Captain of grounded ship Karin Scheper was drunk

MAIB report on container ship run agrounf off Cornwall

A report investigating the grounding of a container ship off the coast of Cornwall last year says evidence suggests the master was drunk and abusive to the Officer of the Watch before falling asleep 2 hours before the vessel grounded.

On August 3rd 2011 the Karin Schepers ran aground on the Cornish coast while travelling from Cork, Ireland to Rotterdam, Netherlands. Just before 3am the master relieved the second officer as the officer of the watch, he fell asleep a short time later.

The investigation found that no lookout had been posted, and with no-one awake on the bridge the vessel continued on for over 2 hours, crossing the Land’s End Traffic Separation Scheme before grounding close to Pendeen Lighthouse, West Cornwall.

Fortunately, the ship was undamaged and the crew were able to refloat her on the rising tide.

The master had been the 8-12 watchkeeper, and at midnight had handed over the watch to the second officer. However, the master returned to the bridge at regular intervals after midnight, sounding increasingly intoxicated until eventually he ordered the second officer from the bridge. Shortly after this the master, alone on the bridge, fell asleep.

The grounding in August was the second time the Karin Schepers had run aground Credit: RNLI

It’s not the first time the ship has run aground. on 22nd March 2009, Karin Schepers grounded in Danish waters while on passage from Finland to the UK. The Danish Maritime Authority (DMA) investigated the accident and published a report which concluded that the grounding of Karin Schepers was caused by the following:

• The chief officer was incapacitated due to intoxication.
• The chief officer fell asleep during his watch.
• There was no look out on the bridge.
• The Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System was off.
• No crewmembers reacted on the various attempts to draw attention to the dangerous path the ship was taking.

Fortunately, the ship was undamaged and the crew were able to refloat her on the rising tide. Credit: RNLI

Following the previous grounding, the owners of the ship, HS Schiffahrts GmbH & Co KG adopted a ‘zero tolerance’ policy to alcohol consumption whereby any member of the crew found to have consumed alcohol would immediately be dismissed.

This policy was implemented on the owner’s behalf by Marlow Navigation Co Ltd. Prior to joining Karin Schepers, crew were required to sign to acknowledge that they understood and would comply with this alcohol policy.

Safety issues identified during the investigation leading to recommendations:

1. The role of the coastguard in relation to the monitoring of the AIS transmissions of vessels transiting the Land’s End TSS requires clarification, as differences exist between MCA operational orders and submissions made by the UK to the IMO.

2. The decision to allow a vessel that is aground, to refloat before a reliable assessment of her condition has been made, should be carefully and systematically considered. By permitting a vessel to refloat without a survey having been carried out, there is a possibility of an escalation of the emergency.

3. The decision by senior MCA staff to allow Karin Schepers to resume her passage without a survey having been conducted, stemmed from a general lack of awareness of the powers of intervention that were available to them.

Safety issues identified during the investigation which have been addressed or have not resulted in recommendations:

1. After he had been ordered from the bridge by the master, who he considered to be tired and drunk, the second officer did not seek advice from another senior officer on board before going to bed. This suggests a lack of an effective crew resource management structure on board the vessel.

2. The fact that the owner was unaware that a lookout was, routinely, not used on board indicates a weakness in the owner’s ability to monitor the onboard application of the vessel’s SMS. The effectiveness of any SMS relies on a robust audit procedure in which the owner actively engages to ensure company procedures are being followed.

3. Where the presence of a company representative is likely to alter the normal operating methods employed on board, consideration should be given to the routine examination of onboard records, including VDR recordings to audit compliance with the SMS.

4. The failure to use the BNWAS is another indication that the vessel’s SMS was ineffective. It is important that audits are robust and of sufficient scope to provide evidence that companies’ SMS procedures are being complied with at all times.

5. Mariners should not hesitate to attempt to contact the watchkeepers of any vessel which appears to be standing into danger. In view of the professional manner in which Falmouth MRCC reacted once it was made aware of Karin Schepers’ position, an earlier attempt to contact the vessel might have enabled action to be taken in sufficient time to have prevented the accident.

Source: ITV News