The UK MAIB reports an incident where the master of a 129m general cargo vessel that traded between regular ports of call decided to follow the inshore, sheltered route, due to an adverse weather forecast. From that point on, there were multiple factors that caused the ship’s grounding; among them, the fact that alcohol policies weren’t backed.
The incident:
Passage planning for the voyage consisted of uploading electronic files from previous voyages onto the vessel’s ECS, drawing course lines onto paper charts and checking the tidal information. The inshore route included several transits of narrow channels between islands and, in some areas, the vessel’s course line had been plotted to pass within 0.2nm of the shore. The crosstrack limit of deviation on the ECS was set at 0.2nm, but its alarm had been silenced.
When the voyage began the bridge navigational watch alarm system (BNWAS) was not switched on and, as darkness fell, no lookouts were posted by either of the OOWs. During the evening, the master joined the OOW on the bridge for the transit of the first of the narrow channels, but left before the watch changeover at midnight and went to bed. No night orders were left in relation to the conduct of the vessel through the narrow channels or the use of lookouts.
Before taking his watch, the OOW coming on duty at midnight informed the duty seaman that no bridge lookout was required. Following a brief handover at midnight with the OOW coming off watch, he then settled into the starboard wheelhouse chair close to the radar set. The only noise in the enclosed wheelhouse was the regular sound of the radar watch alarm, which had been set to activate at low volume every 6 minutes. The OOW was able to reset this alarm without leaving his chair.
The OOW had a lot on his mind; the previous evening’s phone call home had been emotional and challenging and, as a result, he had consumed a significant quantity of alcohol while in his cabin. Despite the no-alcohol policy in place on board, the vessel had a bonded store, the contents of which were regularly consumed on board by the crew.
At about 0100 a planned alteration of course was missed, but the radar watch alarm sounded a short time later and the OOW brought the vessel back on track towards the entrance to another narrow channel. Over the course of the next hour the OOW made several course alterations to keep the vessel on track using the autopilot, the controls for which could also be reached from his chair. Just after 0200 a planned alteration of course was missed and the vessel passed the wrong side of a lighted navigation buoy, narrowly avoiding missing the rocks that the buoy was marking .
After this, the radar watch alarm sounded and was reset a number of times, but the vessel continued off-course and headed towards land. At about 0230 the vessel was in close proximity to land when the radar watch alarm sounded again. This time the OOW silenced the alarm, then engaged manual steering and put the helm hard-a-port. The vessel began to swing to port, but grounded on the rocky foreshore with its engine still set to full ahead.
The master, awoken by the noise of the grounding, soon arrived on the bridge and stopped the engine. The emergency checklist for grounding was not consulted, the general alarm was not sounded and the crew were not mustered. The coastal state authorities were not informed of the grounding for a further 20 minutes, during which time the master phoned the vessel’s owners to discuss the emergency.
The vessel remained aground for the next 2 days, during which time serious damage was caused to its double bottom structure as its hull pounded on the foreshore in moderate seas, and 25 tonnes of gas oil were spilled into the water.
A major salvage and pollution control operation was undertaken and the vessel was subsequently towed to a local dry dock where, following survey, it was declared a constructive total loss.
Lessons Learned
1. Planning a safe passage involves more than simply drawing lines on a chart or uploading files to an electronic chart system. All potential risks should be assessed, and critical areas, which may require special control measures, identified.
2. In order to be effective, alcohol policies need to be backed by audit and testing regimes. In this case a simple audit of the vessel’s bonded store would have identified that the no-alcohol policy was not being complied with.
3. This vessel grounded during the hours of darkness and no lookout was posted. Had a lookout been on the bridge, he would have been well placed to prevent the accident and save the ship.
4. Alarms can only be effective when they are properly set up and turned on. The BNWAS was not switched on; had it been operational it is probable that when leaving his chair to reset the alarm, the OOW would have been alerted to the vessel’s predicament, which on this occasion might have saved the ship.
Source & Image credits : UK MAIB Safety Digest 2/2016
