Good Bridge Team Management Prevents Collisions

Lessons form Marine Accident Reports

The UK MAIB issued this yearSafety Digest including lessons learnt from maritime accidents. Two incidents draw the attention on best and worst practices of bridge team management

Good Practices of Bridge Team Management

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The incident involves a ferry and a container shps. The ferry was preparing to sail; she was on a regular route, with her usual bridge team, and sailed in and out of the port several times each day. Despite this familiarity, the master ensured that the presailing checklist had been fully completedand he held a full pre-departure briefing withthe bridge team, discussing the manoeuvre,the environmental conditions, and remindingeveryone that if they had concerns at anytime, they should raise them immediately.

As the ferry sailed out of the port, the bridgeteam started to plot and discuss the traffic inthe TSS that the vessel would soon have tocross. Once the ferry was clear of port limits,the master set a south-easterly course andhanded over the con to the second officer.The two men again discussed the traffic in theTSS, including discussing the large containership that was in the south-west traffic lane.The master then left the bridge.

The container ship had been overtakingseveral fishing vessels and had altered courseto starboard. This left the vessel on a coursepassing astern of the ferry and with a CPA ofmore than a mile. However, once clear of thefishing fleet, the OOW on the container shipbecame concerned that he was too far offtrack, and began altering course back to port.

The second officer on the ferry quicklyrecognised that the container ship was alteringcourse to port and that its CPA was decreasing,and he called the master back to the bridge.The master took the con and executed a roundturn to starboard. He called the container shipand the coastguard, informing them of hisintentions, while the second officer informedthe engine room watch of what was happeningand continued to monitor other traffic in thescheme. When the container ship was past andclear, the master brought the ferry back on heroriginal course and handed the con back tothe second officer

While electronic charts and GPS feedsto radars are valuable aids to navigation,an unwelcome side effect is that the modernwatchkeeper can often seem obsessedwith sticking to ‘the red line’ (his track) -sometimes at the cost of complying withthe COLREGS.
When establishing the circumstancessurrounding this incident, the voyagedata recorder on the ferry was reviewed.This revealed many positive pointsthat perhaps lay the foundation for thesuccessful outcome of this incident:

Worst Practices on Bridge Team Management

The second incident involved a small surveyvessel that was engaged in survey operations.She was on a near southerly heading at5 knots. Six miles to the north-east of her,on a south-westerly heading, was a largecruise ship.

It was the early hours of the morning and bothvessels were operating in restricted visibility.However, on board the cruise ship, the OOWseemed either unaware of his obligationsunder such conditions or unwilling to complywith them. He had not called the master,was not sounding the correct fog signal, andwas listening to dance music while the shipsteamed on at 18 knots.

Meanwhile, the survey vessel was following itssurvey line, and the mate was monitoring thecruise ship on his radar. He acquired thetarget and assessed that the CPA was less than1 cable. Not wishing to stop the survey work,the mate identified the cruise ship on theAIS display and called the vessel by name onVHF radio in the hope that she would altercourse to allow the survey work to continueuninterrupted. The cruise ship did not respond.

The mate attempted to call the cruise shipa further five times over the next 30 minutesuntil, with the cruise ship less than a mileaway and still not visible, he executed a roundturn to starboard, which resulted in the cruiseship passing by at 4 cables.

In restricted visibility there is no give-wayvessel, so the survey vessel was as obligedas the cruise ship to take action.
The cruise company had clear instructionsand the master had clear standing ordersregarding actions to be taken by the OOWwhen encountering restricted visibility,yet the OOW chose to ignore them.When such a blatant disregard forprocedures takes place, companies shouldtake steps to establish whether this is downto a rogue individual, or indicative of morewidespread poor practice. It is of note thatplaying music on the bridge and continuingat 18 knots in thick fog without callingthe master, seemed to hold no fear for theOOW. Equally noteworthy is that a reviewof the cruise ship’s VDR revealed that theOOW’s actions were never questioned bythe second watchkeeper on the bridge.
Attempting to arrange action to avoidcollision, over the VHF radio, is fraughtwith danger. It is far better to simplycomply with the COLREGS

Find more cases on maritime accidents by reading UK MAIB- Safety Digest 01/2013