MAIB investigation report No 27.2013
The UK Marine Accident Invesitgation Branch (MAIB) has issued ReportNo. 27/2013on the investigations of the flooding and foundering of the fishing vesselAudacious 45 miles east of Aberdeen on 10 August 2012, and the flooding and foundering of the fishing vesselChloe T 17 miles south west of Bolt Head, Devon on 1 September 2012.
Flooding and foundering of FV Audacious
On 10 August 2012, the engine room of the 23.7m twin-rig stern trawler Audaciousflooded while the vessel was fishing, in calm weather conditions, 45 miles east ofAberdeen.
The crew were unable to stop the ingress of water and abandoned shipshortly before the vessel sank at 1554.The skipper, who was the sole bridge watchkeeper, was in the galley when he heardthe tone of the vessel’s engine alter and returned to the wheelhouse to find that theengine room bilge alarm had activated.It was discovered that water had entered the engine room and was level with the topof the main engine.
A bilge pump was started but the sea inlet valves could not beclosed as they were underwater and it was evident to the crew that nothing could bedone to stop the ingress of water.The skipper broadcast a “Mayday” distress message and activated the vessel’sEmergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon.
The crew abandoned to a liferaft afew minutes before the vessel sank and were subsequently rescued, unharmed, bya vessel that had responded to the “Mayday”.
FV Audacious sinking
(Image Credit: MAIB, Report No. 27/2013)
The MAIB investigation of the accident found that the flooding was probably due tothe failure of the sea inlet pipework in the engine room, and that the wheelhouse hadbeen unmanned for periods prior to the accident. It was also found that statutorysurveys and inspections had not been undertaken in accordance with the terms andconditions of the vessel’s UK fishing vessel certificate.
Recommendations have been made to the vessel’s owner regarding bridgewatchkeeping standards.
Flooding and foundering of FV Chloe T
On 1 September 2012 Chloe T suffered uncontrollable engine room flooding andsank 17 miles south west of Bolt Head, Devon. The crew were alerted to the floodingat about 1545 by a fire alarm, indicating that there was smoke in the engine room.
The crew investigated immediately and found that floodwater was spraying off themain engine flywheel onto the turbocharger casing and turning into steam.The engine room flooded rapidly and the bilge pump was unable to cope; the crewcould not find the source of the flooding. Chloe T’s engineer/deckhand suspectedthat the flooding could be due to a failure in the main engine seawater coolingsystem. He was unable to close the seawater inlet valve because it was quicklycovered by flood water.
The skipper realised that there was little that could be done to save Chloe T andmade an early decision for the crew to abandon the vessel into liferafts. The crew allwore lifejackets and abandoned Chloe T safely and efficiently. A number of vesselsresponded to the skipper’s “Mayday” broadcast and the crew were rescued by asearch and rescue helicopter.It was not possible to determine the exact cause of the flooding, but it wasconcluded that it was likely to have been caused by a failure of the main engineseawater cooling system pipework due to corrosion.
There was insufficientdocumentation to show that the pipework had been surveyed or inspected asrequired by the regulations or the MCA’s survey instructions.There was no evidence to show that the engine room bilge alarm activated duringthe emergency. The alarm sensor had been defective some weeks before theaccident, but was cleaned and found to work. It was not tested again and wasconsidered unlikely to have been wholly reliable.
The Scottish Fishermen’s Federation, the National Federation of Fishermen’sOrganisations and the Northern Ireland Fish Producers Organisation have beenrecommended to promulgate the lessons learned from this accident and that ofAudacious, and particularly the need for fishing vessel operators to thoroughlyinspect seawater pipework, to their members. In view of the actions taken by theowner, and the machinery arrangement on board his other vessels, no furtherrecommendations have been made to the owner.
For more information read the MAIB Report No. 27 2013.
