The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has released a safety study which details 14 conclusions and 21 recommendations aimed at further reducing the risk of collisions, allisions, and groundings involving vessels operating within U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Service areas.
The study, “An Assessment of the Effectiveness of the U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Service System”, focused on the performance of the Coast Guard’s VTS system, currently comprised of 12 VTS centers. The need for the study was driven by the investigation of six major commercial vessel accidents since the Coast Guard’s 2009 implementation of its “Vessel Traffic Service National Standard Operating Procedures Manual.”
Information provided by the Coast Guard indicates collisions, allisions and groundings within VTS areas between 2010 and 2014 resulted in two fatalities, 179 injuries and more than $69 million in damage to vessels, facilities, infrastructure and the environment.
“Variance within a single safety system is itself a potential hazard and mariners traveling from one VTS to another must be able to rely on consistent Coast Guard services,” said NTSB Chairman Christopher Hart. “The recommendations contained in our safety study, if acted upon, will improve the effectiveness of the VTS system throughout America’s waterways. I note with appreciation the Coast Guard’s openness and transparency with our investigators and the service’s treatment of our study as a thorough and independent effort to improve Coast Guard operations.”
FINDINGS
1. There is widespread variation in the interpretation of US Coast Guard vessel traffic service (VTS) authority within the VTS centers and across the VTS system, which results in inconsistent application of that authority.
2. The US Coast Guard is not using realistic and sufficient vessel traffic service (VTS) simulation training exercises, which would improve competency and proficiency among all watchstanders across the VTS system.
3. The quality of on-the-job training (OJT) provided to trainees has been inconsistent because the US Coast Guard does not require a minimum level of vessel traffic service operator work experience or instructor training as a prerequisite for all OJT mentors.
4. Because the US Coast Guard does not require all of its vessel traffic service (VTS) watch supervisors to achieve a VTS operator qualification or meet a minimum operator work experience requirement prior to selection, the Coast Guard cannot ensure that all of its watch supervisors are proficient in operator knowledge and skills, including detecting and recognizing traffic conflicts and other unsafe situations.
5. Because the US Coast Guard gives vessel traffic service watchstanders inconsistent guidance about their responsibility to provide navigational assistance whenever an unsafe situation is detected, watchstanders may be reluctant to provide this service.
6. Some US Coast Guard vessel traffic service watchstanders lack confidence applying the navigation rules and regulations when unsafe situations are detected because they do not have sufficient knowledge of or proficiency with the rules and regulations.
7. The US Coast Guard’s current method of monitoring vessel communications on the bridge-to-bridge radio frequency is inadequate to identify unsafe situations in vessel traffic service areas, particularly during periods of low visibility or high traffic volume.
8. Cooperation between pilots and US Coast Guard vessel traffic service (VTS) watchstanders is often adversely affected by a negative perception of VTS expertise because most VTS watchstanders are not licensed mariners with work experience on commercial vessels.
9. The US Coast Guard is not enforcing its requirement that vessel traffic service (VTS) watchstanders use standardized VTS phrases and message markers from the International Maritime Organization Standard Marine Communication Phrases, which can lead to miscommunication with mariners during safety critical situations.
10. The US Coast Guard may be limited in its ability to detect the potential for collisions, allisions, and groundings in vessel traffic service (VTS) areas when VTS watchstanders do not have accurate information regarding vessel size, tow size, and tow configuration for VTS users engaged in towing operations.
11. The US Coast Guard is not using its Ports and Waterways Safety Assessment process to conduct continuous risk assessments and mitigate adverse safety trends within Coast Guard vessel traffic service areas.
12. The US Coast Guard’s collection and quality control of vessel traffic service (VTS) area activity and incident data do not support effective quantitative assessments of risk and safety performance within its VTS areas.
13. The US Coast Guard’s vessel traffic service (VTS) monthly activity report incident data do not include geographic position information, which prevents the Coast Guard VTS program from using geographic analyses to identify and mitigate locations of high risk in VTS areas.
14. The US Coast Guard has not widely used regulatory vessel traffic management options, such as routing measures and vessel traffic service (VTS) special areas, to prevent vessel accidents in areas of demonstrated high risk across the VTS system
The NTSB issued 17 of its 21 recommendations to the U.S. Coast Guard, one to the American Pilots Association, two to the American Waterways Operators and one recommendation was issued to the Radio Technical Commission for Maritime Services.
Further details may be found by reading the abstract below
Source: NTSB
