A large number of cargo containers fall over board
Danish Maritime Accident Investigation Board (DMAIB) issued a Marine Accident report regardingheavy weather damage on SVENDBORG MAERSK, on 14 February 2014.
On 13 February 2014 at 1530, the Danish container ship SVENDBORG MÆRSK departed from Rotterdam, the Netherlands. The ship was bound for the Suez Canal, and subsequently the Far East. The master expected to encounter adverse weather conditions on the route. However, the forecast did not cause any concern.
The following day, as the ship had left the Outer English Channel the weather conditions started deteriorating. In the afternoon, the ship suddenly and without warning rolled to extreme angles and a large number of cargo containers fell over board.
In the early evening, the ship again suddenly rolled violently, reaching an extreme angle of roll of 41 to port. Again a large number of containers were lost over board and the master considered the situation to threaten the safety of the ship. The master sounded the general alarm to muster the crew members. Later in the evening he assessed that the weather no longer posed an immediate danger to the ship.
The weather conditions encountered were more severe than the forecast had predicted.
SVENDBORG MÆRSK proceeded towards Malaga, Spain, for repairs of the ship and removal of damaged containers on board. The ship arrived alongside at 1715 on 17 February 2014.
In the analysis the DMAIB has addressed a number of topics, such as the master´s decision making and the information available to him, as well as the ship´s capability to withstand adverse weather conditions.
The report contains information, received from Maersk Line, about preventive actions taken.
Consequences of the heavy weather encounter
After the arrival in Malaga, the results of the heavy weather encounter of the ship were determined to include the loss over board of some lifesaving appliances stored on deck and damage to others. Some other equipment fitted on deck was found missing and some damaged, including one pilot combination ladder and related fittings. Furthermore, the ship had suffered minor structural damage including stanchions and railings, and shell plating indents.
SVENDBORG MAERSK, aft deck at arrival in Malaga
(Image Credit: Maersk Line)
Lashing gear for 600-700 containers was found to have been damaged during the incidents. The counting of the cargo containers showed that 517 units had been lost over board. From the cargo documentation it was established that of these, 75 units contained cargo and the additional 442 units were empty. Another 250 units were found to be damaged.
| Conclusions |
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The accident happened when SVENDBORG MÆRSK, on two separate occasions, encountered extremities in an adverse weather situation in the northern part of the Bay of Biscay. The extremities caused sudden heavy rolling of the ship that led to the loss of 517 cargo containers and damage to approx. 250 cargo containers. A number of factors coincided and caused the incidents and subsequent consequences. An adverse weather situation was forecasted in SPOS and the ship had prepared for this. However, the weather as a combination of dynamic forces and the extremities encountered by SVENDBORG MÆRSK was not expected by the master and crew members. It was inherently challenging, beforehand, by the means available, to gain a mental overview depicting the exact weather and wave situation the ship encountered during the incidents, including the ship´s motional behaviour, as many variables were involved. The master´s decision-making prior to the heavy weather navigation was largely reliant on his personal experience with heavy weather and the ship he commanded. Decision-making was challenged during uncertain and dynamic conditions with limited data at hand, or a limited recognition of their meaning in combination with the generic SMS procedures available, that will inherently have a deviance in work as described and how work is carried out, which provided poor decision-making support for the master. The quality of the master´s decisions would therefore only be obvious afterwards, when the outcome was known. A number of initiatives affecting the operation of SVENDBORG MAERSK had been initiated by the company, starting with a conversion in 2012. The initiatives ensured an increased cargo capacity on board the ship by modifications made according to changed class rules. The initiatives may have affected the ship´s ability to operate safely in adverse weather conditions, and it is likely to have been a determinant for the extent of the consequences of the incidents. However, the ship had never been designed or configured for operation in weather extremities as those encountered on 14 February 2014. |
| Preventive Measures Taken |
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In relation to the incidents with SVENDBORG MÆRSK on 14 February 2014 Maersk Line has informed the DMAIB about preventive measures: For more than a decade Maersk Line has installed and subscribed for the SPOS program, which provides vessels with computer based weather routing, based on two daily weather forecasts. Since November 2013 Maersk Line has installed and subscribed for a SPOS See Keeping Module on board 106 of the most exposed vessels. This module provides an automatic pre-calculation of vessel’s behaviour in the forecasted wind and wave pattern – sparing the master for the complex pre-calculation and likewise complex risk assessment of parametric roll, synchronic roll, pitching, etc. – In the early months of 2014 Maersk Line found reason to emphasize and positively confirm that this Sea Keeping Module is indeed being utilized. By Fleet Circular 009/2014 Maersk Line enhanced the already existing requirement for the masters to supplement the SPOS program with Weather Routing from DMI and, to the extent possible, deviate or postpone the passage whenever the forecasted wind exceeds BF 9. By the same Fleet Circular Maersk Line removed the generic Heavy Weather Checklist from their Safety Management System and instructed the vessels to use the more dynamic version included in the SPOS program. Since 2004 Maersk Line provided their senior officers with Heavy Weather Training, covering wave theories, vessel response patterns, precautionary measures, etc. Until 2007 the courses were conducted by class room training, but when all had passed, the contents were compiled into a Heavy Weather Training CD which was made available to all vessels through their formal Training Library. Through the mentioned Fleet Circular all vessels were reminded of this Training CD and a new set of CDs were distributed to ensure 100% availability. Within Maersk Line all container lashing equipment is dimensioned with Minimum Breaking Load double of the Safe Working Load – except for the Fully Automatic Twist Locks, which have a considerably lower safety factor when in “automatic mode”. The recent container losses prompted Maersk Line to initiate Final Element Calculations of the captioned twist locks and their influence on the whole stowage behaviour during various scenarios. |
Further information may be found by reading DMAIB Marine Accident Report by clicking on the image below:
