BSU has issued an investigation report into an incident where the multipurpose vessel PETRA L collided with an offshore wind turbine in the Gode Wind 1 wind farm.
The incident
The multipurpose vessel PETRA L, flying the flag of Antigua and Barbuda, was sailing from Szczecin in Poland to Merksem in Belgium via the Kiel Canal on 24 April 2023. After leaving the locks at Brunsbüttel, she headed for the Terschelling-German Bight traffic separation scheme (TSS).
At about 2004, the PETRA L struck an offshore wind turbine (OWT) in the Gode Wind 1 wind farm north of the Terschelling-German Bight TSS, damaging it in the process. She was sailing at a speed of about 9 kts. The ship was heavily damaged. The bow was torn open and pushed in on the starboard side, including below the waterline, which inevitably led to water ingress. There were no casualties.
Since the ship remained buoyant and the engine was still running, the master decided, despite the enormous damage, to sail 70 nm to Emden and initially sailed back to the TSS. The PETRA L was made fast in the port of Emden at 0840 on 25 April 2023.
It was not until daylight began to break that the damage on the starboard side of the bow could be fully ascertained. The BSU was informed about the incident at midday. Two investigators surveyed the ship the following day and spoke with the parties involved.
In addition to the minimum manning of seagoing ships, this investigation also focuses on the monitoring of maritime traffic by Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) Wilhelmshaven and the wind farm operator’s control centre.
Conclusions
Manning and watchkeeping
In the opinion of the BSU, the allision could have been prevented if a proper lookout had been maintained at all times in accordance with paragraphs 24.1 and 32 of Section A-VIII/2 STCW Code. The allision occurred when the master, who was on navigational watch as scheduled, mistakenly took the wrong dietary supplement due to chronic fatigue and fell asleep. The BNWAS did not ensure that the only lookout, i.e., the officer on watch (the master), was sufficiently alert. There was no additional lookout alongside the officer on watch or any other alarm system with which the danger could have been detected and the allision prevented.
In addition to the master, there was only one chief mate, meaning the two individuals had to share watchkeeping duties around the clock, with the master also required at all times to perform additional duties. It must be noted that one master and one chief mate are not sufficient to ensure the safe operation of a vessel – this applies in particular to ships such as the PETRA L, which are equipped with only an autopilot, radar (ARPA), AIS, and BNWAS to support navigational watchkeeping duties.
Watch schedule and standing orders
Watch schedules and standing orders should reflect watchkeeping regulations. Based on the considerations outlined in the watchkeeping regulations, masters should assess the circumstances under which a lookout may not be required between sunrise and sunset. The results of this assessment should be documented in the standing orders.
Minimum safe manning document
In the opinion of the BSU, the Administration of the certifying State should use this accident as an opportunity to ensure that masters of ships such as the PETRA L can always maintain a navigational watch with at least two watchkeeping officers and additional lookouts in accordance with Resolution A.1047(27). The North Sea and Baltic Sea trading areas and the short port layovers offer the crew no opportunity for extended rest periods. In addition to the considerations outlined in the Resolution, the Administration should also take into account the time spent on board by crew members when approving a two-watch system. However, the BSU believes that potentially inadequate accommodation facilities on board should no longer be accepted for any transitional provisions. At least in Germany, this argument has been known for decades and cited in the reasoning for amendments to relevant legal norms for nearly half a century.
Exceptions to this principle can certainly be made for ships that do not have to carry out changes of watch under working time regulations. Furthermore, in the opinion of the BSU, qualified crew members and a cook are always required under Regulation II/5 of the Annex to the STCW Convention. The minimum safe manning document should specify whether other crew members can assume the cook’s duties and what qualifications the cook should have. Furthermore, in the context of safe manning, the minimum safe manning document should contain the standards for qualifications in ship safety and security. With regard to the clarifications in minimum safe manning documents addressed to the Administration of the flag State, Resolution A.1047(27) should be more clearly formulated. This would provide all flag States and ship operators with an improved basis for determining manning requirements and make manning requirements more transparent.
Legal framework for offshore installations
The current 500 m safety zone around an offshore installation seems to be outdated. Given the size and speed of modern ships, significantly longer reaction times are now needed. It raises the question as to why monitoring by the wind farm operator should be limited to the safety zone. Moreover, to detect every vessel in the vicinity of a wind farm installation, radar monitoring should not be dispensed with. Of course, to achieve the best possible result, this should be integrated with AIS and ECDIS.
Vessel traffic service centres
The sudden absence of the NvD at the Wilhelmshaven vessel traffic service centre was to be compensated for by the NvD of the neighbouring VTS assuming responsibility. However, the resulting area being monitored is so extensive that it cannot be managed by just one VTS. This accident clearly demonstrates the need for a faster and more immediate standby system to address the sudden absence of an NvD.
The remaining manning (one NvD and three nautical assistants) was evidently not sufficient for the unusual course of the PETRA L to be noticed within 50 minutes of her leaving the TSS. It should also be mentioned that neither the NvD of Vessel Traffic Service Wilhelmshaven nor later the NvD of VTS Emden inquired why the PETRA L wanted to go to Emden at such short notice. The ship’s plight was only recognised in the lock at Emden. On the other hand, the transmission of an (automated) distress call (mayday) was at the master’s discretion.
The Fraunhofer Institute is currently in the process of developing a new option for improving radio communication. They have been actively working in the field of maritime speech recognition for several years and have now developed a speech recogniser (marFM®). This system is designed to display VHF conversations in real time on a screen using artificial intelligence, inter alia. In addition to German and English, it is intended to function with an increasing number of other languages to prevent misunderstandings. As part of the BMDV’s ‘LEAS’ project, the use and benefits of this software are being investigated and a speech-to-context concept developed. Once the project is complete, the software will be tested for usability in the VTS.
MHCC
The wind farm operator’s internal investigation revealed that alarms in the SOMS were muted when the allision happened, as the numerous alarms were considered disruptive. The BSU believes that an average of six alarms per hour should not overwhelm a sea area monitoring coordinator. Accordingly, this should be changed.
Another issue is software updates. Associated training should be provided to all users promptly so as to avoid operating errors and/or misinterpretations.
Safety recommendations
The following safety recommendations do not constitute a presumption of blame or liability in respect of type, number, or sequence.
Federal Ministry for Digital and Transport (BMDV)
The BSU makes the following recommendations to the BMDV:
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It should work toward effecting a revision of Resolution A.1047(27). All ships operating a multi-shift system should be required to have a sufficient number of deck officers on board so that the master is not forced to keep regular watches. In accordance with the Maritime Labour Convention, each ship should have a cook, and the minimum safe manning document should specify the qualifications required. Further qualification requirements, such as in the context of maritime safety, security, etc., should be clearly specified in the minimum safe manning document.
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Prescribe the use of radar for maritime surveillance and amend Decree WS 23/528.2/2-2-2 accordingly.
Ship operator of the PETRA L
The BSU makes the following recommendations to the ship operator:
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Reapply for the PETRA L’s minimum safe manning document in accordance with the conclusions regarding manning.
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Deploy at least two deck officers on its ships in addition to the master.
The flag State Antigua and Barbuda
The BSU makes the following recommendations to the flag State Antigua and Barbuda:
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Consider the conclusions regarding manning when issuing minimum safe manning documents.
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Amend accordingly comparable minimum safe manning documents already issued, taking into account the necessary adjustments.
GDWS
The BSU makes the following recommendations to the GDWS:
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Ensure that standby personnel are available for its vessel traffic service centres.
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Stipulate that wind farm operators must ensure that monitoring is carried out in a safety zone beyond the 500 m radius so that they can take appropriate action in good time to prevent an allision.
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Allow wind farm operators to contact vessels within the safety zone directly to save time in dangerous situations.
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Raise awareness among its NvDs of the need to inquire about the reasoning behind reported deviations from planned routes.
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Continue to monitor the transcription of conversations on VHF so as to enable vessel traffic service centres to make use of the technical option of reading conversations in real time.
