Report 24/2013
Finnarrow – Image credit:UK MAIB Report 24/2013
The UK MAIB has issued Investigation Report No 24/2013 MV Finnarrow casualty resulting in contact with the berth and subsequent flooding, in Holyhead on 16 February 2013.
At 0556 UTC1on 16February 2013, the port fin stabiliser of the passenger / ro-rocargo ferry Finnarrow made contact with the berth as she arrived atHolyhead, UK. The fin stabiliser subsequently punctured the hull, which led to thepump room flooding. All passengers were disembarked, cargo was unloaded andthe vessel’s onboard services crew were sent ashore. Once divers had plugged thehole in the hull and the shore fire service had employed a high-volume pump, thewater level in the pump room was reduced to below the floor plates and a cementbox was constructed to seal the leak.
The investigation found that the procedures for pre-arrival checks were inadequate.It also concluded that the crew lacked sufficient familiarity with the vessel’sequipment and emergency procedures; issues that had been raised during arecent port state control inspection. Finnlines Ship Management reported it hasimplemented several improvements to its safety management system. However, theMAIB has made recommendations to the company aimed at improving awarenessof the status of the vessel’s fin stabilisers and ensuring its crews are properlyprepared to deal effectively with emergencies.
Action Taken
- Operation of the fin stabilisers has been checked by the manufacturer and found to be in order. Thesystem is now used in automatic mode.
- All Finnlines’ vessels’ fin stabilisers have been checked and modified to ensure they have a similar logic regarding alarms and automatic housing.
- The bridge resource management (BRM) methodology and implementation has been clarified in the SMS with special focus on bridge procedures.
- The role and the importance of checklists has been emphasised in the SMS and a reminder of their implementation will be sent to all vessels.
- The importance of using “closed loop communications” and the “checklist complete procedure” has been emphasised and implemented on all vessels.
- The DPA has verified the implementation of the bridge procedures.
- The Finnarrow accident and lessons learned have been circulated to all vessels.
- A more detailed job specific familiarisation procedure has been developed in the SMS for the handover period on board.
- The existing instructions for how to assess the length of the handover period have been verified
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Conclusions
- Neither the bridge handover and arrival procedures, together with their associated documentation, nor the indication equipment were effective at alerting the bridge team to the status of the fin stabilisers.
- Fatigue might have contributed to the accident given the types of error made by the day master and chief officer and their work patterns leading up to the accident.
- The crew’s response to the flooding could have been more effective and it was fortunate that the vessel sustained flooding to only one compartment.
- The SMS lacked effective guidance that would have helped the crew deal with the emergency.
- The crew were insufficiently familiar with the vessel’s equipment, and lack of effective flooding drills hampered the damage control effort.
- The accident has demonstrated that the SMS was in need of an internal safety audit and correctiveaction as identified in the vessel’s recent PSC inspection.
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For more information, please click at:
UK MAIB Report No on MV Finnarrow accident
