In its recently released casebook of maritime incidents, Swedish Club describes a grounding case as channel buoys were in the wrong position.
The case
A 20,000 DWT dry cargo vessel had picked up the pilot and was approaching the fairway to the port. It was morning with clear skies and light winds.
On the bridge were the Master, the pilot the OOW and the helmsman. The Third Officer was the OOW and had completed the pre-arrival checklist. The vessel was in hand steering mode and the pilot had the conn.
The Master had given the pilot a pilot card, but they had not carried out a pilot briefing. The pilot asked for 7 knots in the fairway and lined up the vessel between the buoys.
Everything seemed in order
The OOW was monitoring the vessel’s position on the radar and the ECDIS and was also filling out the logbook. The vessel passed the first buoys, and everything seemed in order to the Master when he looked outside.
Suddenly the vessel vibrated heavily and the speed fell rapidly until the vessel completely stopped. The Master realised that the vessel hadrun aground. He told the pilot that the vessel was aground, but the pilot did not believe him as the vessel was in the middle of the fairway.
When the pilot also realised that the vessel had run aground he started to talk on the VHF in the local language.
Vessel ran aground outside the fairway
The vessel had run aground on a bank which was outside the fairway. The vessel was clearly visible outside of the channel on the ECDIS and radar. This was also confirmed when the position was plotted.
The Master began to deballast the vessel and carried out engine manoeuvres in an attempt to get the vessel off the bank. Subsequently the Chief Engineer called the Master and told him that the steering gear was not responding.
The Master immediately stopped the engines and asked the Chief Officer to sound all tanks and also take soundings around the vessel.
Tugs called to assist
The pilot told him that two tugs were coming from the port to assist the vessel. The Master had not signed any salvage contract, but the two tugs began to attempt to refloat the vessel with the assistance of the pilot and
authorities. The tugs managed to remove the vessel from the bank the following day.
Lessons learned
- The bridge team did not check the position of the vessel on the chart, radar, or by any other means than visually.
- The passage plan should be berth to berth, so there should have been a planned route into the port which would have highlighted the discrepancy in the vessel’s position on the ECDIS.
- The vessel had an ECDIS, but it appears no one was monitoring the display during the approach.
- There was a leading line for the approach, but for some reason it was disregarded. The bridge team did not monitor the vessel’s progress with all the available navigational equipment.
- It is important that the shipowner has a navigation policy that details which navigation equipment should be used and how the bridge should be manned efficiently at different stages of the voyage. Leading lines should always be used, and the vessel’s position should be confirmed by radar, GPS and visually. This was not done.
- In addition, the passage plan should be berth to berth and it should detail how to conduct a pilot briefing. It is obvious that the pilot should have known that the buoys were out of position. It is important that the bridge team follows the passage plan and monitor the 9.2 actions of the pilot.
