

# INSIDER THREAT TOOL KIT



## GENERAL



This toolkit, developed for training purposes by the IMO Maritime Security Section in collaboration with the International Civil Aviation Organization, is designed to assist organizations operating in the maritime environment, including Maritime Administrations, Designated Authorities, shipping companies, port operators and other maritime stakeholders, to better react to the ever-evolving insider threat. Terrorists, organized crime groups and other hostile perpetrators consistently look to exploit vulnerabilities in security controls and commit security incidents against both the shipping and port sectors. Such security incidents could be facilitated through the exploitation of insiders.

### WHO are insiders?

Insiders are full or part-time employees (including contractors, temporary and self-employed personnel) who are working in or for the maritime sector (including shipping and ports and other maritime stakeholders). Their role provides them with privileged access and/or knowledge to secured locations, items or sensitive security information.

### WHAT is the insider threat?

The insider threat refers to the risk arising from maritime employees conducting or facilitating a security incident through use of their authorized access, thereby giving them a tactical advantage.

### WHAT is the rationale of an insider ?

Insiders may conduct or facilitate a security incident through a lack of awareness, complacency or maliciousness. Lack of awareness of policies and procedures and complacency (lax approach to policies and procedures) can cause insiders to unintentionally facilitate a security incident through their negligence, inaction or failure to follow security policies and procedures<sup>1</sup>.

On the other hand, malicious insiders – those who make a conscious decision to conduct a security incident – may be driven by a mix of

<sup>1</sup> For international requirements please refer to the Maritime Security Measures (Maritime Security Measures means the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974, as amended, chapter XI-2, "Special measures to enhance maritime security", and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, parts A and B).

personal vulnerabilities, life events and situational factors, such as financial gain<sup>2</sup>, ideology, revenge, desire for recognition, or coercion.

A malicious insider could deliberately seek to join an organization to conduct a security incident or acquire the intention of doing so during their employment (e.g. recruitment by a third party to exploit their trusted position).

### HOW can insiders act?

Insiders can conduct any security incident (e.g. damage/destruction of a ship in service, introduction of a weapon or hazardous device or material intended for criminal purposes on board a ship and/or at a port). Insiders can share confidential information, facilitate access to restricted areas, perform their roles inadequately enabling the introduction of prohibited articles into restricted areas, help external parties to obtain access to information technology and operational technology systems<sup>3</sup>, etc.

### MITIGATION MEASURES

A range of personnel security measures and policies can help organizations mitigate the threat posed by insiders. In general, these measures seek to reduce the risk of recruiting staff who may present a security concern by their actions; minimize the likelihood of existing employees becoming a security concern; reduce the risk of insider activity; and protect an organization's assets.



<sup>2</sup> See also Guidance to Implement and Adopt Procedures against Maritime Corruption (FAL.5/Circ.48).

<sup>3</sup> Information technology systems may be thought of as focusing on the use of data as information. Operational technology systems may be thought of as focusing on the use of data to control or monitor physical processes. Furthermore, the protection of information and data exchange within these systems should also be considered. For further information please see the Guidelines on Maritime Cyber Risk Management (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3/Rev.2).

Insider threat mitigation measures and tools can be grouped by the following areas:

## BACKGROUND CHECKS AND VETTING<sup>4</sup>

**Policies and procedures:** Robust policies and procedures on background checks, including employee's identity, previous work experience, criminal history and educational background, are a cornerstone of any framework aimed at mitigating the threat posed by insiders. Such policies and procedures should be clear and concise and should be periodically reviewed.

**Initial background checks:** All employees who need unescorted access to the ship or port and the restricted areas, and persons with access to sensitive security information, should undergo background checks as specified by the Administration or Designated Authority.

Initial background checks should cover:

- identity (e.g. provision of a passport, identity card, records of registry of birth, Seafarers Identity Document etc.);
- character/reference check (e.g. to check integrity or any criminal history, etc.); and
- employment history (e.g. previous employers, educational history, etc.).

**Recurrent background checks:** Background checks should be recurrent and updated on a regular basis as part of cyclical personnel security checks. It is good practice to update a background check every time ship or port identification passes/permits need to be renewed

Those who commit a security incident using insider access or knowledge often acquire the intention to do so after employment has been secured. Additionally, many insiders may have already attracted management's attention (e.g. through breaches of discipline), which should be taken into consideration during the recurrent background check process.

**Continuous vetting:** A continuous vetting process should be encouraged, in collaboration with the relevant Administration or Designated Authority. This is to assess whether an employee continues to meet applicable employment requirements.



<sup>4</sup> Please also see paragraphs 3.5.11 to 3.5.13 and 4.5.28 to 4.5.31 of the Guide to Maritime Security and the ISPS Code 2021 Edition.

**Enhanced background checks:** Background checks that cover intelligence (and any other relevant information available on the suitability of a person to work in a function) could be useful. Indeed, States may collaborate with the relevant Administration or Designated Authority to incorporate some enhanced data into the layered background check and vetting process.

Equally, if staff identify suspicious or unusual behaviour in a person, then the relevant security and local competent authorities should be contacted, as an enhanced intelligence background check might be necessary.

## TRAINING AND AWARENESS

**Awareness training:** Security awareness and security culture training should be encouraged for all staff. This will help ensure that all personnel know the security policies, standards, guidelines and procedures, as well as understand their purpose in maintaining a high level of security. This training will also enable new employees to develop the ability to identify and safely report suspicious behaviours to the appropriate authority or law enforcement officer/agency, including through anonymous means.




**Training integration:** Security awareness could be integrated into initial and existing recurrent training or through the use of campaign material, workshops, drop-in sessions, etc. to promote a strong and effective security culture in maritime.

**Role-specific training:** For some staff, including but not limited to Company Security Officers, Ship Security Officers, Port Facility Security Officers, supervisors, security staff and those with personnel security responsibilities, more in-depth, role-specific training will be appropriate to tailor targeted training outcomes.

**Awareness campaigns:** Visual messaging covering key security aspects should be developed for display within organizations and ship and port environments in order to serve as visual reminders to staff.

## ACCESS CONTROL MEASURES

**Screening:** Access control measures should be in place to ensure that all persons, together with items carried, are subject to screening prior to entry into ship and port restricted areas. Such screening should incorporate some random and unpredictable screening methods to help offset insider knowledge and reduce the chance of prohibited articles being transported onto the ship or port, including when carried by employees.



**Policies and procedures:** Policies and procedures should be clear and include:

- Deactivate identification badges of employees who have left the organization (e.g. resigned, retired, etc.);
- Limit access rights to restricted areas for pass holders based on strict operational need;
- Adequately protect the perimeter and access control points to ensure that staff security screening cannot be bypassed; and
- Implement supervision protocols and wider use of closed circuit television (CCTV) for operational activities, where appropriate.

**Review access lists:** It is recommended that procedures for issuing ship and port identification permits are reviewed to ensure that the employee requesting access to a certain area has an operational need for such access.



## PATROLLING

**Random and unpredictable:** Patrolling should be implemented in a random and unpredictable way (e.g. spot checks), so that patrols cannot be avoided or bypassed as a result of hostile reconnaissance or insider knowledge. Additionally, patrolling should not only focus on the surveillance of ship and port personnel but include passengers, other ship and port stakeholders, and ship and port infrastructure and goods for signs of unusual activity or poor security.

Patrolling can be effective as a visual deterrent if personnel are in uniform and use marked vehicles. Alternatively, patrolling can provide increased surveillance if conducted covertly.



## SURVEILLANCE AND MONITORING

**Methods:** Quality control and monitoring of processes and employees specific to the insider threat can play an important role in avoiding or quickly addressing security incidents. Methods of surveillance include CCTV, reviewing systems logs (e.g. access requests), and surveillance by staff on the ground.

Company Security Officers, Ship Security Officers, Port Facility Security Officers and Supervisors also play a critical role in recognizing and monitoring unusual activities and behaviours of the employees that they oversee.

**Data:** In some organizations, employee data can be found in various software application logs, which record the actions of employees. This digital data can be used as a tool to determine if any malicious intent exists amongst ship and port crew/staff (e.g. accessing areas for which there is no operational need).

Applications could include:

- Physical entry/exit logs, with a primary focus on time and access to physical spaces;
- Log-on/log-off records, with a focus on time- and user-matching credentials;
- Email application logs; and
- Database application logs.



## REPORTING MECHANISMS

**Reporting suspicious behaviour:** Reporting mechanisms should involve everyone throughout the organization – not just those directly involved in security. These are important because employees are the ‘eyes’, ‘ears’ and ‘voice’ of an organization.

Reporting mechanisms may be set up so that employees can safely report suspicious behaviours or incidents through texts, emails, phone calls, social media channels, or by speaking to someone in person. Security reports should receive a clear, effective, and quick response.

Anonymous or confidential reporting can be very useful to help mitigate potential insider threats and to establish an effective security culture in the organization.

### Security is **everyone's** responsibility

Reporting unusual or suspicious activity helps keep us all safe.



When reporting remember:

**WHAT** is it?

**WHERE** is it?

**WHEN** did you see it?

**WHY** it concerned you?

**WHO** witnessed it?



 Unusual behaviour or activity?

Challenge and Report

**WHAT? WHERE? WHEN? WHO?**

**CALL**  
**TEXT**

**TEL NUMBER**



**YOUR INTERVENTION COULD SAVE LIVES**




## BEHAVIOUR DETECTION<sup>5</sup>

**Behaviour detection:** A useful tool to help mitigate the insider threat can be behaviour detection. It is based on the premise that people may display signs of suspicious or unusual behaviour, and that these signs can be picked up by people who have been properly trained.

**Training:** Giving crew/staff an understanding of what is suspicious activity and unusual behaviour, as well as an understanding of how to report it, can be a useful tool.

Behaviour detection training should target a broad range of personnel, including, but not limited to, those involved in issuing passes, conducting background checks, and screening. However, all staff could benefit from this type of training as part of general security awareness training.




## SECURITY CULTURE

**A strong and effective security culture:** Establishing a positive security culture throughout the maritime sector is essential to mitigating insider threats and delivering effective and robust security outcomes. Employees can be:

- motivated and informed about insider risks through regular briefings on threats and wider security issues;
- trained to identify and report anomalous or suspicious behaviours; and
- be a valuable source of information on vulnerabilities and how to address them.

<sup>5</sup> Behaviour detection is the application of techniques involving the recognition of behavioural characteristics, including but not limited to physiological or gestural signs indicative of anomalous behaviour (a combination of verbal and non-verbal signs) to identify persons with a potential intent to commit an act of unlawful interference.



## LEADERSHIP AND STRATEGY

**Strong leadership:** It is critical that leaders understand their part in displaying positive security actions and behaviours expected from their workforce. Open communication between employees and management should be encouraged and leaders should have an understanding of the operational day-to-day pressures on the workforce, and the insider risks those pressures may create.

An executive (e.g. senior-level manager) who takes ownership of security risk principles, implements a top-down approach to security policies, and exemplifies expected behaviours is likely to promote a more compliant and consistent approach across the organization, further helping to mitigate insider threats.

**Strategy:** An insider threat mitigation strategy (endorsed by leadership) is recommended for helping employees understand how to recognize and how to report suspicious behaviours within the workplace.

The strategy can also include personnel-related insider policies, guidelines, and procedures. These include actions to be taken prior to employment and throughout an employee's time with the organization. The strategy and associated policies should be reviewed regularly with all key stakeholders.

Guidance material can provide additional useful information.

## HUMAN FACTORS

**Human performance and factors:** Organizations should have an understanding of how human performance can help mitigate the insider threat. This includes being aware of how human factors can impact individuals, who may either intentionally or unintentionally use their unique access to cause a security incident. Leaders and senior management should:

- develop an understanding of human capabilities and how these can help mitigate the risk of insider activity;
- understand human limitations and how these can be accommodated to ensure they do not impact performance;
- make it easy for staff to report security concerns and suspicious behaviours;
- understand the link between human factors, security culture and motivation;
- ensure the availability of resources needed by personnel;
- ensure supervisory staff are able to identify signs of stress and fatigue in order to deal with them promptly; and
- avoid complacency in day-to-day activities.

## ADVANCE TECHNOLOGIES

**Explosives Trace Detection (ETD):** Explosives Trace Detection (ETD): Use of ETD machines can add an additional layer of security to the standard screening procedures and/or random and unpredictable security countermeasures employed throughout the restricted area, thereby helping to mitigate the insider threat.



**Explosive Detection Dogs (EDDs):** EDD teams can be used to serve many purposes such as: security screening for ships and ports, sweeping restricted areas and providing a means of implementing random and unpredictable security measures.



**Artificial Intelligence (AI):** Use of AI-based systems by trained employees can help to identify trends and abnormal activities. E.g. modern incident management solutions can help identify incidents and differentiate mundane events from imminent threats, such as attempted break-ins into secured areas, and AI-based CCTV can help to identify unusual or suspicious behavior patterns.

