Lessons Learnt: Blown Out of Proportion

UK MAIB Safety Digest

The UK MAIB issued last yearSafety Digest including lessons learnt from maritime accidents. The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) examines and investigates all types of marineaccidents to or on board UK vessels worldwide, and other vessels in UK territorial waters. This Safety Digest draws the attention of the marine community to some of the lessons arisingfrom investigations into recent accidents and incidents.

Vessel on finger jetty (Image Credit: UK MAIB Safety Digest 02/2013)

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The Case

A high speed catamaran (HSC) was scheduledto shift to an adjacent berth. Accordingly, a pilothad boarded the vessel and joined the vessel’smaster, chief officer and chief engineer on thebridge. He asked for a pilot card, but no cardwas provided and the vessel’s manoeuvringcharacteristics were not explained to him.

Thepilot and master briefly discussed the manoeuvreand the master confirmed that, despite thestrong north-westerly breeze, the high speedcraft did not require tug assistance. No teambriefing was held to discuss the conduct of themove or the roles and responsibilities of thebridge and mooring teams.

The master was at the aft-facing manoeuvringstation in the centre of the bridge, from wherehis view of the area immediately around thevessel was limited. As the lines were let go, thewind increased and began to blow the vessel’sbow to the south.

In an attempt to keep thevessel parallel to the berth, the master adjustedits water jets, but was unable to prevent thevessel from being blown towards a finger jettyseveral meters off the vessel’s port side. TheHSC landed heavily on the end of the jetty

The master eventually managed to manoeuvrethe HSC clear. However, in doing so, the vessel’sstarboard prow became wedged behind a fixedfender attached to a dolphin to the north. Thiswas not seen by the master or the bridge team.The vessel continued to move ahead and thefender was detached from the dolphin.

The vessel’s starboard prow was also badlydamaged. The HSC was assisted to her intendedberth by the port’s duty tug before proceedingto a repair yard. The catamaran was out ofservice for 5 days.

Lessons Learnt

The manoeuvring characteristics andlimitations of a vessel should always betaken into consideration irrespective ofthe distance being transited. If doubt existsconcerning a vessel’s ability to manoeuvrein the conditions experienced, it is usuallysafer to order a tug and not use it, ratherthan not to have a tug available at all.
As no safety briefing was held before themanoeuvre, the bridge team were unableto support the master. Team briefings keepeveryone in the picture so that each personis then better placed to see when things arestarting to go wrong and to take positiveaction to assist.
Regular reporting from lookouts stationedfore and aft is very important when mooringin tight areas. However, they must bebriefed on what to report, when to report,and how to report.
Effective communications and informationexchange between masters and pilots arepivotal to their mutual understanding ofa vessel’s intended operation or movement.Without them, a pilot is seldom much useto a master, and vice versa