



SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT

201905/004

REPORT NO.: 10/2020

May 2020

The Merchant Shipping (Accident and Incident Safety Investigation) Regulations, 2011 prescribe that the sole objective of marine safety investigations carried out in accordance with the regulations, including analysis, conclusions, and recommendations, which either result from them or are part of the process thereof, shall be the prevention of future marine accidents and incidents through the ascertainment of causes, contributing factors and circumstances.

Moreover, it is not the purpose of marine safety investigations carried out in accordance with these regulations to apportion blame or determine civil and criminal liabilities.

NOTE

This report is not written with litigation in mind and pursuant to Regulation 13(7) of the Merchant Shipping (Accident and Incident Safety Investigation) Regulations, 2011, shall be inadmissible in any judicial proceedings whose purpose or one of whose purposes is to attribute or apportion liability or blame, unless, under prescribed conditions, a Court determines otherwise.

The report may therefore be misleading if used for purposes other than the promulgation of safety lessons.

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This safety investigation has been conducted with the assistance and cooperation of the Italian Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport

FV ZAIRA

Foundering in Marsascala Bay

resulting in the loss of two fishermen

04 May 2019

SUMMARY

On the early morning of 04 May, *Zaira* was heading towards Valletta to seek shelter from inclement weather. The vessel was around 3.5 nautical miles (nm) from Valletta, when a high wave from the East caused her to heel heavily to the port side. Eventually, a second wave caused the vessel to heel further to port and take in water through her hull openings.

The fishermen lost control of their vessel and had to abandon her. The combined wind and wave action caused the vessel to drift towards Marsascala Bay,

where she eventually foundered and came to rest on the bottom of the seafloor with her mast above the sea level.

Two fishermen made it ashore, but two others perished and were recovered several hours after the accident.

The MSIU has issued four recommendations to the Owner, with the aim of reducing the possibilities of flooding and to increase readiness during emergency situations.



FACTUAL INFORMATION

The vessel

Zaira was built in 1990 by Cantiere GRACI in Licata, in Sicily, Italy. She was an 18 gt Italian registered, single hold fishing vessel. The fishing vessel was in the tenure of a private owner since 03 August 2012. At the time of sinking, her hold was reported to have contained approximately 400 kg of fish.

Zaira had a length overall of 14.25 m, a moulded depth of 1.78 m and a moulded breadth of 4.18 m. The vessel was of a wooden construction, having a freeboard deck, a raised forecastle deck, a bridge and a sheltered deck (Figures 1 and 2). The bulwark was estimated to be two metres high on either side, having large openings on her port side and small side scuttles on her starboard side.




Figure 1: *Zaira*, from her port side. The moulded depth is indicated in yellow, and the bulwark is marked in red




Figure 2: *Zaira*, from her starboard quarter

On the deck below the bridge was the galley, which extended to the beginning of the raised forecastle deck. The refrigeration chamber and the access openings to the engine-room (port and starboard) were set aft of the galley. Behind the raised forecastle deck and to the starboard side of the galley, was a toilet. Directly below the galley was the fish hold and right aft of the fish hold was the engine-room.

The fish hold's hatch cover was made of aluminium and the watertight door to the refrigeration chamber was made of steel. All other access openings on board *Zaira* were fitted with sliding wooden doors, which were not weathertight. Additionally, a hinged wooden door separated the raised forecastle deck from the port side deck.

Propulsive power was provided by a 6-cylinder IVECO AIFO, four stroke, diesel engine, producing 162 kW at 2200 rpm. This drove a single fixed pitch propeller, giving a maximum speed of about eight knots.

The documents of *Zaira* indicated that the vessel was certified to fish within 40 nautical miles (nm)¹ from the nearest coast. The inspection of the vessel's radio station had been carried out by the Italian Authorities in Syracuse on 27 April 2018. Included were a fixed VHF radio with Digital Selective Calling (DSC), a 406 MHz EPIRB², a GPS receiver and an MF/HF radio transceiver, as the GMDSS³ equipment found to be operational during the inspection.

This document also specified that the vessel was restricted to navigate within GMDSS Sea Area A1⁴. In addition, the vessel also carried on board a vessel monitoring system,

¹ 1 nm = 1852 m.

² Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon.

³ Global Maritime Distress and Safety System.

⁴ Sea Area A1 means an area within the radiotelephone coverage of at least one VHF radio coast station in which continuous DSC alerting is available.

which allowed for the vessel's positions to be tracked while at sea⁵.

For navigational purposes, *Zaira* was equipped with a magnetic and gyro compass, a radar set, a GPS receiver and an echo sounder. In addition, a speed and distance indicator through the water was also installed.

Life-saving appliances were provided for six persons and included two six-person liferafts, six life jackets, and two lifebuoys – one was fitted with a light, and the other was fitted with light and smoke signals.

Crew

Since *Zaira* was not a SOLAS vessel, she was not issued with a Minimum Safe Manning Certificate by the flag State Administration. The manning level was therefore at the discretion of the owner. At the time of the accident, the vessel was manned by a crew complement of four namely, a skipper, a mechanic and two deck boys.

The skipper, who was an Italian national, had 18 years experience at sea on board fishing vessels. Available information indicated that the skipper was qualified in his role. Reportedly, the skipper also held a GMDSS ROC licence⁶. At the time of occurrence, he was on the bridge. The Italian mechanic was 66 years old and had been at sea since the age of seven. In addition to his certificate to work as a mechanic, it was reported that he also had a restricted skipper licence and a GMDSS ROC licence. At the time of occurrence, the mechanic was on the bridge, manning the wheel.

⁵ The vessel monitoring system on board *Zaira* was able to collect the vessel's position and transmit it via the Global Navigation Satellite System to a communication server, following which, the data was processed and delivered to the national fisheries monitoring software, in Italy.

⁶ Restricted Radio Operator's Certificate; for operating within GMDSS sea area A1 only.

The two other crew members, who were Moroccan and Tunisian nationals, were employed as deck boys. They had been looking for a job and joined *Zaira* on 01 May 2019. For the Moroccan deck boy, this was his first experience at sea, while the Tunisian deck boy had already experienced a short spell of time at sea, serving on board a bottom trawler. At the time of occurrence, both deck boys were in the galley.

Environment

The wind, as described by the skipper, was blowing from a Southeasterly direction and eventually it backed to Northeast, reaching gale force⁷. The waves were estimated to have been between five to six metres high. The hourly wind data, which was recorded by the Malta Meteorological Office's Bnghajsa and Valletta weather stations, for the early hours between 03 May and 04 May, is tabulated in Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1: Hourly wind data as recorded from Bnghajsa weather station

Date/ Time	Highest Gust / knots	Wind Direction	Av. Wind speed / knots	Wind Force
03/05 22:00	26.4	E	9.3	F3
03/05 23:00	22.2	E	11.5	F4
04/05 00:00	36.3	ESE	15.9	F4
04/05 01:00	28.8	SEbyE	17.5	F5
04/05 02:00	34.6	SEbyE	20.2	F5
04/05 03:00	38.3	SEbyE	23.7	F6
04/05 04:00	41.4	SE	24.9	F6
04/05 05:00	37.7	SEbyE	20.7	F5

⁷ Gale force wind equivalents to Force 8 on the Beaufort wind scale (34 to 40 knots).

Table 2: Hourly wind data as recorded from Valletta weather station

Date/ Time	Highest Gust / knots	Wind Direction	Av. Wind speed / knots	Wind Force
03/05 22:00	34.2	SEbyE	21.3	F6
03/05 23:00	32.3	ESE	19.6	F5
04/05 00:00	40.4	SE	24.4	F6
04/05 01:00	50.7	SE	24.5	F6
04/05 02:00	50.7	SE	31.5	F7
04/05 03:00	52.9	SE	28.7	F7
04/05 04:00	46.7	SE	27.3	F7
04/05 05:00	50.0	SE	26.4	F6

The locations of these two weather stations in relation to *Zaira's* approximate position during the distress are indicated in Figure 3.



Figure 3: Location of Benghajsa and Valletta weather stations

(Source: Malta Airport METOFFICE)

Narrative⁸

Zaira left the port of Syracuse on 01 May 2019, just after midnight, and headed to an unspecified location, 60 nm to the Southeast of Malta. When she arrived, two other Italian registered fishing vessels were in the area.

On 03 May, the other fishing vessels relayed the weather forecast to *Zaira*, which indicated the onset of inclement weather. At that stage, *Zaira* had already carried out two fishing operations and the skipper had decided to head towards Malta, to seek shelter from the oncoming weather (Figure 4). It was reported that during the sea passage to Valletta, all access openings were closed, bar for the wooden door leading to the bridge.




Figure 4: *Zaira's* Northwesterly track upon leaving the fishing grounds

When the vessel was 25 nm away from Valletta (on 03 May at around 2325), the skipper called Valletta VTS to advise his intentions. The VTS requested *Zaira* to call again at five nm. At 0258 on 04 May, *Zaira* called Valletta VTS again, to advise that she was five nm away. At this point, *Zaira* had

⁸ All times are Maltese Daylight Saving Time (UTC + 2).

Marsaxlokk's southernmost peninsula abeam to her port side and was heading on a Northwesterly course, making good a speed of approximately seven knots, towards Valletta Harbour.

As *Zaira* rolled heavily in the Easterly waves, a high wave hit her starboard side, causing her to heel to port. Reportedly, *Zaira* did not return to the upright and, shortly after, a second wave from the same direction caused her to heel further to her port side. This resulted in the vessel heeling past her angle of deck edge immersion, and consequently taking water.

At 0314, the Italian authorities received the first SOS⁹ from *Zaira*. At that time, she was approximately 0.5 nm from the nearest land and moving in a Northwesterly direction (Figure 5). The skipper, seeing the distressing situation that the vessel was in, pressed the emergency button on the vessel monitoring system for 12 times in a time span of 10 minutes. The mechanic, who was on the bridge at the time, was reportedly seen by the skipper to jump overboard as soon as it was apparent that the vessel was sinking. Eventually, the skipper was forced to leave the bridge, due to the rising waters.

The vessel did not sink immediately. During this time, the skipper approached both deck boys and together, they prepared the liferaft and boarded it. The liferaft, with the three fishermen inside, drifted towards the shore while *Zaira* sank. When they had reached closer to shore, after about 10 minutes, the liferaft capsized, throwing the three fishermen into the water. The skipper and the Tunisian deck boy made it ashore and immediately sought help.




Figure 5: The first SOS position recorded at 0314 and the last SOS position recorded at 0324. Position at 0500 shows the final position of *Zaira* as it rested on the bottom of Marsascala Bay

The last position received from *Zaira* was at 0500. This indicated that the vessel's drift stopped inside Marsascala Bay¹⁰. At this stage, *Zaira* was resting on the sandy seafloor of the Bay, with her mast above seawater level.

Search and Rescue

At 0400, the Armed Forces of Malta's Operations Room received a landline telephone call, informing them of *Zaira*'s difficulty and that two fishermen were still in the water. 15 minutes later, the first search and rescue launch was deployed from the Armed Forces' base, and headed towards the accident location. By 0521, the Moroccan deck boy was sighted and was brought ashore. He was soon after transported to hospital, where he was pronounced dead.

⁹ The alarm shows on the extracts of the vessel's track provided by the Italian Harbour Authorities.

¹⁰ Marsascala Bay is a small, seaside location, with pleasure boats and other small boats moored to buoys during summer time. The Bay neither has any port facilities nor other related services.

The search and rescue for the Italian mechanic remained active by sea, land and by air for almost 15 hours, until he was located at 1911, approximately eight nm from the accident location. He was confirmed dead soon after recovery.




Figure 6: Position 1: location of first SOS and approximate position 2: location where the body of the mechanic was found

Salvage

The fishing vessel *Zaira* was refloated on 09 May 2019. The divers employed for the salvage reported that all the hatches and wooden doors on board *Zaira* were found open (Figures 7, 8 and 9).




Figure 7: Port side of *Zaira*, red arrow showing the bridge hatch open, white arrow showing the port side bulwark hatch missing



Figure 8: Hatch on port side freeboard deck in way of the fish hold found open



Figure 9: Hatch on freeboard deck leading to the stern tube found missing

Furthermore, it was reported that the salvors found the door leading from the raised forecandle deck to the freeboard deck in two pieces (Figure 10).



Figure 10: Door leading to the port side deck found in two pieces

The MSIU was informed that the salvors may have not been the first divers to have visited *Zaira*, as items were reported missing to the police (Figure 11).




Figure 11: Rudder was not found by the salvors and was reported to have been stolen

ANALYSIS

Aim

The purpose of a marine safety investigation is to determine the circumstances and safety factors of the accident as a basis for making recommendations, and to prevent further marine casualties or incidents from occurring in the future.

Cooperation

During the course of this safety investigation, MSIU received all the necessary assistance and cooperation from the Italian Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport.

Probable cause of sinking

In all probability, *Zaira* sank following flooding of her compartments in adverse weather conditions and which led to loss of buoyancy and stability.

Probable cause of deaths

None of the fishermen was wearing lifejackets. The mechanic jumped overboard

in rough weather conditions while the deck boy was pulled out of the sea after the liferaft capsized. In the absence of autopsy reports, the MSIU attributed the deaths of the two fishermen to drowning.

Weather conditions

The wind, as recorded by the Bengħajsa weather station at 0300, indicated that it was blowing from a Southeasterly direction with an average speed of 23.7 knots. However, Valletta weather station recorded stronger winds on the East coast of the island, with an average wind speed of 28.7 knots and wind gusts of up to 52.9 knots at 0300. The recorded difference between these readings was attributed to the hilly topography of the island. Due to this difference and the lack of weather records from the vessel, the safety investigation could not determine with certainty the weather being experienced by *Zaira* and her crew members.

At that time, *Zaira* was Southeast of Marsascala, sailing on a Northerly course towards Valletta Harbour. The skipper had described the experienced waves as being five to six meters high and coming from the East, which was to *Zaira*'s starboard side.

The skipper also described that the wind had backed to the Northeast and increased to gale force. The safety investigation could not determine the accuracy of this statement, however, both Valletta and Bengħajsa weather stations' observations indicated that the wind was blowing from the Southeast throughout the early hours of 04 May. The skipper's observation (Northeasterly winds) may be attributed to the movement of the fishing vessel in rough seas, as she rose and fell with the waves.

Probable causes of flooding

Survivors recalled that the vessel did not return to the upright after the first wave hit her starboard side. Then, a second wave caused the vessel to heel further to her port

side and eventually she started taking water and could not be recovered.

The poop deck was not entirely open to sea as it had a sheltered deck covering over the sides and the engine-room, and an extended bulwark on the starboard side (Figure 12).



Figure 12: The poop deck of Zaira, showing a reconstruction of the sheltered deck (in yellow) and a reconstruction of the engine-room deckhead (in red)

It is not known whether the sheltered deck was lost in the rough weather, or when the vessel started sinking. Available information, however, suggested that the destruction of the sheltered deck was caused by the battering waves on the starboard side. The missing bulwark in Figure 12 was still attached to the vessel, while she was resting on the bottom of the seafloor (Figure 13).




Figure 13: Underwater photograph of the poop deck area

Zaira was encountering waves of at least five metres high. Due to the vessel's motion in the seaway, with her bulwark being two metres high, the raised forecastle deck wide open, and her poop deck open at the stern, green seas were being shipped onto her decks.

Furthermore, the door from the raised forecastle deck to the port side deck was found in two pieces (Figure 10). This would have allowed the water shipped over the raised forecastle deck, to flow down to the port side deck, adding to the water being shipped over the poop deck.

The vessel had freeing ports on either side of the poop deck (Figure 14).




Figure 14: Magnified photo shows starboard side's freeing port. An identical freeing port was on the other side

Assuming that the freeing ports were clear from any obstructions, water would have generally cleared through them. However, it was doubtful whether these freeing ports would have been sufficient to drain the large volumes of water from the deck before more green seas were shipped by the next wave. This would have allowed significant volumes of water to collect between the raised forecastle deck and the bulwark, eventually finding its way into other compartments.

It is hypothesised that water had consequently entered the fish hold and the engine-room, although it was reported that the hatch cover of the fish hold to have been

in a good condition before this occurrence. However, the fish hold hatch cover's rubber inserts were noticed to be worn out (Figure 15), suggesting that the hatch cover was not weathertight.



Figure 15: Hatch cover in way of fish hold, showing worn out rubber inserts (in yellow) and rubber strips around the securing points (in red)

It was considered probable that the securing arrangements were not being used to fully batten down the hatch cover. Furthermore, black rubber strips were wrapped around its securing points (Figure 15 and 16). It was reported that these were present to prevent the fishermen from injuring themselves while walking past.



Figure 16: Rubber strips wrapped around securing points and securing dogs lying on the side

Zaira's engine-room access openings (Figure 17) were found open during the salvage, which would suggest that once on deck, water was free to enter the engine-room. It is not known when the deck ceiling of the engine-room broke away from its fittings (Figure 12). However, considering that this might have occurred during the sea passage, it would have contributed further to water ingress into the engine-room space.




Figure 17: Starboard and port side engine-room access

Once water had accumulated inside these compartments and on deck, the vessel would have become gradually unstable as free surface moments¹¹ would have most likely been experienced by the vessel.

Moreover, *Zaira* was constantly experiencing wind and wave action on her starboard side, which caused her to heel to the port side. As a result, the cargo of fish being carried inside the fish hold may have shifted to the port

¹¹ Free surface moments cause a vessel to become tender and sluggish, making her slow to return to the upright.

side, causing her to list to port and eventually reach her angle of deck edge immersion.

Loss of buoyancy¹²

When a vessel is floating upright in still water, the centre of buoyancy (B) and the centre of gravity (G) will be on the same vertical (imaginary) line, acting in opposing direction (Figure 18a). When a vessel is heeled by an external force, such as waves, the shape of the underwater section of the vessel would change, causing the centre of buoyancy (B) to shift in the direction of the heel, to a new position (B₁). With the centre of gravity (G) acting downwards and the centre of buoyancy (B₁) acting upwards, this will create a righting lever (GZ) which will try to bring back the vessel to the upright position (Figure 18b).




Figure 18: (a) the vessel in an upright position and (b) the vessel heeled to one side with B₁ indicating the shift in the centre of buoyancy

However, when there is a loss of buoyancy, such as when compartments have been flooded, the righting lever would be insufficient to bring the vessel back to the upright. Generally, smaller vessels are unable to cope with large waves.

In the case of *Zaira*, water had been flooding into the fish hold and the engine-room, while also accumulating on deck, thus reducing her freeboard considerably and making her more susceptible to flooding. In addition, the weather acting on her starboard side, and

consequently giving her a heel to port and the possibility that the fish in the fish hold had shifted to port, would have further reduced her ability to return to the upright.

Although *Zaira*'s access was reported to have been closed, most of the access hatches were found open during the salvage; nonetheless, except for the refrigeration chamber, none of the compartments was weathertight. Therefore, water would have entered the compartments in any case, following which, the loss of *Zaira*'s buoyancy would have been inevitable.

Complexity of the situation

In the early hours of 04 May, the skipper and the mechanic, who were both on the bridge, were focused on the vessel's navigation through rough weather. It was night time, the vessel was close to land and, moreover, water being shipped onto the vessel's deck. As complex as this situation may have been, both fishermen must have been accustomed to such situations; however, the crew members had to manage the unexpected during the night.

It was clear that the sudden heel to port experienced by *Zaira*, was not expected by the fishermen. Then, the weather acting broadside and the ingress of water in *Zaira*'s fish hold, combined with the possible shifting of fish stored inside the fish hold, brought about a sudden change in the situation, making it even more complex.

As soon as the skipper realised that they were overwhelmed, he resorted to calling out for help by pressing the emergency button on the vessel monitoring system. Moreover, the action of the mechanic to jump overboard suggested a rapid aggravation of the situation, which he was not prepared for. His actions were also suggestive of him being overcome by emotions of fear and jumping overboard was considered to be the safer option to going down with the vessel.

¹² Buoyancy is the force that acts vertically upwards from the geometric centre of the underwater section of any floating body.

Furthermore, during the night, the two experienced fishermen seemed to be indifferent to the weather conditions being experienced by their vessel and they must have believed (at least initially) that the vessel would manage to weather the storm. The MSIU believes that this was the reason why the lifejackets were not donned.

It was reported that *Zaira* was equipped with manually activated bilge pumps and a high water level alarm. The MSIU could not confirm the functionality of the bilge pumps and the alarm, however, it was reported that no bilge water alarm was activated during the sea passage towards Valletta. In fact, initially, the skipper did not deem it necessary to switch on the bilge pumps as he did not observe any water ingress. However, when there was rapid ingress of water, the fishermen either did not have enough time to start the bilge pumps, or the control switches for the bilge pumps were already inaccessible.

In addition, it was reported that on the onset of the second high wave there was a short circuit in the VHF radio. It is possible that most of the other electrical equipment might have also been affected, including the bilge alarm panel. Hence, the alarm might have not activated, thereby failing to draw the attention of the fishermen towards manually starting the bilge pumps.

Distress alerting

Although the skipper had pressed the emergency button immediately when it was evident that his vessel was in distress (at 0314), the Armed Forces of Malta, responsible for the Rescue Coordination Centre, were only alerted when an emergency landline telephone call was received by their operations centre at 0400. This is because *Zaira*'s SOS positions were only received by the Italian Harbour Authority (Comando Generale delle

Capitanerie di Porto), through the fisheries and aquaculture information system¹³.

The safety investigation is unaware of the actions that had been taken by the Italian Harbour Authority upon receiving the distress alerts, however, it was reported that the owner of *Zaira* had been contacted. It was not excluded that the unavailability of the VHF radio due to it being damaged by sea water, had exacerbated the skipper's delay in requesting assistance directly from Malta.

Moreover, there was no information on an EPIRB distress signal being received by the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre of Malta. Reportedly, the EPIRB¹⁴, which was installed on board *Zaira*, had not been recovered.

Navigational area

Zaira's certificates were issued for close coastal fishing for a distance of not more than 40 nm from the national coast. Although of no direct bearing to this accident, it was noticed that *Zaira* was fishing at a distance of more than 40 nm from the Maltese coast. The accident took place while the vessel was close to the Maltese shores.

CONCLUSIONS

1. In all probability, *Zaira* sunk due to flooding of her compartments and loss of stability.
2. The probable cause of death of the mechanic and the deck boy was drowning.

¹³ Vide footnote 5.

¹⁴ The EPIRB was last tested and checked during a Radio survey on 27 April 2018 and was found working satisfactorily.

3. The wooden door leading from the raised forecastle deck to the port side deck had failed.
4. Most of the access openings to *Zaira*'s compartments were found open, allowing water ingress.
5. The fish hold hatch cover rubber gaskets were worn out and the securing points were covered with rubber strips, thus compromising the weathertightness of this hatch cover.
6. The wind and wave action were causing the vessel to heel to port side.
7. Most probably the fish in the fish hold shifted to port side, causing the vessel to list to port.
8. The flooding of compartments reduced *Zaira*'s freeboard, thereby making her susceptible to additional flooding.
9. No lifejackets were donned by the fishermen during the rough sea passage to Valletta.
10. The bilge alarm panel may have been damaged by sea water, thus giving no indication of the ingress of water.
11. The bilge pumps had not been started.

RECOMMENDATIONS¹⁵

The Owner of *Zaira* is recommended to:

10/2020_R1 install a watertight hatch cover in way of the fish hold.

10/2020_R2 install weathertight doorways, to reduce the risk of ingress of water into the vessel's lower compartments.

10/2020_R3 increase the number of freeing ports on the freeboard deck to avoid water collection.

10/2020_R4 carry a waterproof VHF radio for use in case of emergencies.

¹⁵ **Recommendations shall not create a presumption of blame and / or liability.**

SHIP PARTICULARS

Vessel Name:	<i>Zaira</i>
Flag:	Italy
Classification Society:	Not applicable
IMO Number:	Not applicable
Type:	Fishing vessel
Registered Owner:	<i>Privately owned</i>
Managers:	Not applicable
Construction:	Wood
Length Overall:	14.25 m
Registered Length:	12.49 m
Gross Tonnage:	18
Minimum Safe Manning:	Not applicable
Authorised Cargo:	Fish

VOYAGE PARTICULARS

Port of Departure:	Syracuse, Sicily
Port of Arrival:	Fishing grounds
Type of Voyage:	Short International Voyage
Cargo Information:	Fish (approximately 0.4 tonnes)
Manning:	4

MARINE OCCURRENCE INFORMATION

Date and Time:	4 May 2019 at 0314 (LT)
Classification of Occurrence:	Very Serious Marine Casualty
Location of Occurrence:	35° 51.47' N 014° 35.15' E
Place on Board	Not applicable
Injuries / Fatalities:	Two fatalities
Damage / Environmental Impact:	Material damage
Ship Operation:	In passage
Voyage Segment:	Transit
External & Internal Environment:	Winds were blowing from a Southeasterly direction and gradually increased to Force 7 on the Beaufort wind scale. The waves were approximately 5 to 6 metres high.
Persons on board:	4