UK MAIB No 17/2014
The UK MAIB has issued Investigation Report regardingthe fire on the main deck of the ro-ro cargo ferry Corona Seaways in the Kattegat, Scandinavia on 4 December 2013.
At0215on4December2013,afirewasdiscoveredonthemaindeckofthero-ro cargo ferry Corona Seaways while the vessel was on passage from Fredericia toCopenhagen,Denmark.Thecrewmustered,closedtheventilationlouvres, establishedboundarycoolingandoperatedthefixedCO2 fire-extinguishingsystem. Althoughsmokecontinuedtoescapefromthelouvres,steadytemperaturesinthe vicinityofthefireindicatedthattheCO2 hadbeeneffectiveincontrollingit.At0640, thevesselenteredtheSwedishportofHelsingborg,whereassistancewasprovided bythelocalFireandRescueService.
The vessel suffered light structural damage and the loss of some minor electrical supplies.Threevehiclesandsixtrailerswereseverelyfire-damagedandother vehiclessufferedminorradiantheatdamage.Thefirewascausedbyanelectrical defect on one of the vehicles engine starting system.
Recommendationstothemanagementcompanyincludeareviewofitsonboard instructionstotakeaccountoftherevisedproceduressinceintroducedbythe operator for the carriage of used and unregistered vehicles.
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Safety issues directly contributing to the accident that have been addressed or resulted in recommendations:
- Therewasnoevidencethatanycheckshadbeencarriedouttoprovethetrucks roadworthinessorgeneralsafety,includingtheintegrityofitselectricaland mechanical systems.
- Thecarriageofusedvehiclesandequipmentthatdonothaveappropriate roadworthinesscertificationandwhosehistoryandconditionareunknownbrings increased risks when compared to the carriage of well maintained vehicles that are in regular use.
- DFDSA/SsfireriskcontrolmeasuresintroducedafterthefireonboardVictoria Seaways applied only to used vehicles carried on designated car transporters. There was no documented evidence that these control measures were carried out.
- ContrarytothespiritoftheMCAsCodeofPracticeandthemastersUnsafeCargo’ notice,therewasnoevidencethatthevesselscrewcarriedoutvehiclesafety checks.
- NeithertheSSMMnortheonboardriskassessmentscoveredthecarriageofused vehiclesandequipment.
Other safety issues directly contributing to the accident:
- Theenginestartermotormainsolenoidwasseverelydamagedbyinternalarcing, which had destroyed the moving contact.
- Theheavydutycableconnectingthebatterytotheenginestartermotormain solenoid was live and permitted unintended electrical arcing inside the solenoid which,togetherwithhighcurrentflowexperiencedduringenginestarting,caused thecabletooverheatandinitiatethefire.
- Theheavydutycableconnectingthebatterytotheenginestartermotormain solenoid was live and permitted unintended electrical arcing inside the solenoid which,togetherwithhighcurrentflowexperiencedduringenginestarting,caused thecabletooverheatandinitiatethefire.
Safety issues not directly contributing to the accident that have been addressed or resulted in recommendations:
- InjectionofCO2 intothemaindeckwasdelayed,allowingthefiretodevelop, becauseittooktimetoestablishthefitterswhereaboutsduringthecrewmuster.
- ThereasonwhytheCO2 fire-extinguishingsystemapparentlyfailedtodischargethe allottedquantityofCO2 asdesignedremainsunexplained.
- The main deck ventilation louvres were not fully closed and some of the crew were unawarehowtocorrectlyoperatethem.Thisallowedair(oxygen)tofeedthefire andpotentiallyaffectedtheCO2 concentrationlevelsneededtoextinguishthefire.
- Thecargodeckventilationfanswerenotoperatedasrequiredbythecurrent regulations.Thisincreasedthefireriskduetothepotentialbuild-upofflammable vapoursfromvehicles.
Other safety issues not directly contributing to the accident:
- Vehicledrivers/passengerswhohadconsumedalcoholweredisruptiveandstarted toaffectthechiefofficersmanagementoftheincident.
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More details may be found by reading the UK MAIB Investigation Report
