The Need for Navigational Audits

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IUMI 2013 Shipping Statistics – Analysis Spring 2014

OCIMF report in 2013

P&I Clubs

Each P&I Club will be only too aware of the number of navigational incidents they are called upon to deal with; the wreck removal costs for the Costa Concordia are staggering and a worrying development. Concerns about the size and value of a claim for an incident involving a super post panamax containership are also well documented. A major navigational incident involving one of these ships will show just how expensive these claims can be

What are Navigational Incidents?

I summarise these into 4 categories

• Collisions
• Groundings
• Weather Damage
• Fines

A collision between 2 ships has the propensity to create the worst type of outcome in terms of human, environmental and financial loss. Collisions are very simple to avoid – I speak as a former practitioner – regrettably they are caused by inaction on the part of the ships’ officers concerned

Groundings are caused by the underkeel clearance being reduced to zero or less; primarily because the ship has been allowed to get into a position where it should never have been. Failure to monitor the ship’s position and adherence to the planned track tend to be the main culprit. The results of groundings, which tend to be close to the shore are now played out on our TV screens.

Heavy weather damage is slightly different, because on occasions heavy weather cannot be avoided and, due to proximity of navigational dangers, mitigating manoeuvres cannot be undertaken. Many ships do however, allow themselves to placed in danger through poor planning or failure to monitor weather reports.

Fines for navigation activities tend to be for failure to adhere to Traffic Separation Schemes, excessive speed or inappropriate actions.

How do these incidents happen?

1. Collisions

One of the basic requirements for a collision is that you require 2 objects, at least one of which is moving. Both must meet at the same point at the same time. Collisions can be predicted by observing the other ship and plotting its relative movement. The simple action of altering course and or speed will prevent the collision.

Collisions are also determined by probability – if two ships will not meet at the same point at the same time, there will not be a collision. Likewise it only takes one ship to take avoiding action to avert a collision. This is probably why such a large percentage of voyages are reportedly incident free.

It only takes a small change in speed or alteration of course to change a collision into a very, very near miss; but it would still be a miss. We are now able to see this inability to take such action on movie clips posted on YouTube.

2. Groundings

These occur because the ship is essentially in water that is too shallow for safe navigation. Either there is just not enough depth or, due to speed the ships draft increases (squat) and reduces the underkeel clearance to a dangerous value.

The main causes of groundings are that the ship is in the wrong place, either due to poor planning of the ship’s track, last minute changes to a plan that have not been carefully studied, “cutting corners” or failure to monitor the ship’s position.

When everything is going well, these incidents do not appear to occur; but happen when a ship is forced off its track due to a collision avoidance action or the effect of strong currents. Commercial pressure can also play its part, and anxiety to make ETAs can make ships’ officers take unplanned short cuts to passage plans. All result in situational awareness becoming lost and the ship enters a place of danger.

3. Heavy Weather Damage

There is no power on earth as strong as the combined effects of wind and waves. Extreme weather can be a daunting experience but the majority of modern merchant ships are designed and constructed to withstand such weather. They do, however, require proper handling in such weather to avoid endangering the crew and the ship’s safety.

Many ships experiencing heavy weather damage do so for 2 simple reasons; they are being driven too fast or avoiding action was not taken at an early stage.

4. Fines

In many cases these are due to simply not reviewing local laws and regulations and including these in the passage plan.

Who is affected?

All shipping companies, new and old, small and large,

What is being done to improve the situation?

Over the years, there have been numerous initiatives, both in technical developments and training. We now have sophisticated radars, ARPAs and AIS to assist in avoiding collision; we have GPS and ECDIS to provide continuous position indication and monitoring. We even have VDRs to record what is happening.

Training has been increased and now includes Bridge Team Management and even sophisticated CBT on some vessels. In fact I would say we have reached saturation point for remote training.

But many of the navigational incidents are the result of a failure to implement basic navigational actions such as maintaining an “active” lookout, plot other vessels and determine if risk of collision exists – and take appropriate action according to the COLREGs.

Fixing the ship’s position at regular intervals, using the most appropriate means to fix the ship’s position and monitoring progress along the track are other prime causes of events leading up to groundings.

There is currently NO INDUSTRY requirement NOR standard to audit navigational activities. A ship spends possibly 90% of its time underway at sea where navigation is the principle activity being undertaken, but does not enjoy the same proportion of scrutiny.

Only the Oil Majors through their TMSA initiative make any reference to navigational audits and then these are not exactly requirements nor do they specify frequency nor standard to be adopted.

For the world fleet, it is assumed that Navigation will be audited under the ISM Code requirements. The external auditors for the ISM DOC are normally Class Surveyors who are also normally from an Engineering background. As such they are hardly qualified to audit navigation. Ask yourself how many questions directed at Navigation were last brought up at your DOC audit?

In a similar way, the same auditors are responsible for auditing navigation during shipboard ISM SMC audits. The frequency of these audits is every two and a half years and in that time there could have been 7 different Masters. A reliable finding can hardly be achieved. There is no requirement in the ISM Code for even internal auditors to sail on the ships.

The vast majority of audits of navigation are limited to in port only, where the audit is based on records alone. Without intentionally trying to hide incomplete checks, ship’s officers may not be recording the true picture of what is happening and thus the audit results are skewed.

My own findings are quite simple;

• many valuable basic procedures are just not being implemented in practice
• many Masters and officers have never seen these procedures being done properly
• there is too much anecdotal evidence in circulation which may not reflect the true picture and this is hampering progress
• we are not learning lessons from past mistakes and these are certainly not being distributed to where they are required – onboard ship

What can be done:

How much does it cost to investigate a major collision or grounding? How much does it cost to resolve the incident by repairs to damage, payment of claims and indemnities? Is it not possible to reduce these costs?

I believe it is by adopting the Loss Prevention principle of auditing/inspecting activities and correcting problems before they create an actual loss/incident. A navigation audit undertaken whilst the ship is underway is required to redress the balance.

Navigation is a human activity – it falls squarely into the Human Element sector. One of the problems of audits is the best result a ship’s Master and crew can achieve is a score draw – the rest is all negative – defects, deficiencies, delays, damage, demurrage. So something new is required to achieve the desired objective and this requires encouraging the ship’s Master and officers to feel professional about their own navigation. A more holistic approach.

I do not feel that sailing for a few days, conducting an audit, issuing some Non Conformities and or observations is sufficient. I would like to adopt the principle “far better a willing volunteer than a conscript”. I think any shortcomings should be identified, the individuals and group (Bridge Team) shown what is wrong and why it is wrong and then allow them to put corrected practices in place. Policy or procedural “Non Conformities” would be reported to the company for follow up; the other deviations being reported as corrected at source. Deviations from existing shipboard procedures would be pointed out onboard and the opportunity to correct these given to the Masters and officers.

In this way, I strongly believe we can create improvements from the bottom up rather than top down. Many officers have just never had the opportunity to see how things should be done properly, or are aware of how they should be done

Mark Bull

Fellow – Nautical Institute, Marine Consultant