UK MAIB issues report on Florida and Chou Shan collision

Collision between CMA CGM Florida and Chou Shan on 19 March 2013

UK Marine Accident Investigation Brach (MAIB) has issued report No. 11/2014 on thecollision betweenCMA CGM FloridaandChou Shan140 miles east of Shanghai, East China Seaon 19 March 2013.

According to the report at 0033 on 19 March 2013, the container vessel CMA CGM Florida and the bulk carrier Chou Shan collided in the East China Sea resulting in both vessels sustaining serious damage, and approximately 610 tonnes of heavy fuel oil being spilled from CMA CGM Florida. There were no injuries. CMA CGM Florida had left Yang Shan, China, on 18 March and was heading towards Pusan, Korea. Chou Shan was heading from Qinhuangdao, China, towards the east coast of Australia.

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CMA CGM Floridas Filipino second officer, who was the officer of the watch, altered course to starboard to pass between a group of fishing vessels on the port bow and a vessel on a reciprocal course to starboard. This resulted in a risk of collision with Chou Shan, which was crossing CMA CGM Florida from port to starboard. Chou Shans officer of the watch then used the Very High Frequency (VHF) radio to request that CMA CGM Florida pass around Chou Shans stern. The VHF radio conversation was conducted in Mandarin by CMA CGM Floridas Chinese second officer, who had joined the vessel in Yang Shan and was on the bridge for familiarisation.

CMA CGM Floridas Filipino officer of the watch did not understand Mandarin and was unaware that the Chinese second officer had, tacitly, agreed to Chou Shans request. Both vessels altered course to port, which resulted in a continued risk of collision with each other. CMA CGM Floridas Chinese second officer then called Chou Shan on the VHF radio to request that both vessels pass port-to-port. This was agreed to by Chou Shans officer of the watch. Both vessels then altered course to starboard, resulting in a collision.

CMA CGM Floridas second officers and Chou Shans officer of the watch considered that it was appropriate to use VHF radio for collision avoidance, contrary to industry advice. Furthermore, Chou Shans officer of the watch considered that it was appropriate to use VHF radio for negotiating a passing protocol that was contrary to Rule 15 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.

CMA CGM Floridas Filipino officer of the watch lacked situational awareness. Contributing to this was the Chinese second officers incomplete translation of the VHF radio communications with Chou Shan and the Filipino officer of the watchs disproportionate reliance on Automatic Identification System (AIS) target Closest Point of Approach and Time to Closest Point of Approach information.

CMA CGM International Shipping Company PTE Ltd (CMA CGM) and Sincere Navigation Corporation have each taken action aimed at preventing a recurrence. A recommendation has been made to CMA CGM for it to take appropriate measures to ensure its company shipboard policies and procedures are adhered to and that its masters recognise the importance of engaging with and motivating crew in the safe and efficient management of its vessels. Sincere Navigation Corporation has been recommended to review and amend its safety management system to ensure that VHF radio is not normally used for collision avoidance and that its masters are empowered to provide specific metrics in their standing orders as to when they should be called by the officer of the watch. The International Chamber of Shipping and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency have been recommended to update their respective guidance on the use of AIS data for collision avoidance.

Conclusions

CMA CGM Florida’s Filipino OOW lacked situational awareness and precautionarythought.
CMA CGM Floridas two 2/Os and Chou Shans OOW considered that it was appropriate to use VHF radio for collision avoidance, contrary to the advice provided in ICSs Bridge Procedures Guide and the MCAs MGN 324 (M+F).
CMA CGM Floridas Chinese 2/O acted autonomously in his role of external communicator, and did not fully translate his VHF radio conversations into English for the Filipino OOW.
Chou Shans OOW considered that it was appropriate to use VHF radio for negotiating a passing protocol that was contrary to Rule 15 of the COLREGS.
CMA CGM Floridas and Chou Shans masters standing orders presumed that the OOW and the master had a shared understanding of the circumstances in which the OOW would become sufficiently concerned to warrant their calling the master.
CMA CGM Floridas masters standing orders lacked specific metrics, provided ambiguous instructions on the use of VHF radio for collision avoidance, and contained no instructions with respect to radar operating mode and AIS integration.
CMA CGMs SMS provided no specific instructions regarding the use of VHF radio for collision avoidance and made no mention of this in its general guidance as to what the masters standing orders should include.
Sincere Navigation Corporations SMS conflicted with the advice provided in ICSs Bridge Procedures Guide relating to the use of VHF radio for collision avoidance.
Whether or not the two individuals had direct interpersonal conflicts is unclear, however, they were both hampered in their attempts to communicate by having to converse in a second language. Current research suggests that culturally the Chinese 2/O is likely to have been respectful of the Filipino 2/O’s age, experience and authority as OOW. Other research has also identified concerns over the compatibility of the two nationalities.
Chou Shans OOW was probably influenced by the high power-distance hierarchy of his national culture in agreeing to a manoeuvre about which he had concerns.