NTSB provides tropical cyclone information for mariners

The US NTSB issued a report, urging the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the National Weather Service (NWS), and the US Coast Guard to take action on tropical cyclone information recommendations, in the interest of mariner safety. The recommendations derive primarily from the NTSB’s ongoing investigation into the sinking of cargo vessel El Faro on October 1, 2015.

The incident

On Thursday, October 1, 2015, about 0715 eastern daylight time (EDT), the Coast Guard received distress alerts from the 790-foot roll-on/roll-off container ship El Faro. The US-flag vessel, owned by TOTE Maritime Puerto Rico and operated by TOTE Services, was 40 miles northeast of Acklins and Crooked Island, Bahamas, and close to the eye of Hurricane Joaquin. The ship was en route from Jacksonville, Florida, to San Juan, Puerto Rico, with a cargo of containers and vehicles.

Just minutes before the distress alerts were received, the El Faro captain had called TOTE’s designated person ashore and reported that a scuttle had popped open on deck no. 2 and that there was free communication of water into the no. 3 hold. He said the crew had controlled the ingress of water but that the ship was listing 15 degrees and had lost propulsion. The Coast Guard and TOTE were unable to reestablish communication with the ship.
Twenty-eight US crewmembers, including an off-duty engineering officer sailing as a supernumerary, and five Polish workers were on board.

The Coast Guard, US Navy, and US Air Force dispatched multiple assets to the ship’s last known position, but the search was hampered by hurricane-force conditions on scene. On Sunday, October 4, a damaged lifeboat and two damaged liferafts were located. The same day, the Coast Guard found a deceased crewmember wearing an immersion suit. A Coast Guard rescue swimmer placed a self-locating buoy next to the body and left to investigate reported signs of life elsewhere.

No signs of life were found, and the previously located body could not be found again. On Monday, October 5, a debris field and oil slick were discovered. The Coast Guard determined that El Faro was lost and declared the accident a major marine casualty. At sundown on Wednesday, October 7, the Coast Guard suspended the search for survivors.

Findings

1. Specific improvement of tropical cyclone forecasting in moderate-shear environments would lead to better model performance/guidance and improved mariner safety.
2. Technology that would allow National Weather Service forecasters to quickly sort through large numbers of tropical cyclone forecast model ensembles, identify clusters of solutions among ensemble members, and allow correlation of these clusters against a set of standard parameters would significantly improve official forecasts for tropical cyclones that affect mariners at sea.
3. Mariners using only Inmarsat-C SafetyNET miss important tropical cyclone information found in the Intermediate Public Advisories and Tropical Cyclone Updates.
4. Current National Weather Service policy for the issuance of an Intermediate Public Advisory may prevent the generation of important new information about a tropical cyclone that does not pose an immediate threat to land.
5. The “next advisory” time identified in the Tropical Cyclone Forecast/Advisory products for a particular storm could mislead some users as to when new storm information of any type for that storm will become available from the National Weather Service.
6. Although National Weather Service facilities are required to issue Special Advisories when an unexpected significant change is believed to occur in a tropical cyclone, no formal guidance exists for forecasters to define significant change.
7. Timely dissemination of National Weather Service Tropical Cyclone Forecast/Advisories, Intermediate Public Advisories, and Tropical Cyclone Updates to mariners in all regions via medium-frequency navigational TELEX (NAVTEX), high-frequency voice broadcasts (HF VOBRA), and high-frequency simplex teletype over radio (HF SITOR) would help mariners remain informed about tropical cyclones.
8. Certain enhancements to the National Weather Service FTPmail service would assist mariners in remaining cognizant of weather information not available in a timely manner, or not available at all, via other onboard weather information receipt vehicles.
9. Future improvements to National Weather Service weather services for mariners could be greatly aided by improved National Weather Service solicitation of mariner feedback.

Recommendations

To the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:

• Develop and implement a plan specifically designed to emphasize improved model performance in forecasting tropical cyclone track and intensity in moderate-shear environments.
• Develop and implement technology that would allow National Weather Service forecasters to quickly sort through large numbers of tropical cyclone forecast model ensembles, identify clusters of solutions among ensemble members, and allow correlation of those clusters against a set of standard parameters. 

To the National Weather Service:

• Work with international partners to develop and implement a plan to ensure immediate dissemination to mariners, via Inmarsat-C SafetyNET (and appropriate future technology), of the Intermediate Public Advisories and Tropical Cyclone Updates issued by the National Weather Service, in a manner similar to the current process of disseminating the Tropical Cyclone Forecast/Advisory. 
• Modify your directives to ensure, for all tropical cyclones of tropical storm strength or greater within your jurisdiction, that your facilities issue, at the 3-hour interval between regularly scheduled Tropical Cyclone Forecast/Advisories, an Intermediate Public Advisory, a Tropical Cyclone Update, or another product available (or expected to be available) to mariners via Inmarsat-C SafetyNET (and appropriate future technology), and that the product include the coordinates of the current storm center position, maximum sustained surface winds, current movement, and minimum central pressure. 
• Modify your directives to ensure that the “next advisory” time in a Tropical Cyclone Forecast/Advisory clearly indicates when to expect the next update of “current” or forecast information for that particular tropical cyclone. 
• Quantitatively define “significant change” in terms of both the track and intensity of a tropical cyclone to guide the issuance of Special Advisory packages.
• Ensure that tropical cyclone graphic products issued by entities such as the National Hurricane Center, the Central Pacific Hurricane Center, the Guam Weather Forecast Office, the Joint Typhoon Warning Center, and Fleet Weather Center–Norfolk are made available in near-real time via the FTPmail service. 
• Allow users to schedule recurring, automated receipt of specific National Weather Service products through an enhanced FTPmail service (and appropriate future technology).
• Develop and implement a plan for soliciting feedback from the marine user community, particularly ship masters, about the accuracy, timeliness, and usability of weather services to mariners. 

To the US Coast Guard:

• In collaboration with the National Weather Service, provide timely broadcasts of the Tropical Cyclone Forecast/Advisories, Intermediate Public Advisories, and Tropical Cyclone Updates to mariners in all regions via medium-frequency navigational TELEX (NAVTEX), high-frequency voice broadcasts (HF VOBRA), and high-frequency simplex teletype over radio (HF SITOR), or appropriate radio alternatives (and appropriate future technology.

Explore more by reading the official report herebelow: