New report on organized crime threats in Eastern Africa
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) released the report Transnational Organized Crime in Eastern Africa: A Threat Assessment that provides insight into some of Eastern Africa’s principal transnational organized crime threats. Given the size and diversity of the region of Eastern Africa, any discussion of crime problems is necessarily selective. One of the four major issues that the report focuses is the Somali maritime piracy.
Most of the population of Eastern Africa is poor, and their governments have limited capacity to deter cross-border criminality. Poverty and weak governance also increase the potential for corruption, rendering Eastern Africa a relatively attractive region to traffic from, though, and to. Until the rule of law is firmly established in the region crimes are likely to continue.
Due to its strategic position along the Gulf of Aden (over 42,000 vessels transit the area each year), piracy has a long history in Somalia, but the current wave of successful hijackings began only in 2005. Somali pirates brought in an estimated US$150 million in 2011, which is equivalent to almost 15% of Somalia’s GDP. Aside from aid and remittances, piracy quickly became the largest source of foreign exchange in the country.
Despite the recent reduction in activity, piracy remains one of the most profitable activities in a country where legal alternatives may be hard to find. Based purely on attacks where the ransom payment was known, pirates earned at least US$36 million in 2012. If ransom values were inferred in cases where they were not known, the figure would be ashigh as US$40 million. Preventing piracy from returning to former levels will require constant vigilance offshore and the promotion of sustainable development onshore.
Piracy off the coast of Somalia
Somalia has been in a state of perpetual conflict since the ouster of dictator Siad Barre in 1991. In addition to twenty two years of conflict, Somalia has experienced five major droughts since 2000, catastrophes for a country where the majority of the population is reliant on livestock herding and agriculture. Combined, conflict and drought gave Somalia the lowest GDP per capita in the world in 2011.
In contrast, it is estimated that pirates brought in some US$150 million in 2011, which would be equivalent to almost 15% of Somalia’s GDP. Aside from aid and remittances, piracy has become the largest source of foreign exchange in the country.
Due to its strategic position along the Gulf of Aden, piracy has a long history in Somalia, but the current wave of successful hijackings began only in 2005. Today, some 42,500 vessels transit the high-risk area each year.
According to the local narrative, the practice started after a tsunami washed toxic waste containers onto local beaches in 2005, confirming rumours that other countries had been using Somalia’s un-policed waters as a dumping ground. Whatever the truth of this narrative, it is deeply etched in the Somali consciousness, and has allowed piracy to be portrayed as a kind of redistributive activity.
Only a small fraction of the vessels held for ransom today are fishing vessels, and there is evidence that pirate groups are “licensing” foreign vessels to transit or fish in Somali waters. Declining public support may be one reason why piracy attacks have fallen dramatically since April 2011.
Another factor leading to the decline is increased risk for pirates. The promulgation of “Best Management Practices” for responding to piracy has surely played a role in vessels escaping pirate attacks.
Ransom negotiations have also become more protracted, requiring investors to support the pirates and their hostages for many months before seeing a return, if indeed they see any at all. For example, the MV Iceberg was hijacked on 29 March 2010 and liberated by the Puntland authorities on 23 December 2012 – in this case, it seems that pirates invested nearly two years in a vessel that never paid off.
A final factor in the recent decline of piracy is the increased aggressiveness of international enforcement. In the past, the international community was dependent on the national and local authorities to take action against the pirates.
Thus, for a variety of reasons, piracy has lost much of its attraction. A rising number of would-be pirates never make a profit or never return. As international attention has intensified, it has become more difficult for the pirates to operate openly. Unless the character of piracy changes (by,for example, taking on a political dimension) or international attention wanes, this trend is likely to continue.
Piracy incidents attributed to Somali pirates, 2012
How is the piracy conducted?
There is no central piracy command authority in Somalia. The decision to launch an attack may emerge from the collusion of a range of actors, including professional pirate groups, their community sponsors, and their sources of finance, some of which may be based overseas. An agreement is drawn up between these parties, specifying the allocation of risks and rewards. It appears that although some pirate crews have a degree of continuity, many planned hijackings are handled on a project basis. Once the project is complete, the ransom is distributed and the structures dissolve, to be resurrected at a later date if circumstances merit.
Who is conducting the piracy?
Piracy requires the collusion of a range of actors, of which the pirate foot soldiers are just one component. These include:
- Financiers
- Seamen
- Chandlers and other suppliers
- Shore-based security structures
- Negotiators
How big is piracy?
The UN International Maritime Organization (IMO) maintains meticulous records of all confirmed pirate attacks. As with all recorded crime statistics, there may be some degree of under-capture, particularly regarding the hijacking of smaller craft used for mother ships, and concerning vessels operating out of countries that do not report to the international authorities. With regard to registered vessels, it is unlikely that many major cases escape the attention of the IMO.
These statistics clearly show the growth of Somali piracy between 2005 and 2011, and its decline since. In 2012, there were just 15 successful attacks, close to 2005 levels (14). There were no successful hijackings for ransom in the Somali area of operations in the first half of 2013.
Implications for interventions
Somalia needs a sea-going law enforcement capability to enable the recently agreed Somali Maritime Security and Resource Strategy. This would involve further development of the Somali Coast Guard. This should enable the Somali authorities at all levels of government to monitor, policeand control the coastal waters around Somalia. Such support would include provision of equipment and training, but also improved capacities for communication between the various authorities in Somalia (regional and federal).
- There is a need to develop the capacity of other regional sea-going law enforcement authorities, as this would have impact on all of the illicit flows discussed in this report.
- Public information campaigns should emphasize that piracy is dangerous and unacceptable to the broader Somali community, with prominent piracy failures highlighted.
- Alternative development for coastal communities should be advanced, including programmes designed to ensure cash incomes from fishing activities. The international community can also help protect Somali waters from the incursions of unlicensed fishing vessels.
- One unfortunate side effect of the influx of piracy ransoms has been the development of the capacity to launder money in the region, despite (or perhaps, because of) the weaknesses in the licit financial sector. Since the local economies are largely cash-based, formal financial controls must be complemented with efforts to counter movements of illicit cash and monitor remittance agencies. Developers of telecom-based money transfer services must be made aware of the risks and subjected to regulation to address the threat of money laundering. Preventing money laundering and associated corruption, will require better collection, analysis, and sharing of data by national authorities, including central banks, land registries, and revenue collection agencies. Finally, national law enforcement agencies must be trained to detect money laundering and instructed in the meansavailable for addressing it.
Read more in the report UNODC’s Transnational Organized Crime in Eastern Africa: A Threat Assessment
