyant support of a PFD.
- The vessel and its crew were not adequately prepared or equipped to deal with emergency situations. Of note:
● Knives were not carried or readily available on the working deck.
● PFDs were not worn on deck when there was a realistic risk of being carried overboard by the fishing gear.
● The liferaft had not been serviced.
● The release of the starboard lifebuoy was impeded. - Once in the water, the crew had no means of raising the alarm. The carriage of an EPIRB and/or PLBs would have resulted in an immediate and location-focused emergency response.
Lessons learned
- The crew had no stability information for Solstice and did not fully appreciate the risk of capsize. Vessel owners should always ensure that stability assessments are carried out before and after any modifications are undertaken
- The weight in Solstice’s net was clearly excessive. In such circumstances, action should be taken to reduce the loads being lifted on board
- Take the search out of search and rescue; fit an Automatic Identification System (AIS) and carry an EPIRB and/or PLBs. They can be life savers
- Personal flotation devices should always be worn when working on deck and emergency use lifejackets should be readily available
Recommendations
The UK MCA has been recommended to conduct an impact assessment to determine the effectiveness of the actions the organisation has taken, as a result of the lessons learned from the Solstice investigation, to improve its network operations.
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