Fire and subsequent foundering of the passenger vessel ECC Topaz

UK MAIB issues Accident Report

The UK MAIB has issued a report on the fire and subsequent foundering of the passenger transfer catamaran ECC Topaz while conducting engine trials off the east coast of England 14 January 2014.

On 14 January 2014, at approximately 1245, the 14m passenger transfer catamaran ECC Topaz caught fire 11 nautical miles south-east of Lowestoft. The three crew members on board the vessel were unable to extinguish the fire, which spread rapidly throughout its glass reinforced plastic structure, forcing them to abandon to a liferaft. The crew were airlifted to safety within an hour of abandoning their vessel. At 1420, the burnt-out wreck of the vessel sank in 33m of water. There were no passengers on board and no water pollution was caused as a result of the accident.

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In February 2014, following reports of charring on workboats similar to ECC Topaz as a result of modifications made to oil fired air heater exhaust pipes, the MAIB issued a safety bulletin. The safety bulletin informed the industry of the accident and alerted it to the fire hazard posed by uninsulated exhaust pipes. The MAIB investigation has subsequently determined that there were two plausible causes for the fire: an uninsulated section of the exhaust pipe from an oil fired air heater igniting the wooden deck it was routed through; or a degraded exhaust pipe from the same device causing the hot exhaust gas to leak and impinge directly on to flammable material stored in the compartment.

The skipper detected the fire after it had spread into the wheelhouse from the compartment below, where the oil fired air heater was located. Under the relevant safety regulations, the oil fired heater was not categorised as an item of machinery and therefore the compartment was not required to be fitted with either fire detection or fire suppression equipment.

The British Marine Federation, in its role leading a group drafting an international standard for liquid fuel powered heating appliances and galley stoves, has made several amendments to the draft standard based on the lessons learnt from this accident. The Maritime and Coastguard Agency has modified the draft revision to The safety of small workboats and pilot boats a code of practice by recognising liquid-fuelled heaters as machinery items and by referring further to the guidance contained in the international standard. The Royal Yachting Association has disseminated the lessons of this accident within the leisure boating sector with the aid of a flyer produced by the MAIB for this purpose. Blyth Workcats Ltd, the boat manufacturer, has rectified the modified exhaust pipes on all the affected workboats.

Eberspächer (UK) Ltd, the heater manufacturer, has been recommended to investigate an anomaly between the exhaust pipe temperature rating and exhaust gas temperature experienced in service. Blyth Workcats Ltd has been recommended to ensure that no modifications to equipment are carried out without authorisation and approval from the relevant equipment manufacturer.

Conclusion

It is almost certain that the fire on board ECC Topaz originated in the starboard hull compartment directly below the wheelhouse where the diesel fired air heater was located

Eberspächer heaters are well protected by safety features and despite the large numbers in use there are no records of the heaters causing fires. It is therefore considered very unlikely that the fire was caused by an electrical or mechanical malfunction in the heater

The unauthorised modification of the heater exhaust pipe resulted in the introduction of an uninsulated section of exhaust pipe that would have transferred heat to the plywood under deck, eventually causing it to burn.

It is possible also that the exhaust pipe of the heater on board ECC Topaz was degraded to a point where it was leaking. Had this been the case, the direct impingement of hot exhaust gas, on to the plywood under-deck or onto flammable substances stored in the heater compartment, would have been sufficient to start a fire if the oxygen level was sufficient to support combustion.

It is possible that other vessels are operating with degraded exhaust pipes as well.

The requirements relating to fire safety in the Brown Code are restricted to machinery spaces, and since the heater was not recognised as machinery, it was not considered to pose a fire risk.

The heater space was not fitted with a smoke detector and therefore the skipper did not have any warning that a fire had started. Had he been alerted earlier, he could have taken steps to prevent the spread of fire.

Had the ‘Recommended Service Schedule’ schedule been followed, the heater would have been serviced annually, and this might have identified further carbon build-up and any issues regarding the exhaust or air trunking.

Source and Image Credit:UK MAIB

Further information may be found by reading relevant UK MAIB report by clicking on the image below: