Report No.23/2013
Island Panther – Image Credit UK MAIB
UK MAIB has issued combined report on the investigations of the contact with a floating target by the wind farm passenger transfer catamaranWindcat 9 while transiting Donna Nook Air Weapons Range in the south-west approaches to the River Humber on 21 November 2012 and the contact ofIsland Panther with turbine I-6, in Sheringham Shoal .Wind Farm on 21 November 2012.
At 1811 on 21 November 2012, the wind farm passenger transfervessel Island Panther made heavy contact with the transition pieceof turbine I-6 in the Sheringham Shoal Wind Farm at a speed ofabout 12 knots. The impact caused the five persons on board to beforced out of their seats and sustain various injuries. The structureimmediately aft of the vessel’s bow fender crumpled as a result of theimpact but no water ingress occurred.
During the day, Island Panther had been operating within the windfarm transferring personnel from the floating hotel, Regina Baltica,to various turbines situated in the wind farm. With bad weatherapproaching, the master collected the personnel from their variouslocations and had returned them all to Regina Baltica by 1536.
At 1750, Island Panther’s night master and deckhand joined the vessel from Regina Balticaand a handover between the day and night masters commenced. At 1800, with the daymaster still at the helm, Island Panther collected a passenger from Regina Baltica beforethe night master took command.
The night master had to make passage through the wind farm to follow the approved routeback to Wells-next-the-Sea. It was dark, the wind was gusting 25-30 knots with drivingrain from the west-north-west, and there was 1.5m of swell from the south-east. The southcardinal buoy light on the south side of the wind farm was visible, as were the rows ofturbine aviation safety lights. The master steered Island Panther towards the south cardinalbuoy light, glancing at the chart plotter in front of him, at a reduced speed of 11-12 knotsbecause of the sea conditions.
At 1811, Island Panther made heavy head-on contact with the unlit transition piece of aturbine. The impact forced everyone out of their seats. The passenger sustained a headinjury but remained conscious and was tended to by one of the crew. The vessel wasassessed for damage before slowly heading out of the wind farm. Two other passengertransfer vessels stood by and the vessel was met off Wells fairway buoy by two lifeboats.Having decided it was safer to keep the casualties on board, once there was sufficient tidalheight, Island Panther entered the harbour and was met by shore emergency services.
The investigation determined that the accident occurred because the master had reliedtoo heavily on visual cues and had made insufficient use of the lookout and navigationequipment available. There was insufficient training, particularly in regard to navigationequipment, and no formal assessment of new masters, allowing the possibility of ingrainedpoor working practices being passed on. Although the turbine transition piece had beenreported as unlit, the system for reporting defects had failed to result in a navigationwarning being promulgated. Although, not formal aids to navigation, it was inevitable thatthe lights would be utilised as such.
Recommendations have been made to the wind farm operator, Scira Offshore EnergyLtd, the vessel owner, Island Shipping Ltd, and other stakeholders involved in the offshorerenewable energy industry aimed at improving the safety of wind farm passenger transfervessel operations.
For detailed analysis of the accident, please read the:
