Accidental release of a lifeboat on Nagato Reefer

UK MAIB issues Accident Report

The UK MAIB has issued a report on the accidental release of lifeboat on Nagato Reefer with 1 person injured.

(Image Credit: ABP, Southampton)

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On 9 April 2014 a crewman was injured while an abandon ship drill was being carried out on board the Panama registered refrigerated cargo vessel Nagato Reefer in the port of Southampton, UK.

A Port State Control inspection of Nagato Reefer had been conducted, during which the crew had been required to undertake an emergency fire drill. During the drill the Port State Control officer noted several deficiencies, which led to Nagato Reefers detention.

The crew were also required to complete an abandon ship drill using the vessels port lifeboat. With six crew on board, the lifeboat was lowered into the water, released from its davit and manoeuvred away from the vessel before being returned for retrieval. With some difficulty the crew reset the lifeboats hook release gear and attached the davit wire suspension links to the hooks. Fall preventer devices were connected before the boat was retrieved to deck level, where all the crew disembarked before it was lifted into its davit.

The crew then began to secure the lifeboat. The aft gripe wire had been attached and the forward gripe wire was being connected when an officer instructed the crew to release both fall preventer devices. When the forward fall preventer device was disconnected, the forward hook opened and the davit suspension ring released. The forward end of the boat then fell onto handrails on the deck below, striking and injuring a crewman and damaging the lifeboats hull.

Emergency services were summoned to attend the injured crewman, who was taken to hospital for observation. He was found to have suffered only minor injuries and was able to return to the vessel the following day.

The investigation found that the management of safety on board Nagato Reefer was ineffective, and there was evidence of a poor safety culture both on board and in the management of the company. Specific areas of concern included a breakdown in trust and communication among the crew, failure to conduct drills and essential maintenance, and the falsification of records.

Recommendations have been made to the vessels manager aimed at ensuring its crews are properly trained in emergency preparedness, the maintenance and operation of their safety equipment, and that the importance of maintaining accurate records required by international statutes is observed throughout its fleet.

Conclusion

Safety issues directly contributing to the accident that have been addressed or resulted in recommendations

The accident followed a breakdown in communications between the crew who were not empowered to challenge orders or to participate in the decision making process on board.
The vessels safety management system was poorly implemented, the crew had not been adequately trained and were not familiar with the operation of safety equipment on board.
There was evidence of paint and dirt on the hook assembly of the lifeboat release and retrieval system, which affected its operation.
Despite records to the contrary, it was apparent that no maintenance or inspections of the LRRS had been carried out since the annual inspection and service in October 2013.

Safety issues not directly contributing to the accident that have been addressed or resulted in recommendations

On the advice of the management company, the FPDs were fitted to the starboard lifeboat while the vessel was on passage, demonstrating a systemic lack of understanding of the correct use of the device.
The crews performance at the fire drill was indicative of the poor level of crew training and the failure to undertake the requisite SOLAS emergency drills on the vessel.
The vessels safety committee met after the accident but recorded that there had been no accidents or near misses on board.
The managers review of the accident identified shortcomings in the crews emergency preparedness training but did not produce an action plan to improve emergency response standards on its vessels.
The lifeboat hook had been moved following the accident, before the accident investigators attended the scene.

Other safety issues not directly contributing to the accident

Shigi estimates that more than 100 vessels have lifeboats which are fitted with the SRS-37 release gear. Owners/managers should ensure that the crews of these vessels have received specific training in the operation of this type of on-load release gear.
Phasing out the use of FPDs when modified LRRSs are fitted to vessels in line with the IMO requirements, may render these systems more dangerous unless owners/ managers ensure that appropriate maintenance and type specific training takes place.

Source and Image Credit:UK MAIB

Further information may be found by reading relevant UK MAIB report by clicking on the image below: