Lessons Learnt: Alcohol- assisted collision

UK MAIB Safety Digest

The UK MAIB issued last yearSafety Digest including lessons learnt from maritime accidents. One case draws the attention on collision caused by master’s reckless behaviour.

A small outbound general cargo vessel and alarge inbound ferry collided near the fairwaybuoy that marked the seaward limit of a port.Fortunately, there were no resulting injuries orpollution and both vessels managed to proceedinto port under their own power. However, thecargo vessel’s bow was extensively damaged and the collision caused a largegash in the ferry’s port side.

It was shortly after sunset, the weather wasfine and the visibility was good. Each vesselhad operational radar, each had contacted theport’s VTS at the required reporting points,and there was no other traffic in the vicinity.

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The cargo vessel’s master was alone on thebridge as the vessel approached the fairwaybuoy. On the ferry, the master had temporarilyleft the bridge, leaving the chief officer (whowas also a pilotage exemption certificate holderfor the port) with the con. The third officerand a helmsman were also in attendance.

As the ferry approached the fairway buoy, thechief officer was content to close the cargovessel because, in his experience, vesselsdeparting the port routinely altered courseto starboard after passing the fairway buoy

The cargo vessel left the fairway buoy to port.However, instead of then altering course tostarboard, her master chose to alter course toport, which put the cargo vessel on a collisioncourse with the ferry.

The VTS operator had called the cargo vesselon VHF radio and had questioned the master’sintentions. On receiving confirmation from themaster that he was altering course to port, theVTS operator then called the ferry, informingthe chief officer that the ferry was standing intodanger with the cargo vessel, and requestinghim to contact the cargo vessel directly.

The chief officer followed the VTS operator’sadvice and tried to make contact with thecargo vessel. Meanwhile, the third officer, whohad seen the cargo vessel altering course toport, informed the chief officer of the factand repeatedly advised him of the danger ofcollision. The chief officer then ordered hardto starboard and called the master back tothe bridge. However, this action was too lateto prevent the vessels colliding.

Once the vessels were alongside, localpolice officers boarded each of them andbreathalysed the deck officers. The cargovessel’s master was found to be more thanthree times over the legal limit for alcohol.He was later convicted for breaching theRailways and Transport Safety Act 2003 andsentenced to 1 year’s imprisonment.

Lessons Learnt

Don’t drink and drive! It is totallyunacceptable to be in charge of a navigationalwatch while intoxicated. In this case, thecargo vessel’s master received a prisonsentence for his reckless behaviour.
The ferry’s chief officer assumed that thecargo vessel would alter course to starboardafter passing the fairway buoy. When thisdid not happen, he should have been inlittle doubt that a risk of collision existed.The ferry was a stand-on vessel in acrossing situation and the chief officerwas at liberty to take avoiding action byhis manoeuvre alone. However, he delayeddoing so and continued towards the fairwaybuoy on the assumption that the cargovessel would eventually take action toavoid a collision.
Although the ferry’s third officer informedthe chief officer that the cargo vessel wasaltering course to port, the chief officercontinued to delay taking avoiding action.Given the close proximity of the cargovessel and the ferry’s manoeuvringcharacteristics, his decision to delay indicates that he did not appreciate the timeavailable in which he had to act beforecollision became inevitable. How well doyou know your own vessel’s manoeuvringcharacteristics? Would you know whento act?
The VTS operator quickly identified thatthe cargo vessel, on passing the fairwaybuoy, had not altered course to starboardas he had expected. He did not hesitate toquestion the master’s intentions, confirmhis action and convey this to the ferry.However, short and sharp warning messages,in accordance with best practice, wouldhave been more effective in conveying theurgency of the situation to both vessels.

Read more cases at UK MAIB’s Safety Digest 02/2013 (click at image below)