Report on the grounding of Fri Ocean on 14 June 2013, south of Tobermory
Fri Ocean (Image Credit: UK MAIB REPORT NO 26/2013)
On 14 June 2013, the general cargo vessel Fri Ocean ran aground at about 10.5 knots, 2 miles south of Tobermory, Isle of Mull, while on passage from Corpach in Scotland to Varberg in Sweden.
The vessel’s bow shell plating and frames were damaged, which resulted in flooding to the bow thruster room. The crew carried out a temporary repair, and the vessel was re-floated at 2120. After inspection at Oban, Fri Ocean proceeded to Liverpool for permanent repair.
The investigation identified that the second officer, who was alone on watch, fell asleep, largely through lack of stimulation possibly exacerbated by fatigue, shortly after making a course alteration at 0256.
None of the alarms fitted to the GPSand ECS3were loud enough to wake the sleeping officer, and a bridge navigational watch alarm system (BNWAS) that could have alerted the crew to the second officer sleeping was probably not in use.
Recommendations have been made to the vessel’s manager, Kopervik Ship Management AS, designed to enhance its safety management system (SMS) with regard to: the use of lookouts and the BNWAS; fatigue management and navigational requirements; and improving the auditing and verification of its
navigational policy.
CONCLUSIONS
While ergonomically efficient, the bridge design encouraged the second officer to sit down which increased the potential for him to fall asleep.
The second officer’s method of navigation provided little stimulation and allowed him to remain inactive for extended periods of time which further increased the potential for him to fall asleep.
Although the second officer had gone out to the starboard bridge wing to get some fresh air, and had then secured the starboard bridge door in the fully open position, his actions were insufficient to prevent him from falling asleep.
The lack of a lookout removed a valuable control measure in that his interaction with the second officer might have prevented the latter from falling asleep. Additionally, if a lookout had been present on the bridge, he would have been in a position to immediately wake the second officer.
Routine absence of a lookout on watch at night without incident would have reinforced a belief that it was safe to operate the vessel in that way, and would have influenced the master’s decision not to employ a lookout on this occasion.
The second officer was possibly fatigued when he arrived on the bridge for his watch.
The second officer’s and 0000-0400 watch AB’s fitness for duty might have been assured had the assigned port cargo watches been maintained and additional crew resources effectively managed.The BNWAS was probably not switched on during the period leading up to the grounding, and the ECS and GPS audible alarms were insufficiently loud to wake the sleeping second officer.
The master might have either not appreciated the value of having the BNWAS switched on or have simply forgotten to switch it on given that a lookout would normally have been present.
The SMS did not provide guidance on fatigue management.
For more details, please read the UK MAIB Accident Report No 26/2013 by clicking here
