UK MAIB released its report about the accident that took place on 1 July 2017, when two Hong Kong registered vessels, the bulk carrier Huayang Endeavour and the oil tanker Seafrontier, collided in the Dover Strait about 5 nautical miles west of Sandettie Bank. Both vessels were damaged, but were able to proceed to nearby ports for damage assessment. The accident did not result in any injuries or pollution.
The accident
On 30 June 2017, Seafrontier departed Antwerp, Belgium, heading to Lagos, Nigeria loaded with 37944 metric tonnes of gasoline. Huayang Endeavour was on passage in the south-west traffic lane of the Dover Strait Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS).
When Seafrontier crossed into the south-west lane of the TSS, the second officer adjusted the autopilot to follow a COG of 221°. Seafrontier’s bridge team noticed a small vessel, the Donau Express II, on the starboard bow. At the same time, Huayang Endeavour was 3.2nm to the north-west of Seafrontier on a COG of 210°.
A little later, Huayang Endeavour’s master adjusted the autopilot to steady on to a COG of 212° and his vessel was now bearing 347° from Seafrontier at a range of 1.6nm, whose stern light was visible to Huayang Endeavour’s bridge team. Seafrontier’s own COG was 221° on a converging course with Huayang Endeavour.
While Huayang Endeavour was 1nm away from Seafrontier and still on a relatively steady bearing, its master could see Seafrontier’s stern light, but neither of its sidelights. He remained concerned by the small CPA and ordered the second officer to use the VHF radio to find out what Seafrontier’s bridge team’s intentions were.
[smlsubform prepend=”GET THE SAFETY4SEA IN YOUR INBOX!” showname=false emailtxt=”” emailholder=”Enter your email address” showsubmit=true submittxt=”Submit” jsthanks=false thankyou=”Thank you for subscribing to our mailing list”]
As a result of the earlier VHF conversation, Seafrontier’s master thought that Huayang Endeavour would pass down Seafrontier’s starboard side and so decided to increase sea room with Donau Express II would be to take a full turn to port. Seafrontier’s master informed the bridge team of his decision and instructed the second officer to inform Dover coastguard of his intentions.
As the VHF conversation with Dover coastguard concluded and with Seafrontier swinging to port, Seafrontier’s AB was startled to see that Huayang Endeavour was now on Seafrontier’s port quarter and he could clearly see Huayang Endeavour’s green sidelight. Seafrontier’s master was alarmed to see Huayang Endeavour so close, and reduced the engine telegraph setting to dead slow ahead, while ordering the helmsman to stop the swing to port.
Huayang Endeavour’s master, who was still visually monitoring Seafrontier, was equally alarmed to see that Seafrontier was altering rapidly to port and across his vessel’s bow.
Seafrontier’s second officer changed the setting to emergency astern 5 seconds before Huayang Endeavour’s starboard bow struck Seafrontier’s port side in way of the accommodation housing and hull. Seafrontier’s second officer then set the engine telegraph to stop and the vessels remained in contact, with Seafrontier on Huayang Endeavour’s starboard side.
Both vessels sounded their general alarm to muster the crew. Seafrontier’s master notified Dover coastguard of the collision and a helicopter was tasked to monitor the scene. Inspections for damage were conducted and none was identified below the waterline.
Probable cause
The UK MAIB investigation found that a Very High Frequency (VHF) radio conversation between the two vessels caused in the two bridge teams to have conflicting views as to what had been agreed regarding Huayang Endeavour overtaking Seafrontier. As a result, Seafrontier’s bridge team did not check for sea room astern before altering course, leading to a close quarter situation between the two vessels.
In addition, Seafrontier’s master had been present on the bridge for over 14 hours and was probably suffering from fatigue, which was likely to have had an adverse effect on his decision making.
In summary, UK MAIB concluded to the following:
- Seafrontier’s master was operating within his maximum permitted working hours however he was probably experiencing fatigue which resulted in his decision making and reaction times being affected.
- Huayang Endeavour’s bridge team did not complete effective long-range scanning as required by the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREG’s).
- The use of VHF to resolve the situation was inappropriate as it did not allow sufficient time for effective action to be taken, the language used was not precise or clear and it did not result in a shared plan.
- Seafrontier’s bridge team did not monitor Huayang Endeavour’s manoeuvres after the VHF conversation and as they did not check for sea room before altering course, were unaware of the bulk carriers actual position.
Recommendations
Following its internal investigation Huayang Endeavour’s manager changed its procedures regarding the use of VHF for collision avoidance, and shared the lessons learned from this accident to its fleet.
The manager of Seafrontier, has also completed an internal investigation, and has taken a number of measures to train its personnel in bridge and crew resource management, review its procedures, and shared the lessons from this accident to its fleet.
For these reasons, UK MAIB did not make any recommendations.
You can learn more information about the accident in the PDF herebelow
