UK MAIB issues report on Sirena Seaways

UK MAIB No 6/2014

The UK MAIB has issued Accident Report of the ferry Sirena Seawats which made heavy contact with berth 3 at Harwich International Port, on June 22, 2013 . The impact caused considerable damage to the fore-end of the vessel, including penetrations below the waterline.

Sirena Seaways / Image Credit: UK MAIB report

The linkspan at berth 3 collapsed into the water; the supporting structures were severely damaged and were no longer useable. No one was injured and there was no pollution. Sirena Seaways was subsequently moved to another berth to disembark the passengers and vehicles.

Sirena Seaways’s propulsion control records showed that the starboard propulsion system remained set at about 63% ahead throughout the accident. No defects were found with the propulsion control systems and it was considered most likely that the button to activate the back-up control system for the starboard propulsion system was inadvertently pressed during the early stages of the entry into the port.

This bypassed normal control of the starboard propulsion system. The error was not noticed by the bridge team and the starboard propulsion system continued at 63% ahead for nearly 2 hours after the accident, hampering attempts to pull the vessel from the damaged berth.

Recommendations have been made to the vessel’s owner to: review the need for regular bridge and crew resource management training; and, consider methods for warning passengers and minimising the risk of injury in a similar emergency.

CONCLUSIONS

The starboard CPP back-up control button was inadvertently operated 28 minutes before the accident,
probably while the bridge centre console lights-up’ button was being pressed. The error in operating the back-up button was not noticed by the bridge team prior to the accident.
The engineers in the ECR noticed the back-up system indicator lamp was lit but did not attempt to clarify with the bridge team why it had been operated.
The design of the propulsion control indicators on the bridge wing consoles, and the subsequent modification, allowed both the in-command lights and the back-up lights to be lit simultaneously even though the back-up system was in control.
The glow from the back-up indicator lamp on the bridge wing console was insufficient for it to be noticed by the bridge team.
The design of the bridge consoles pre-dated changes in SOLAS Chapter V which required improved ergonomics on bridge control systems.
The pitch indicators on the bridge wing were not monitored to check that the bridge wing console had positive control of the propulsion.
The bridge team’s recognition of the high speed of approach was too late for action to be taken to prevent the collision.
No warning was given to the passengers and crew (other than the mooring teams) prior to the impact with the linkspan.
The impact caused multiple hull penetrations, including some below the waterline, and demolished much of the infrastructure at berth 3, Harwich International Port.
The bridge team did not notice that the starboard CPP remained driving at 63% ahead for about 2 hours after the accident.
The CPP back-up control system was not routinely used or tested on board, and it was not included in the planned maintenance system.
There was little discussion between senior deck and engineering officers to evaluate the effects of the damage or agree the most appropriate response to the emergency.
Complacency in communications between the teams led to a breakdown in the shared situational awareness of the vessel’s propulsion system and indicates the crew were not working as a cohesive team.