A general cargo ship set sail towards a specific anchorage in a river to conduct a bunkering operation. Being ballasted and while transiting into the river at night, the weather conditions began to deteriorate. Regarding pilotage, a pilot had already embarked to assist the crew in executing safe navigation.
It is worth mentioning that the ship had recently suffered the loss of its port anchor, and the replacement was yet to be made. The ship’s classification society, in order to secure safety until a replacement anchor was fitted on board, demanded the main engine to be in a standby mode whenever anchoring operations were taking place.
At the anchorage area, another ship experienced anchor-dragging. The ship maintained its position, since the crew members dropped additional shackles of cable into the water. Furthermore the master kept the ship’s engine on standby mode.
Meanwhile, the cargo ship which had already executed the anchoring process once started to drag anchor as well. Therefore it was decided to abort the bunkering operations and drop anchor to another position designated by the local Vessel Traffic Services (VTS). Five shackles of cable were released into the water at 23:00. On completion of the process and before the pilot disembarked, he advised the master not to stop the main engine and to be vigilant as long as the prevailing circumstances were threatening the ship’s safety.
The master instead neither maintained the main engine in standby mode nor provided specific instructions to the second officer to whom he handed over the bridge anchor watch.
The second officer, upon assuming the watch, decided to complete administrative tasks rather than to focus to the challenging watch. However, he set variable range markers on the radar’s display to a third vessel (research and survey type) which dropped the anchor northwest of the cargo ship in less than half a nautical mile, and a head of land to the east.
At 02:46, the cargo ship started dragging anchor again. The second officer realized the situation nine minutes later (02:55). He immediately notified the master, and the duty engineer to start the main engine.
The crew members of the survey vessel also tried to counter the situation by starting the main engine and cautioning their counterparts on the cargo vessel via the VHF about the rapidly diminishing distance between the two ships. The chief officer reported their efforts to start the main engine. The VTS also transmitted a warning to both ships asking for the readiness of their main engines.
Despite the crew’s efforts of the cargo ship to counter the situation, the stern of their ship collided with the bow of the research ship at 03:12. Afterwards the two vessels remained entangled due to the combination of the bad weather conditions, tidal forces and the anchor chain of the research vessel, even though the main engines were started.
Regarding the second vessel which had also dropped anchor nearby, it was advised by the VTS to weigh anchor immediately. Its master engaged astern propulsion but shortly afterwards, at 03:20, the port of cargo ship collided with the second’s vessel bow.
Identifying contributing factors to the collision
Given the tidal forces and the environmental conditions, the insufficient five shackles of anchor cable can be identified as one of the factors for dragging anchor. Stopping the main engine despite the adverse warning of the pilot is considered to be another critical factor.
The master, given the deteriorating weather and the presence of a tidal stream, neglected to provide instructions to the OOW about the necessity to check the ship’s position very frequently with short time intervals in between.
Likewise, the watchkeepers on the cargo vessel should have focused on the challenging watch and the risk of safety they had to deal with rather than to be occupied with administrative tasks. The cargo vessel did not promptly alert the other ships in the vicinity of the VTS about the rapidly escalating situation in order for the other ship to be prepared to counter an emergency timely.
Lessons learned
- To improve prevention of potential similar future incidents, bridge watchkeepers should conduct a more frequent and vigilant monitoring regarding the ship’s position.
- Utilizing Global Positioning System (GPS) anchor alarm aids is another valuable action the OOWs should always have to consider, depending on the surrounding circumstances.
- Whenever an emergency occurs, the ship crew should always deploy sufficient anchor cables in the anchorages.
- The anchoring procedure should also include immediate reporting to the master, adequate communication with the engine room personnel and the bosun for ensuring that the main engine and other machinery (eg. windlass) are ready to engage.
- The bridge must be manned adequately with helmsman and lookout. The foregoing actions may provide sufficient time for a vessel’s crew to react and counter an emergency successfully.
- The Safety Management System (SMS) must be a valuable tool and support for the master by providing specific guidance and instructions on readiness levels, such as the standby mode of the main engine and other necessary machinery depending on the surrounding circumstances.
- Sometimes though, the potential absence of those instructions must be covered by the master’s reliable judgment and overriding authority to set aside institutional procedures when it is of vital importance to deal with rapidly developing emergencies.
Training
Given the congested nature of many anchorages and the proximity of other ships, it is essential to provide training to bridge watchkeepers and other crew members to foster a strong safety culture. This training should emphasize effective communication both among seafarers on the same vessel and with crews of nearby ships, promote team spirit and mutual situational awareness, and cultivate a heightened vigilance in monitoring the ship’s position to ensure safety.
