Freefall Lifeboat Casualties – Safe Work Practices

RMI issues Marine Safety Advisory No. 52-13

The Republic of Marshall Islands has issuedMarine Safety Advisory No. 52-13 with reference to Freefall Lifeboat Casualties and Safe Work Practices.

The Maritime Administrator has recently conducted marine safety investigations into twoFreefall Lifeboat (FFLB) incidents that were near miss Very Serious Marine Casualties. In bothcases the FFLB was unintentionally released and fell to the water while crewmembers wereinside the boat performing maintenance. The crewmembers were seriously injured in bothincidents. Based on the Maritime Administrator’s review and analysis of the available information theidentified lessons learned can be categorized as follows:

• Adherence with Lifeboat Maintenance Procedures
• Adherence with Lifeboat Securing Procedures
• Adherence with Safe Work Practices
• Inadequate identification and evaluation of potential risks

A brief synopsis of the two marine casualties is as follows:

FFLB Marine Casualty No.1:

The ship’s Third Officer and Second Engineer along with a service technician were performing the FFLB annual inspection. The FFLB was secured to the davit using its aft lashing cables, i.e., maintenance wires, when the Third Officer entered the FFLB tocharge and activate the FFLB’s release hook mechanism. When the FFLB hook was released, the aft lashing cables, which were later found corroded, parted, allowing the boat and unprepared crewmember to fall into the water. During the investigation the following determinations were made:

• prior to entering the FFLB an SMS-required tool box meeting and task risk assessment were not performed;
• although part of the FFLB’s maintenance checklist, the corrosion on the aft lashing cables, which were covered with plastic sheathing that was cracked and deteriorated due to weather exposure, was not previously detected; and,
• the FFLB was not connected to the davit launching/retrieval cable as per the manufacturer’s procedures.

Broken lashing cables, i.e., maintenance wires

(Image Source: Republic of Marshall Islands)

FFLB Marine Casualty No.2:

While the ship was underway the Chief Engineer and FourthEngineer were in the boat replacing the cable for the engine’s kill switch when the FFLB unexpectedly released. The FFLB was only secured by the lifeboat hook; the aft lashing cables or davit launching cables were not in place. During the investigation the following determinations were made:

• the crewmembers did not activate the FFLB release hook using the release lever – the lever was found in the secured position when the lifeboat was retrieved;
• the FFLB’s release hook was found improperly secured (see below pictures); therefore, it could be opened by the movement of the two crewmembers who were inside of the lifeboat; and,
• the FFLB aft lashing wires and davit launching/retrieval cables were not secured.

Incorrectly (Left) – Correctly (Right) secured lifeboat release hook

(Image Source: Republic of Marshall Islands)

It is understood that lifeboat arrangements vary from ship to ship. However, the lessons learned from these marine casualties emphasize the importance of strictly following both the manufacturer’s and ship management’s respective onboard lifeboat procedures as well as the need for ships’ staff to conduct a pre-task risk assessment when performing maintenance or preparing for drills. Owners, ship management, and Masters are asked to share this Marine Safety Advisory with ship’s crews and to regularly emphasize the importance of adhering to the manufacturers’ and ship management’s established procedures for lifeboat maintenance and operation.

Read the RMIMarine Safety Advisory No. 52-13