The National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) was announced by the Government of Canada in June 2010 with the objective of replacing the current surface fleets of the Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Coast Guard. One of the ships that is included in NSPS is the Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship (A/OPS).
PBO analysis suggests that the current budget will be insufficient to procure six to eight A/OPS as planned. Rather, it is more likely that, if there are no delays, the current budget will allow for four ships to be built. However, any delay over a year would mean that the budget would likely only be sufficient to build three ships. Schedule slips, therefore, may have a significant impact on the government’s purchasing power and on other projects down the pipeline, such as the Canadian Surface Combatant.
Due to inflation, the effect of delaying the start of construction of the first ship causes the estimated cost to increase to the point where only three ships
can be built rather than four. A one year delay would result in the project being $34 million over budget. A two year delay would result in the project
being $85 million over budget. These figures suggest that if there is a delay, one or a combination of three things will happen: the budget will be increased, the number of ships paired back, or the ship’s capabilities will be paired down.
The PBO undertook an independent cost estimate of the A/OPS project to determine the reasonableness of the government’s plan to deliver six to eight ships for $2.8 billion by 2024.
The baseline estimate assumes a construction start date of September 2015 as well as a build schedule that minimizes total cost. The cost is separated out by each ship so it is possible to determine how many ships can be built within the allotted budget as well as to show how much more money it will take to build additional ships. Further to the baseline scenario, estimates of the cost increases due to delaying construction start by one and two years are calculated. Sensitivity analysis is carried out by varying the ships’ weight and complexity.
Ice-Capable versus Icebreaker
It is important to note that A/OPS is technically not an icebreaker. It is actually an ice-capable ship. Icebreakers are ships that clear a path through the
ice so other ships that are not ice-capable can follow. Ice-capable ships can go through ice of various types and thickness, depending on their polar class, as icebreakers do but are not wide enough to clear a path for other ships. A/OPS was originally announced to be a PC 5 icebreaker. It has
subsequently been changed to an ice-capable ship with a bow of PC 4 and a hull of PC 5.
There is a design challenge in achieving the divergent requirements of being both ice-capable and operating offshore. Icebreakers are designed to work
in ice-covered water while offshore ships are designed to operate on the open seas where large waves can occur in rough weather. In addition,
icebreakers traditionally have parabolic hulls which allow them to ride up over the ice and then crush it with their weight. Hence, they have a highe weight-to-size ratio than ships that sail the open seas (i.e. offshore ships). The parabolic hull shape and the broader beam (higher width to length atio) than offshore ships give icebreakers “poor rough weather characteristics”such as being prone to slamming. In order to handle large waves, offshore ships are longer and narrower with more streamlined hulls. Also offshore ships are lighter in weight enabling them to have higher open water speed.
Source: Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer – Canada
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