As UK MAIB reports in its most recent Safety Digest, at just after midnight on a calm autumn night with excellent visibility, an outbound cruise ship and an inbound roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) ferry passed 100m apart with a relative closing speed of 35 knots (kts), the equivalent of 5 seconds to a collision.
The incident
The cruise ship had disembarked its pilot and was heading north out of the harbour limits when vessel traffic services (VTS) contacted the officer of the watch (OOW) on VHF radio to make them aware of an inbound ro-ro ferry from the east. Both vessels were due to converge on the same north cardinal buoy at around the same time and the cruise ship’s OOW announced their intentions to VTS to pass port to port with the ferry. This was heard by the ferry’s OOW, who then made an alteration of course to the north to create more space for the cruise ship at the buoy.
Expecting the cruise ship to alter course to starboard as it passed the north cardinal buoy, the ferry’s OOW altered their own course to port to approach the channel. Confused by this, the cruise ship’s OOW attempted to call VTS several times on VHF radio to request them to ask the ferry to come further to port and pass the cruise ship’s stern. However, the first three VHF radio calls did not transmit due to a faulty call button on the radio handset.
The cruise ship’s OOW eventually transmitted the message to VTS as the two vessels moved ever closer to each other. VTS passed the cruise ship’s message to the ferry, which altered further to port in response. The cruise ship’s OOW also made an alteration of course to port and passed closely ahead of the ferry.
Lessons learned
- Action → Apply the COLREGs1. The ferry’s OOW decided to alter course to port towards the channel based on an assumption that the cruise ship was going to alter to starboard. On seeing the ro-ro ferry altering to port, and the closest point of approach between the vessels start reducing, the cruise ship OOW’s immediate action was to contact VTS for an intervention. While useful for increasing awareness of the movements and intentions of other vessels, the overreliance on VTS and VHF radio by the OOW led to a near miss with potentially devastating consequences. Avoid making assumptions on scant information, and remember that any action should be positive and taken in ample time.
- Plan → Supplement bridge manning. The north cardinal mark was well-known as being navigationally diffcult due to convergent traffc streams, but both bridge teams comprised only an OOW and a lookout. Voyage planning does not stop at lines on a chart; critical areas should be identifed and, if necessary, arrangements made to supplement the bridge team with the master or another officer.
- Maintain → Look after your equipment. The fault on the VHF radio handset was a known issue that the bridge team had not taken steps to rectify, rendering them unable to contact either VTS or the ro-ro ferry at a critical time.
