Lessons learned: Underestimating strong winds is a common reason for groundings

The case

A 1,000 TEU container vessel departed its berth after loading. During the loading there had been some delay and the gantry cranes had stopped operating because of strong winds, so the Master was eager to depart. The navigation officer had prepared the bridge before departure.

Pilot plan was not discussed

On the bridge were the Master, pilot, lookout and Chief Officer. A tug assisted the vessel during departure.The Master gave the pilot the pilot card and offered him some coffee.

After this the Master gave the pilot the conn. The pilot was steering from the port side bridge wing.The berth had a heading of 317 degrees and there were still WSW winds at Beaufort scale 9.The vessel was moored at the end of the berth.

The fairway leaving the port had a heading of 230 degrees.The pilot’s plan was forthe vessel to go astern and swing to port and clearthe end ofthe berth and then follow the fairway. However, he did not explain the plan to the Master and the Master didn’t ask the pilot about any plan.

The Master ordered all lines let go. The bow started to fall off quicker than the stern as the wind pushed on the vessel’s port side, off the berth. The pilot ordered half astern and the plan was to use the bow thruster to let the vessel’s bow swing past the end of the berth and to position the vessel to sail out in the fairway. At this time the vessel had a course of 310 degrees.

Drifting towards buoy

The tug assisted with pushing the vessel on the starboard side. The vessel was now moving astern at 2 knots and towards the opposite side of the fairway, the south side.

There were several buoys marking the fairway. The closest buoy was on the starboard quarter about 50 metres away.

The wind continued to push the vessel from the portside causing the vessel to drift SE in the fairway towards the south side of the fairway. The vessel had a stern thruster and it was set full to starboard to assist the vessel in turning to port. The vessel started to slowly come around and had a heading of 291 degrees but was still drifting SE towards the buoy.

Multiple warnings ignored

The Second Officer was on the stern and warned the Chief Officer over the UHF that a buoy was only 30 metres away on the starboard quarter.

The vessel now had a heading of 320 degrees which was a 90-degree angle towards the fairway. The Chief Officer informed the pilot and Master but neither of them acknowledged or took any action.

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The Second Officer now informed the Chief Officer that the buoy was only 10 metres away. The pilot ordered half ahead on the engines. For some reason the stern thruster was stopped. At the same time the pilot received a job-related mobile phone call which he answered.

The vessel continued its movement astern and hit the buoy on the starboard quarter. The entire buoy was dragged underneath the vessel and damaged the propeller, rudder and rudder stock.

The damage caused the vessel to lose its steering and because of the damage the Master stopped the main engine. This caused the vessel to start drifting even quicker SE towards shallow waters.

The pilot suggested that the anchor should be dropped, and so the Master ordered the port anchor to be dropped.

This was delayed as the Second Officer had to cross from the stern to the bow. When he reached the bow and the bosun tried to drop the anchor it became entangled and it took a minute before it was released. At the same time the vessel ran aground.

Lessons learned

1. Underestimating natural forces such as strong winds is the third most common reason for vessels running aground.
2. A big concern in many navigational claims is that the bridge team does not work efficiently as the different members don’t discuss the plan – or sometimes don’t even have a plan as in this case.
3. It is important for the Master to be polite but assertive when he feels that the vessel’s safety might be at risk. To avoid such a situation occurring, the Master’s expectations need to be discussed during the pilot briefing. In this case there had not been a pilot briefing. The Master should inform the pilot of any parameters e.g. the rate of turn and speed he is comfortable with, and the pilot should explain to the Master what the plan is to ensure the operation is safe. This is what we would consider as having good situational awareness. This is especially important as there were strong winds.
4. During the pilot briefing the Master should ask the pilot about local regulations, concerned traffic, expected currents and winds, passing requirements and how the pilot plans to approach the departure. If the local language is spoken the pilot should be asked to explain the conversation, in English, to the bridge team. If a plan is discussed and agreed, it is easier to amend the plan if there are complications.
5. The pilot must be included in the bridge team and anything unclear about the vessel’s progress or deviation from the plan needs to be voiced within the bridge team at once. To have efficient communication is one of the most important factors for a functional bridge team. In this case there had not been a pilot briefing.

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