The Swedish P&I Club Monthly Safety Scenario for April 2014

The Swedish P&I Club published its Monthly Safety Scenario for April 2014 regarding grounding of a bulker vessel in the Arctic. The Swedish Club publishes on a monthly basis a new “Monthly Safety Scenario” (MSS) to assist owners in their efforts of complying with the above regulations.

It was early November and a bulker vessel wassailing the Northern Sea Route. It was one ofthe last transits for the year and it was startingto get cold and was dark most of the day.The bulker was carrying ore from Narvik inNorthern Norway to northern China. It had a1AS ice class and was about 40m wide.

For thelast few years the vessel had been frequentlytrading in the Baltic Sea during the winter. However, this winter the vessel would nottrade in the Baltic but between Asia and thewestern USA. The owners thought it would be agood idea to reposition the vessel throughthe Northern Sea Route and asked the managerto arrange everything.The master had sailed in the Baltic for many years during the winter and so had most of the officers. However, none of them had any experience of trading in the Arctic.

The manager had ordered Russian paper charts, and two ice pilots to sail with the vessel during the transit. One polar icebreaker, which was less than 40m wide, was arranged to assist the vessel. When the vessel traded in the Baltic it usually just followed an icebreaker.

Before the vessel started the transit, theMaster discussed with the ice pilots how to planthe transit. It became apparent that the ice pilots’English was not very good. The ice pilots ensuredthe Master that there would be no problems asthey had done this many times and had neverhad an accident. The ice pilots said they wouldcommunicate with the icebreaker and coordinatewhich route to sail. The master agreed to theplan.

About three days into the transit a northerlywind started to blow. The sea had been mostlyice-free during the transit but now ice startedto appear from the North.

The ice pilot told the Master it was importantto avoid any multi-year ice. The problem was thatthe lack of daylight made it difficult to locate anymulti-year ice. The master and officers could notdifferentiate between new ice and multi-year ice.The icebreaker informed the ice pilot that therewould be some multi-year ice. As the bulker waswider than the icebreaker it also had to breaksome ice.

The icebreaker suddenly made a large turn tostarboard because of heavy multi-year ice. The icepilot ordered the vessel to follow the icebreakerclosely. Suddenly the port quarter hit somethingand the entire vessel vibrated.

A couple of minutes later the high level alarm in the engine room bilges sounded. The 2nd Engineer investigated and confirmed that water was entering the engine room on the port side. Bilge pumps were started but the water continued to rise.

The chief engineer informed the master thatif the water continued to rise they would have toabandon the engine room.

During this time the wind increased steadilyand the vessel started to drift. The Master askedif the Chief Engineer had the leak under control because he had to increase the engine power.

At the same time the master asked the ice- breaker if they could connect a wire to the bow but the ice breaker had problems arranging theequipment.

Suddenly the vessel stopped and there weresome heavy vibrations. The Master asked the 2ndOfficer if the vessel had run ground but the 2ndOfficer replied that he didn’t know as the chartindicated that there was enough water. Thevessel did not move and the Master asked theChief Officer to check all tanks and compartments. After a couple of minutes there was ahigh level alarm from the bow thruster room.The Chief Officer and the Bosun entered the bowthruster room and confirmed that water wascoming in.

The Master asked the Chief Officer if he couldsee any oil spill around the vessel but he saidit was too dark to see any oil. The vessel thensuffered a blackout and it went completely dark.

The Swedish P&I Club advises the shipowners to inform the Hull underwriter and P&I Club before trading in the polar regions

Also the Club advises that a vessel should, as a minimun, fulfil the following requirements when sailing in the polar regions:

This Monthly Safety Scenario includes the following questions for incident investigation and further discussion on the accident

1. What were the immediate causes of this accident?

2. Where did the chain of error start?

3. Is there a risk that this kind of accident could happen to our vessel?

4. How could this accident have been prevented?

5. What sections of our SMS would have been breached, if any?

6. Is our SMS sufficient to prevent this kind of accident?

7. If procedures were breached why do you think this was the case?

8. Do we have a risk assessment onboard that addresses these risks?

9. Are there procedures in our SMS that address how to trade in difficult regionslike the polar regions?

10. What kind of training is needed before trading in the polar regions?

11. Will our equipment withstand the cold climate?

12. Does our vessel have an ice class?

13. The infrastructure in the polar regions is minimal as there are no big ports or salvagevessels close by. How should we prepare for this?

14. What kind of extra spare parts will be needed when trading in the polar regions?

15. If the vessel is wider than the icebreaker will two icebreakers assist so that the vesseldoesn’t have to break ice?

16. Would the engine room be manned 24/7 to prevent a small failure becoming a disaster?

17. Would the bridge have extra officers and lookouts on watch?

18. Do you think our navigation and communication equipment would be sufficient forthe polar regions?

19. What do you think was the root cause of this accident?

Source: The Swedish P&I Club /Monthly Safety Scenario