Canada issues report on the grounding of passenger vessel 'Princes of Arcadia'

Canada issues report on the grounding of passenger vessel ‘Princes of Arcadia’

Marine Investigation Report

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) released an investigation report regarding the grounding of Roll-On/Roll-Off passenger vessel ‘Princes of Arcadia’ approaching the Digby ferry terminal, Nova Scotia, 07 November 2013.

On 07 November 2013 at 1200 Atlantic Standard Time, the roll-on/roll-off passenger ferry Princess of Acadia, which was carrying a total of 87 passengers and crew, sustained a main generator blackout and grounded while approaching the ferry terminal at Digby, Nova Scotia. No pollution or injuries were reported.

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Lessons learned: Mistakes during maintenance lead to blackout

The Princess of Acadia was approaching the ferry terminal at Digby, Nova Scotia, with 87 passengers and crew aboard. In preparation for docking, as the bow thruster was started, the main generator blacked out causing a loss of electrical power and disabling the main propeller pitch control pumps. Once the pitch control pumps stopped, the propeller thrust defaulted toward full astern while the engines were still running, causing the vessel to slow down, stop and travel backwards towards the nearby shoreline until running aground.

The investigation found that a deteriorated generator component caused the failure of two main generators and the blackout of the main electrical switchboards, among other system failures. The investigation also identified that neither the bridge nor the engine room had effective procedures in place to respond to the blackout of the main switchboard. Because of this, the master was not informed that engine room personnel were having difficulty restoring power, and the engine room was not aware of the urgency of the situation. This impeded an effective response to the emergency. The vessel had voluntarily implemented a safety management system (SMS), but it did not provide the master with guidance to proactively identify risks or investigate hazardous occurrences.

There were also deficiencies with passenger-related duties in written evacuation procedures and with Transport Canada’s oversight to ensure compliance with regulations regarding passenger safety emergency procedures. As such, there is a risk that these procedures will not achieve their intended purpose. Previous marine investigations (M12C0058 and M13L0067) have found deficiencies in the oversight of passenger safety regulations.

Following the occurrence, Bay Ferries Ltd., the vessel operator, instituted improved operating procedures for when the vessel prepares to arrive at Digby. They have also installed a simplified voyage data recorder, which records bridge audio and information navigation equipment and other available sensors. Llloyd’s Register, the vessel classification society, has increased the frequency for generator breaker testing.

Report findings

Findings as to cause and contributing factors

After the vessel entered confined waters, the bow thruster was started and a deteriorated exciter brush caused a main generator to lose power, resulting in a blackout of the electrical switchboards.
The vessel continued making way but was not under command because the controllable-pitch propeller pumps had stopped and the propeller pitch had defaulted toward full astern.
The master was not informed that engine room personnel was having difficulty restoring power to the main switchboard and the engine room was not aware of the urgency of the situation, which impeded an effective response to the emergency.
Neither the bridge nor the engine room had effective procedures to respond to the blackout of the main switchboard.
About 2 minutes prior to grounding, the vessel began backing toward the shore and the propeller shafts remained clutched in until the vessel started to ground.

Findings as to risk

If maintenance and inspections of vessel equipment are not documented with detailed and complete records, there is an increased risk that tracking of equipment reliability and related maintenance will be ineffective for determining overall maintenance needs.
If maintenance schedules are not updated when critical equipment is modified or replaced, there is a risk that this equipment will not be serviced when necessary and, as a result, will not be fully operational when needed.
If bridge and engine room personnel do not exchange critical information during an emergency, there is a risk that key personnel will not be fully aware of the situation and may make ineffective decisions.
If crew members do not have formal written procedures that facilitate quick and effective action, there is a risk that they will not respond effectively in an emergency.
If drills are not practiced regularly and do not realistically simulate an emergency, there is a risk that crew members will not be able to respond effectively during an emergency.
If an alarm is not sounded to indicate an emergency at the earliest possible stage, there is a risk that the passengers/crew will not be ready to respond to the situation.
If a safety management system does not provide guidance for the master to proactively identify risks and investigate hazardous occurrences, underlying risks may not be addressed.
If Transport Canada oversight to ensure compliance with regulations regarding passenger safety emergency procedures is ineffective, there is a risk that these procedures will not achieve their intended purpose.

Source and Image Credit: TSB

More information may be found by reading the investigation report issued by Transport Safety Board of Canada.