UK MAIB issues investigation report on crewman loss from Sea Melody

UK MAIB No 16/2014

The UK MAIB has issued Investigation Report regarding crewman lost overboard from Sea Melody Groveport, River Trent 18 December 2013.

Sea Melody arrived at Groveport, River Trent, at 0611 on 16 December 2013 to discharge its cargo of steel products. The vessel was secured, starboard side alongside, with two headlines and two springs forward, and two sternlines and two springs aft. While at the discharge berth orders were received to load cullet for recycling, from the adjacent berth, as the vessels next cargo.

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Cargo discharge was completed at 1600 on 18 December, following which the chief officer went ashore to read the vessels draught, which was 1.4m forward and 2.4m aft. While on the quayside he met a shore linesman, who advised him of the vessels required position at the adjacent berth for loading cargo. The linesman also advised on the sequence in which the forward mooring ropes should be transferred from bollard to bollard during the move and the VHF frequency for ship to shore communications during the operation.

At 1830, the master called the crew and prepared to manoeuvre the vessel from the control console on the starboard bridge wing.

It was dark, the flood stream was flowing at a rate of about 2 knots from ahead, and the wind was blowing off the berth and increasing in strength as the operation to move Sea Melody began. The master instructed the crew, all of whom carried portable VHF radio sets, to let go the aft mooring ropes and then ordered the forward mooring party, which consisted of a second officer and two seamen, to slack away the headlines.

When the move commenced, Sea Melody was in a light condition, with its bow thruster just below the surface of the water. The master used the engine, helm and bow thrust to control the vessel, which was observed to move away from the berth and into the centre of the river on three occasions during the manoeuvre.

The shore linesmen, whose VHF radios were set to channel 17, attempted to contact the master to inform him of the preferred sequence for transferring the mooring ropes from bollard to bollard on the wharf. But they were unable to do so. They called across from the wharf to the forward mooring party that the master should monitor VHF channel 17, but this message was relayed to the master as VHF channel 73.

The wind continued to increase in strength, up to Beaufort force 7, and it began to rain as the manoeuvre proceeded. The forward mooring party found it difficult to handle the mooring lines as the vessel veered off the berth into the river, and the master sent another second officer to assist them.

The two second officers and one of the seamen were tending the two forward springs on the starboard side while the other seaman, Sergey Gaponov, worked alone on the port headline.

At about 1915 Sergey was heard to call out for help. His colleagues turned towards him and saw that his left leg had become caught in a bight of the headline and that he was being pulled towards the bow as the vessel moved astern. The crewmen went to help Sergey, but could not prevent him from being pulled over the bow due to the weight on the headline.

Conclusions

The initial briefing about the move between the linesman and the chief officer was ineffective as it was conducted informally, on the quayside, at a time when both men were distracted by other duties. As a consequence, the master did not receive important information necessary for effective decision making.

The crew were not properly briefed on the manoeuvre to shift berths with the result that they were unaware of the hazards that could be encountered in the prevailing conditions.

The effects of a strong tidal flow and near gale force offshore wind combined to make the manoeuvre more complicated than expected, resulting in more crew being deployed to tend the mooring lines.

The lack of a dedicated supervisor at the forward mooring station meant no-one was in a position to stop Sergey from standing in the bight of rope, or to intervene quickly to prevent him being dragged overboard.