Preventing sanction evasion: Advisory on fraudulent certificates

This advisory responds to incidents where shipments of Russian-origin oil and oil products have been fraudulently disguised as non-Russian through falsified Certificates of Origin (COs). To assist in identifying and mitigating these risks, the advisory provides a comprehensive overview of red flags that may signal fraudulent activity and offers practical guidance for verification.

Red flags  

Below is an overview of red flags which may help industry stakeholders identify a fabricated or falsified CO. While these red flags may not signify illicit activity in and of themselves, they could be indicative of product origin manipulation, especially when two or more are present, and should trigger increased due diligence:

• The CO lists a country or outer port limits (OPL) of a country that does not normally produce or export oil or oil products, and/or a volume that does not correspond with previous oil production and export metrics for that country. 

• A CO lists a product being non-Russian origin but there is vessel and/or voyage tracking information which shows that the product(s) initially came from Russia and no substantial processing of the oil has taken place off the water in a third country.   

• The CO is for a shipment that displays evidence of voyage irregularities including, for example, AIS manipulation and suspicious ship-to-ship transfers. 

• The CO contains information that is inconsistent with other shipping and transaction information such as attestations, contracts, cargo documents, and vessel and voyage details and history. 

• There are multiple versions of a CO for a given shipment that list inconsistent information on companies involved, product details, and signatures/contact details.  

• Multiple shipments that have the exact same CO details.  

• A relevant competent authority, for example, a national chamber of commerce, has not issued the CO.  

  • For example, in Malta, the authorities have confirmed that only The Malta Chamber of Commerce, Enterprise and Industry (The Malta Chamber) is allowed to authorise COs and that private entities are not allowed to issue such COs. If there is a CO that has sign off by just a private company and not The Malta Chamber, it is fraudulent. 

• A new company with complex or obscure ownership structures has started to issue COs in locations known for ship-to-ship transfers associated with deceptive or sanctions evasive activity. 

• A company that has issued a CO does not respond to requests for further information or fails to provide relevant information to validate the CO and/or confirm that a shipment has occurred as described in the CO.

Mitigations 

Below are some potential mitigation measures which may help UK entities protect themselves against the threat of supporting shipments of Russian oil and oil products that involve fabricated or falsified COs: 

• Verify that the country listed on the CO produces and/or exports the stated oil or oil product. 

• Compare the volume of the product stated on the CO with historical trade and export data to see if it corresponds with previous shipments or seems abnormal. 

• Risk assess COs that appear incomplete, inconsistent, or contradictory to previously shared or publicly available information. Alternative documentation and information sources should be used to corroborate the information presented in a CO. 

• If there are red flags, consider asking to see all copies of a CO for a particular shipment, including those held by different entities in the supply chain. Assess if they are consistent or there are discrepancies.    

• Where an official CO has been issued by a chamber of commerce, industry participants may be able to check the validity of the certificate of origin using the International Chamber of Commerce’s (ICC) online tool.  

• Where a ‘self-certified’ CO has been issued, undertake appropriate due diligence of customers and counterparties that issue and provide such COs, including Know Your Customer (KYC) and Know Your Customer’s Customer (KYCC) procedures, the latter of which may be used to identify ultimate beneficial ownership, including any links to Russian entities.  

• If there are concerns with the validity of a CO, contact the relevant national authorities (including maritime and customs) to request their assistance e.g., to verify if the entity listed as issuing the CO is legally allowed to do so and the details within the CO. 

• If there are concerns with the validity of a CO, conduct an audit of other relevant documents for the relevant shipment (e.g. attestations, bills of lading, oil trade contracts) as they might also have been fabricated or falsified to align with the CO. 

• If you determine a CO is fabricated or falsified, conduct an audit of past COs and other relevant documentation provided by this counterparty, since they may have previously deceived a service provider as well. 

• Report any suspicious activities that indicate fabricated CO and OPC evasion to relevant national authorities.