Canada issues report on container vessel grounding in Fraser River

Marine Investigation Report regarding Cap Blanche grounding

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) released an investigation report regarding the grounding of container vessel Cap Blanche, Fraser River, British Columbia on 25 January, 2014.

On 25 January 2014 at 0624,3 the Cap Blanche departed Tacoma, Washington, United States, for Fraser Surrey Docks in the Fraser River, British Columbia. During the transit, the master was informed that the berth was not ready for the Cap Blanche, and the vessel proceeded to the Constance Bank anchorage off Victoria, BC, where it anchored at 1324.

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The berth became available later in the day, and the vessel proceeded to the Brotchie pilot station at 1718, picking up a British Columbia Coast Pilots Ltd. (BCCP) pilot at 1800. The Cap Blanche then proceeded to the mouth of the Fraser River, arriving around 2115 in fog. At this time, the bridge team was comprised of the master, the officer of the watch (OOW), and a helmsman.

A Fraser River pilot boarded at 2118 and discussed the transit with the BCCP pilot, at which point the Fraser River pilot took over the conduct of the vessel.4 He set up his portable pilotage unit (PPU)5 and connected his rate-of-turn generator6 to the pilot plug in order to monitor thevessels progress. The pilots PPU had a predictor7 that continually self-updated to display the vessels next 6 predicted positions at intervals of 30 seconds. The pilot also communicated with vessel traffic services (VTS) as required on his intentions and the vessels position.

The pilot and the master then exchanged their respective master-pilot exchange cards. The pilot card contained information on the transit, tidal window, tidal lift,8 and under-keel clearance for 3 points on the voyage to the berth. The pilot had also included information on the berthing procedure at Fraser Surrey Docks. Furthermore, the pilot informed the master about anticipated traffic during the transit. The master in turn informed the pilot on the vessels condition, including the anchors on standby and the steering gear for manoeuvring.

Shortly after 2130, the pilot increased the vessels speed in order to overcome cross-currents at the mouth of the river and, at 2132, commenced a starboard turn to enter the Fraser River on the ranges.9 The vessel passed the Sand Heads light at 2143 at a speed of 16 knots. The pilot set up a variable range marker with a radius of 0.5 nautical miles (nm) on the radar in order to monitor the vessels progress in the river. At this time, the master was using the ECDIS located at the starboard conning position to monitor the vessels progress, while the OOW was using a paper chart.

At 2150, the Cap Blanche passed buoy S6,11 and the pilot ordered half ahead. When the vessel reached buoy S8 at 2152:30, the pilot, who was positioned at the radar with the PPU, ordered the rudder 15 to starboard to initiate the turn through the Steveston Bend. The pilot then used the predictor to assess the vessels rate of turn and, as the vessel was turning, ordered the rudder angle to be reduced to 10 to starboard, 5 to starboard, and then midships.

At 2153:20, when buoy S8 was about midships, the vessels heading was 065 gyro (G), and the rate of turn was 24.8 per minute12 to starboard at a speed of 14.3 knots. At 2154:30, the heading was 089G, the speed was 13 knots, and the vessel had started to turn toward the south side of the channel. The pilot ordered counter rudder to port and full ahead on the engine to stop the turn to starboard and correct the vessels position in the channel, but the vessel did not respond sufficiently, and it grounded just north of buoy S10 at 2156 within the navigable channel.

Following the grounding, the tanks were sounded, and the vessel was checked for damage. No ingress of water or pollution was detected. The master and pilot discussed options for refloating and agreed to make an attempt using the bow thruster. The master then requested that engine room start the thruster, and the pilot used a combination of thruster and engine movements to refloat the vessel on the rising tide. The vessel proceeded to Fraser Surrey Docks and docked at berth 7 at 0042.

Report Findings

Findings as to causes and contributing factors

In the absence of visual cues, the pilot relied primarily on the projected vessel positions displayed by the predictor to monitor the vessel’s rate of turn.

The predictor function was using input from the automatic identification system thatwas inexact due to the global positioning system smoothing interval, but the pilot was unaware of this.

The vessel’s rate of speed upon initiating the turn limited the time available to respond to the developing situation.

The vessel’s rate of turn put the vessel on a course for the silting on the south side of the channel.

The pilot did not share information about the extent of silting in the Steveston Bend, andthe bridge team had not taken steps to obtain this information; as such, the bridge team was unable to identify or to assist the pilot in resolving the developing unsafe situation.

Although the pilot applied counter rudder to arrest the turn, its effect was reducedbecause the vessel was decelerating, and the vessel ran aground just north of buoy S10.

Findings as to risk

If a navigator relies on a single piece of navigational equipment, there is a risk that potential errors or inaccuracies will go undetected.

If information that may affect the safe passage of the vessel is not communicated between bridge teams and pilots, there is a risk that unsafe situations and conditions may persist.

If pilots do not make use of the most accurate navigational equipment available to them,there is a risk they will make decisions based on imprecise information.

Source and Image Credit: TSB

More information may be found byreading the investigation report issued by Transport Safety Board of Canada.