Resulting in the breaching of five of her ballast tanks – experience feedback
A large container ship was on a coastal passage in the South China Sea, an area well known for dense concentrations of fishing vessels. In the evening, in order to adjust the ETA at the destination port the following morning, the Master decided to stop and drift for an hour in open water before resuming passage at full speed.
When the chief officer came on watch at 0400, accompanied by a lookout, he reviewed the charts to be used and noted the potential danger areas, including an isolated, unmarked reef, and highlighted it on the paper chart.
The planned track avoided the reef by means of two sharp course alterations. By 0600, about an hour before these waypoints, a large concentration of randomly-moving fishing vessels was encountered, causing the chief officer to make a number of course alterations over the next hour.
By this time, the vessel was approaching the most navigationally constrained part of the passage, in the vicinity of the off-lying islands and reef. The ship was making 21 knots and she was well off her intended track.
The vessel’s position had been plotted only twice between 0600 and 0700, each plot based on a single radar range and distance. An electronic chart system was fitted, but was only monitored occasionally. Suddenly, a fishing vessel separated from the fleet and accelerated towards the container ship’s starboard bow.
Constrained by other fishing vessels on the starboard side, the chief officer altered course to port, directly towards the reef, which he had forgotten about. At about 0708, the ship ran aground at full speed on the reef, resulting in the breaching of five of her ballast tanks.
Lessons learnt
1. There are occasions when traffic is so dense that the officer of the watch has very little time to do anything but concentrate on collision avoidance. In such situations, asking the Master for help, or reducing speed, can usually make things more manageable. Such actions are not a sign of weakness or incompetence, but are sensible precautions which help to keep vessels safe and need to be encouraged.
2. When constantly altering course to avoid other vessels in restricted waters, things can happen quickly, and it can be very difficult to accurately monitor a vessel’s position unless radar parallel indexing and/or ECS/ECDIS are fully utilised. The occasional fix – with limited reliability – is far from sufficient.
3. A safe passage plan takes into account those points on the route which might need more people on the bridge. It should also include other precautions such as a reduction in speed due to factors such as the proximity of dangers, the likelihood of dense traffic or poor visibility. Passage planning requires thought, and involves far more than putting lines on charts.
4. Adjusting ETA by stopping in open water at the start or during a passage tends to reduce flexibility later. It is good to have time in hand when busy waters with hidden dangers lie ahead.
Source: Mars/Nautical Institute
