Proper bridge team procedures ensure safe passage
UK Marine Accident Investigation Brach (MAIB) has issued a report on thecontact made by passenger ferry Barfleur with chain of chain ferry Bramble Bush Bay.
Barfleur
Bramble-Bush-Bay
At 0626 (UTC1 +1) on 16 July 2014, the RoPax2 ferry Barfleur made contact with one of the chains of the chain ferry Bramble Bush Bay, causing the chain to part. The chain and its corresponding hydraulic drive motor on board Bramble Bush Bay had to be replaced following the accident, while Barfleur received only minor damage to its rudders, starboard propeller and skeg.
The investigation found that Barfleurs high speed and close proximity to Bramble Bush Bay, which was moored in its normal out-of-service position on the south side of the entrance to Poole Harbour, caused the vessels to interact. The resultant lateral movement of the chain ferry resulted in its chains being lifted. Barfleurs track south of the fixed white leading light line, coupled with the low height of tide and the resulting squat effect on Barfleurs draught, led to Barfleur making contact with the chain ferrys out harbour chain.
A recommendation has been made to Barfleurs owner, Brittany Ferries, aimed at improving bridge team procedures when entering port to ensure the passage is planned and monitored effectively. A recommendation has also been made to Poole Harbour Commissioners to specify in the port passage plan that the harbour speed limit refers to speed through the water.
| Conclusions |
- Barfleur passed closer than usual to Bramble Bush Bay, at a higher than normal speed, and in a lower than normal depth of water. These three elements combined to cause unnecessary squat, wash and interaction with Bramble Bush Bay.
- Interaction between Barfleur and Bramble Bush Bay resulted in the chain ferry moving laterally south-east, causing its chains to rise and, consequently, their depth to reduce.
- Barfleur was proceeding south of the recommended route and in excess of the harbour authority’s speed limit, thereby reducing Barfleur’s underkeel clearance, and resulting in the ship contacting the ‘out harbour’ chain of Bramble Bush Bay.
- Barfleur’s bridge team’s familiarity with the track normally followed and the methods used to monitor the vessel’s progress led to an acceptance that the track and position monitoring methods were valid in all circumstances and conditions.
- Barfleur’s passage through the harbour entrance had not been planned or monitored in accordance with navigational best practice, guidance for which is provided in the ICS Bridge Procedures Guide.
- Barfleur’s passage plan did not contain information on the extent to which the ship could safely deviate from the planned track, given the prevailing conditions.
- Without a full understanding of the master’s intended track and no proper consideration of the extent to which the ship could safely deviate from the intended track, the OOW was restricted in the practical assistance he could provide the master.
- The speed limit imposed by the harbour authority was not specified in the Poole Pilotage Plan as speed through the water.
- Barfleur’s bridge team did not consider reducing the vessel’s speed in the prevailing circumstances and conditions. This indicates a misunderstanding of the purpose of the speed limit within the port. Appropriate guidance on the dangers of squat, wash and interaction is provided in the UK MCA’s MGN 199 (M).
- A lack of clear instructions for the VDR in Barfleur’s SMS led to no data being saved following the accident.
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Further information may be found by reading relevant UK MAIB report below:
Source and Image Credit: UK MAIB
