UK MAIB Report No 11/2013
MAIB has issued a report on the investigation of the man overboard from mv Timberland in the North Sea on 25 November 2012.
At 1459 (UTC1) on 25 November 2012, two crew members were washed overboard from the general cargo vessel Timberland. The accident occurred during heavy weather in the North Sea.
Both men lost their lives; the body of one of them was recovered from the sea by helicopter following a search and rescue operation co-ordinated by The Netherlands Coastguard. The body of the other remains missing.The two crew members had proceeded onto the aft mooring deck to secure a coiled mooring rope that had loosened in its stowed position.
They were struck by a large wave, which washed them overboard, causing their respective lifelines, which were secured to the vessel, to part.
The management company, Imperial Ship Management AB, has since taken action to ensure that all mooring ropes which are not secured on drums are stowed underdeck on board all vessels within its fleet. Additionally, it has introduced detailed instructions and guidance in its safety management system manual with regard to sending crew on deck in heavy weather. Consequently, the MAIB has made no recommendations.
(photo credits: MAIB, MAIB Report No 11/2013)
Overview:
- The following events were significant in the period leading up to and during the accident:
- The nylon mooring rope was coiled and secured on the aft mooring deck following Timberland’s departure from Haraholmen, Sweden.
- The port side steel bar holding the nylon mooring rope pallet in position broke free from the deck, causing the rope to loosen.
- Fire-fighter’s lifelines were used to secure the bosun and AB Alcontin to the vessel
- The lifelines parted when a large sea washed across the aft mooring deck.
- After being washed overboard, the bosun and AB Alcontin were unable to survive in the prevailing heavy weather conditions.
Conclusions:
1. No heavy weather checklist was available and none was required to be completed as part of the vessel’s safety management system.
2. Previous occurrences of the aft mooring ropes coming loose had not been formally recorded, possibly because there had been no adverse consequences.
3. The loose nylon mooring rope presented a significant risk of it fouling the vessel’s propeller owing to its inherent tendency to sink.
4. The need for a designated enclosed means for stowing the coiled aft mooring ropes had not been recognised.
5. The manufactured port side steel bar holding the nylon mooring rope pallet in position had lacked strength and appeared not to have been maintained.
6. The vessel’s safety management system contained no detailed requirements with regard to sending crew on deck in heavy weather.
7. The master possibly underestimated the potential wave height that could have been expected in the prevailing weather conditions
8. No designated lifelines were provided on board for use in sending crew on deck in heavy weather.
9. The master overestimated the strength of the fire-fighter’s lifelines and his ability to manually control their loading in the prevailing conditions.
10. The strength of the fire-fighter’s lifelines was insufficient to withstand the loading exerted on them by the large wave that washed the crew members overboard.
11. Although both men had been wearing lifejackets that had inflated, neither the bosun nor AB Alcontin was able to survive their exposure to the heavy weather conditions.
For more information, please click at UK MAIB Report No.11/2013
Source: UK MAIB