MAIB issues Accident Report No. 21/2013
The UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) issued the report of its investigation into a release of phosphine gas during cargo discharge on board a general cargo vessel in Warrenpoint, Northern Ireland on 5 December 2012.
On 5 December 2012, a fumigated cargo of maizewas being discharged from the general cargo vesselArklow Meadow in Warrenpoint, Northern Irelandwhen it became apparent that the fumigant was stillactive; fumigant retainers that had been removed fromthe cargo holds started to smoke.
Cargo operations were immediately stopped andArklow Meadow’s crew were evacuated to thequayside. The local fire brigade was quickly on thescene and established a 50 metre cordon aroundthe vessel. Houses and retail premises surroundingthe port area were also evacuated by the police asa precautionary measure. Eight of Arklow Meadow’s11 crew, and a stevedore who had potentiallybeen exposed to phosphine gas, were taken to hospital for observation anddecontamination.
Arklow Meadow
(Image Credit: MAIB)
A total of 89 fumigant retainers were recovered from the vessel and shore areas,leaving 21 fumigant retainers unaccounted for. The recovered retainers wereneutralised by immersing them in water. It took 5 days for the level of phosphine gasin the vessel’s cargo holds to reduce to a safe level.
The MAIB investigation identified that:
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A recommendation has also been made to the British Ports Association and theUnited Kingdom Major Ports Group to help ensure that all UK ports have proceduresand emergency plans in place when dealing with fumigated cargoes.
Fumigation warning notice
(Image Credit: MAIB)
Conclusions
1. The low levels of PH3detected at the tops of the cargo holds prior to the dischargeof the maize cargo, and the issue of a certificate indicating that it was safe to workthe cargo from outside the holds, were misleading.
2. When the cargo discharge was started, the fumigant on top of the maize was stillactive, probably due to the way it was packed together with the low humidity in thecargo holds during the vessel’s voyage from the Ukraine.
3. Neither the vessel’s master nor her crew were aware of their responsibilities or ofthe risks involved when carrying a fumigated cargo, and a number of safety-relatedactions were either not completed or were not completed correctly.
4. The failure to remove the fumigant residues from the cargo holds before cargooperations were started, and the subsequent incorrect handling of the fumigantresidue that was eventually removed, were pivotal to the exposure of the ship’s crewand shore workers to high levels of PH3.
5. The ignorance of the fumigation process shown by Arklow Meadow’s master andchief officer and the scant nature of the guidance provided in the vessel’s SMSmanual are of concern.
6. WHA had not specifically considered the hazards connected with the handling ofship’s discharging fumigated cargoes in its procedures and emergency plans.
7. Many UK ports which accept fumigated grain cargoes have yet to implementprocedures and emergency plans specifically dealing with this cargo type.
8. The consultant who tested the atmosphere at the top of the cargo holds whenArklow Meadow arrived off Warrenpoint, and then confirmed that it was safe todischarge the maize cargo from outside the holds, was not a qualified fumigator.
9. The establishment and use of a list of ‘approved’ fumigators would give assurance toboth ports and masters alike.
10. The requirements and guidance published by the MCA on fumigated cargoes andthe safe use of pesticides include only temperature as the key factor in fumigantdecay and provide little advice regarding the provision of qualified fumigators or thedevelopment of port procedures and emergency plans.
Recommendations
The Maritime and Coastguard Agency is recommended to:
In consultation with the Health and Safety Executive, the Port Skills and SafetyOrganisation, and other industry bodies as appropriate, review, consolidateand reissue the guidance provided to UK stakeholders on the loading, carriageand discharge of fumigated cargoes to highlight the importance of:
- The potential for a fumigant to remain active due to factors such astemperature, relative humidity, voyage length, and fumigant method. The retention of suitably trained and qualified fumigators at both theload and discharge ports. Ships’ crews being aware of their responsibilities. UK port authorities having robust procedures and contingency planswhen receiving vessels with fumigated cargoes.
The United kingdom Major Ports Group and the British Ports Association are recommended to:
Through its Marine and Pilotage Working Group, develop a revision of theGuide to Good Practice on Port Marine Operations to reflect the revisedguidance to be issued by the MCA, and in the meantime ensure that ports areaware of:
The potential dangers posed by fumigants.
The importance of suitably qualified fumigators certifying, whereapplicable, that the cargo can be safely discharged and that all fumiganthas been removed and safely disposed of.
The importance of developing procedures and emergency plansto cover the inadvertent or unexpected release of fumigant from afumigated cargo.
For more information read the MAIBAccident Report No. 21/2013
