UK MAIB issues report on Sea Breeze flooding and abandonment

Salvors stabilise the flooding and bring the vessel under tow

UK Marine Accident Investigation Brach (MAIB) has issued a report on the investigation into the flooding and abandonment of the general cargo ship Sea Breeze, 11.6nm off Lizard Point, Cornwall, 9 March, 2014.

At 0654 on 9 March 2014, the master of Sea Breeze, a Barbados registered general cargo vessel, contacted the Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre at Falmouth to report that the vessels engine room was flooding. The vessel was on passage from Raynes Jetty, Llanddulas, Wales to Shoreham, West Sussex, with a cargo of limestone. A ballast pump in the vessels engine room was being maintained, when water began to enter the space. The crew were unable to stem the flow and the engine room was evacuated.

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The Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre Falmouth issued a Mayday Relay on behalf of Sea Breeze and lifeboats from Lizard and Falmouth were tasked along with a helicopter from the Royal Naval Air Station Culdrose. Several vessels responded to the call and HMS Tyne proceeded to the scene to provide assistance.

Salvage pumps were put on board from both of the lifeboats and the helicopter, but the water level in Sea Breezes engine room could not be controlled. Following reports of water ingress into the cargo hold all six crew abandoned Sea Breeze onto the Falmouth lifeboat.

Sea Breezes owners contracted salvors, who were able to stabilise the flooding and bring the vessel under tow.

The MAIB investigation established that the valve actuator gearbox on a sea water isolating valve in the ballast system was defective such that someone operating the valve might believe the valve was shut when it was not. The valve position indicator was working but it had not been checked prior to work being started on the ballast pump. When the pump was removed the engine room flooded through the 15cm diameter ballast main.

The Barbados Maritime Ship Registry has taken action to improve its ability to track and monitor the survey and inspection status of its registered vessels.

A recommendation has been made to the managers of Sea Breeze, Shipmar Co Ltd, which is designed to improve the application of its safety management system across the company and its fleet.

Recommendations have also been made to Lloyds Register to: improve its guidance to surveyors on the conduct of ships side valve surveys; and to propose to the International Association of Classification Societies that its requirements should be amended to include a function test of the actuator mechanism of ship’s side valves during special surveys.

Conclusion

Safety issues directly contributing to the accident that have been addressed or resulted in recommendations

There were no testing or maintenance routines, or systems in place, to ensure the correct operation of the ballast system or any other equipment on board Sea Breeze.

The master, who was also the officer on watch, was not aware of the work being carried out on the ballast system and no permit to work on the system had been issued.

A risk assessment had not been completed prior to commencing work on the ballast system with the result that basic contingency preparations were not taken, and once the work started basic engineering good practice was not applied.

Records of drills had been falsified and it is likely that none of Sea Breezes crew had completed any emergency preparedness training on board.

The crews response to the serious flooding incident in the engine room was ineffective.

When the engine room was evacuated, the watertight door between the engine room and the accommodation was left open, allowing the flooding to extend into the accommodation.

Sea Breezes crew saw no value in safety management and this was symptomatic of an absence of any safety culture on board or within Shipmar, specifically:

There was no evidence on board to indicate that the SMM had ever been referred to.

There had been a complete breakdown in safety management on board Sea Breeze.

Shipmars lack of response to the findings of recent audits.

Other safety issues directly contributing to the accident

The engine room on Sea Breeze flooded because the single isolating butterfly valve between the port sea chest and the port ballast pump that was undergoing maintenance, was not fully closed prior to work commencing.

The condition of the worm and quadrant gearing in the actuator of valve A104 port was such that it could jam intermittently, giving the impression that the valve was closed when it was not.

Safety issues not directly contributing to the accident that have been addressed or resulted in recommendations

It would be prudent for classification society surveyors to carry out a full function test of ship side valve actuator systems during survey, and if this gives any cause for concern the system(s) should be stripped and inspected.

Had BMSR completed its annual survey of the vessel when it was due, the deterioration of the vessels condition might have been recognised and corrective action could have been required.

Other safety issues not directly contributing to the accident

Reports from the master to the DPA, along with surveys of the vessel following the accident, identified several issues that could have resulted in Sea Breeze being out of class prior to the accident had it been surveyed.

Had the deterioration of Sea Breeze not been brought to an abrupt end by this accident, it is considered quite possible that the vessel could have suffered the same fate as Swanland.