UK MAIB issues investigation report on collision between two fishing vessels

Accident Investigation report 20/2014

The UK MAIB has issued Accident Investigation Report No.20 on the collision between fishing vessels SAPPHIRE STONE and KAREN, resulting in the loss of KAREN 11 miles south-east of Campbeltown, 22 January 2014.

Sapphire Stone

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Karen

At 1637 UTC1 on 22 January 2014, the fishing vessels Sapphire Stone and Karen collided. At the time of the collision, Sapphire Stone was steering a north-westerly course towards Campbeltown to land its catch, while Karen was towing its nets on a west-north-westerly course.

Karen was struck on its port quarter and was severely damaged. Its hull was opened to the sea, which caused the aft crew accommodation and main engine room to flood rapidly, resulting in the vessel foundering within 3 minutes of the collision. Sapphire Stone suffered minor damage to its stem post.

Attempts by Karens skipper to send a DSC2 distress alert were unsuccessful due to the speed with which the vessel foundered. However, Karens crew were quickly rescued by the crew of Sapphire Stone, and the coastguard was alerted by Karens EPIRB3, which activated after the vessel sank.

The MAIB investigation identified that neither skipper was keeping an effective visual lookout, and that radar contacts were not being systematically observed, or plotted, to ascertain whether a risk of collision existed. Additionally, Sapphire Stones skipper had become over-reliant on AIS4 information displayed on his chart plotter.

MGN5s 313 (F) and 324 (M+F) issued by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) explain the need for maintaining a proper lookout, and warn of the danger of over-reliance on chart plotters and AIS target information.

Recommendations have been made to the skippers of both vessels to heed the contents of extant MCA guidance to the fishing industry.

Conclusions

Sapphire Stone was required to keep clear of Karen. Karen was required to take action when a collision could not be avoided by the actions of Sapphire Stone alone. However, neither skipper was aware of the other vessels close proximity prior to the collision.
Neither skipper was maintaining a proper visual lookout as required by Rule 5 of the COLREGS; or systematically observing or plotting radar contacts to ascertain whether a risk of collision existed as required by Rule 7.
The MCA has provided guidance on watchkeeping best practice, and use of AIS in MGNs 313 (F) and 324 (M+F).
Since fitting an AIS unit and integrating it with the vessels chart plotter Sapphire Stones skipper had increasingly relied on AIS information for detecting and monitoring other vessels. Karen was not fitted (nor was required to be fitted) with AIS, which meant that Sapphire Stones skipper was neither alerted to Karens presence, nor able to assess whether risk of collision existed in the manner to which he had become accustomed.
Sapphire Stones skipper was distracted by Ribhinn Donn IIs deck lights, which resulted in loss of situational awareness.
From his position in the wheelhouse, Karens skippers view aft from the port beam was obstructed by the vessels accommodation.
The absence of a DSC alert and/or distress message being transmitted on VHF radio channel 16 caused an unnecessary delay in the coastguard responding to the emergency which, under different circumstances, could have led to far more serious consequences.
The successful activation, transmission, and receipt of the alert from Karens EPIRB demonstrates the indisputable value of fitting the equipment.