The industry needs to support the best casualty investigation
Most ships complete their voyages expeditiously and with perfect safety, and we perhaps do not give their crews and managements sufficient credit for this. But this tremendous “success rate” should not blind us to the lessons we can learn from those voyages we hear about where problems were encountered. From such reports, trends can be established and warning lights go on as we try and ensure that such a problem will not occur aboard the ships for which one bears responsibility. It is why the industry needs to support the best, most comprehensive and universal (in a global industry) system of casualty investigation, good when it is based on a “no-blame” regime, best when it is transparent.
So what trends ought to be switching on those warning lights today? One very notable warning seems to be coming from pilots around the world, who have been commenting on the number of ships that are experiencing “fuel problems” in vulnerable places. Sudden losses of power can be exceedingly embarrassing in confined waters when the engines are in a manoeuvring mode. Many, it would appear, can be attributed to the new fuel regulations that are being implemented in the various emission control areas around the world – more of which might be expected as the years progress. There have been reports of ships alarming both those aboard and authorities of coastal states when experiencing total power losses off lee shores, or in heavily trafficked areas, effectively where mechanical reliability matters most.
One might hope that this will be a temporary phenomenon, but it does illustrate the complications that sometimes arise when regulations, from the best possible intentions, provoke a major change in operating practice. Regulators, possibly because they are reacting to an agenda which has environmental pressure behind it, may possibly under-estimate the effects of implementation. Indeed, when the action was taken against the emission of sulphuric components, there was a perception that sulphur was of no possible use in the combustion process and could be eliminated at will, and secondly that to change fuels on a large ship was no more complicated than throwing a switch or opening a valve.
In fact, the incidents of problems with fuel switching have demonstrated again that things are usually more complicated than they first appear and that there is a strong requirement to ensure that people are both trained and practised in such evolutions and their complexities.
Another area that perhaps ought to be causing some warning lights to illuminate involves steering gear incidents, once again in confined waters where any damage that results is likely to be severe. These seem to be divided into those where there has been some sort of mechanical failure and those where the lack of competence of the helmsman or the supporting bridge team are contributors. Inability to rapidly change modes of steering at the first sign of trouble because of unfamiliarity with the procedure has been suggested is a problem, pointing to the need for regular drills. Dirt in hydraulic lines and poor maintenance has also been identified as reasons for mechanical failure that has seen ships veer out of channels in canals or port entrances and collide with others, or the bank. Worth looking for those warning lights, and react accordingly!
Source: BIMCO, Watchkeeper
