A recent incident reported by CHIRP Maritime underscores the critical importance of adhering to contractual safety requirements in maritime operations.
CHIRP has been informed about contractual requirements concerning a recent operation involving an Offshore Supply Vessel (OSV) and a Floating Production Storage and Offloading vessel (FPSO). The OSV in question was a DP1 vessel, which does not necessitate a follow-target function for standard operations. However, due to the FPSO’s movement in the operating environment, such a function was mandated by contract.
Per the agreement between the contractor and the charterer, the contractor was required to equip the vessel with two reference systems: a Differential Global Navigational Satellite System (DGNSS) and either a laser or microwave system capable of ‘Follow Target’ functionality. These systems are critical for FPSO operations, ensuring a specified distance is maintained between the vessel and the FPSO while adjusting the angle between their longitudinal axes to account for any horizontal rotation of the FPSO.
Despite the lack of the required ‘Follow Target’ function, the master proceeded with the operation under pressure from the client’s schedule. This choice resulted in potentially unsafe conditions, as the crew had to manually adjust the vessel’s position based on visual references during a 12-hour fuel oil transfer. The Designated Person Ashore (DPA) advised against operating under these precarious circumstances, but the operation continued. The crew recognized that safety was compromised to meet client demands and reported these concerns to CHIRP.
CHIRP Comment
The agreement between the contractor and the charterer established specific technical requirements for the OSV, including the necessity of a ‘Follow Target’ function to manage the expected movement velocities of the FPSO, which can be substantial. This function is vital for maintaining a safe distance and alignment with the FPSO. The OSV was equipped only with a DP1 (Dynamic Positioning Class 1) system, which typically lacks ‘Follow Target’ capability. Consequently, the OSV did not fulfill the contractual requirements essential for safe operations alongside the FPSO.
Despite this deficiency, the operation proceeded due to client pressure, leading to unsafe conditions given the absence of automated capability for maintaining safe proximity and alignment with the FPSO. The crew’s manual adjustments based on visual and radar references, which are less precise than automated systems, further compromised safety during a critical 12-hour fuel oil transfer.
The crew’s recognition of the safety compromise and subsequent reporting to CHIRP reflects a responsible approach to safety reporting and an understanding of the associated risks. The DPA, responsible for ensuring compliance with safety and environmental standards, cautioned against proceeding without the required ‘Follow Target’ function. This caution highlights significant safety concerns. Despite this advice, the master chose to continue with the operation, raising questions about the prioritization of safety within the company and its organizational structure. The decision to disregard the DPA’s recommendations raises concerns about the company’s safety culture and risk management practices.
In recent years, multiple collisions have occurred during DP operations near mobile assets, such as drilling vessels and FPSOs. While relative position referencing systems, including the ‘Follow Target’ function, are beneficial, proper training in their use is essential.
CHIRP acknowledges the Information note provided by the International Maritime Contractors Association (IMCA) No 1650- November 2023, which outlines important considerations regarding Position Reference Systems (PRS) when operating close to assets that are not rigidly fixed to the seabed.
Lessons learned
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Pressure: The pressure to meet commercial objectives overruled safety considerations regarding the crew, the FPSO, and the environment. How would one respond in a similar situation, particularly given the DPA’s request to halt the operation due to a lack of safeguards?
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Teamwork: The master’s behavior does not reflect teamwork, suggesting an isolated approach, with the crew not appearing empowered to initiate ‘stop work’ procedures. What would one have done in this situation?
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Culture: Company culture applies universally, and the master bears the responsibility to exemplify it through actions.
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Capability: Would one operate outside the required standards if the vessel lacked the necessary capabilities to meet dynamic positioning standards? Are DP safety standards being overlooked in this context?
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Local Practices: It is essential to prevent local practices from establishing a new standard. It is advisable to request the installation of necessary equipment to ensure compliance with requirements.
