Report No.23/2013
Windcat 9 – Image credit UK MAIB
UK MAIB has issued combined report on the investigations of the contact with a floating target by the wind farm passenger transfer catamaranWindcat 9 while transiting Donna Nook Air Weapons Range in the south-west approaches to the River Humber on 21 November 2012 and the contact ofIsland Panther with turbine I-6, in Sheringham Shoal .Wind Farm on 21 November 2012.
Just after 1712 on 21 November 2012, the wind farm passengertransfer catamaran Windcat 9 made contact with a floating target inDonna Nook Air Weapons Range while on passage to Grimsby. Theport hull was holed, causing extensive flooding, but there were noinjuries.
At 1620, Windcat 9 left Lynn and Inner Dowsing Wind Farm, situated2.7 nautical miles off Skegness. On board were two crew (masterand a deckhand), a supernumerary (trainee master) and 12 windfarm technicians. The vessel was on autopilot and the masterwas following a reciprocal course on his chart plotter to that of hisoutbound passage. At about 1650, the master was demonstrating to the trainee master howto adjust the plotter’s range. In doing so he inadvertently moved the route, which took thevessel to within 0.75 cable of an unlit floating target.
The master, believing he was still on his reciprocal route, then applied port helm to getahead of Fastnet Tern, another vessel returning to Grimsby. A short time later, he madeanother course correction, this time to starboard after he belatedly realised he wassignificantly to the west of the planned track. About 30 seconds later, while proceedingat 23.5 knots, Windcat 9’s port hull made contact with the target. Following the master’sdistress alert radio transmission, a number of vessels came to his aid. Soon afterwards, thepassengers and crew were transferred to Fastnet Tern.
The investigation found that the master did not hold the correct qualifications and thatnavigation practices, including passage planning and monitoring, use of lookouts andknowledge of the navigation equipment were weak. In addition, the company’s crewassessment procedures were not followed and the master had not been formally assessedto determine his suitability for his role. It was also noted that best practice guidance formanagers and crew of offshore renewable energy passenger transfer vessels was limitedand disparate, and there was no integrated method of promulgating lessons learned to theindustry.
Windcat Workboats Limited has been recommended to review and amend its:
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The National Workboat Association and International Marine Contractors Association, incollaboration with other industry bodies, has been recommended to:
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For detailed analysis of the accident, please read the:
