DMAIB issued an investigation report on the collision of the general cargo ship ICE ROSE with anti-submarine ship 311 KAZANETS of the Russian Navy in the Sound, Denmark, in September 2020. The investigation established that the collision happened as a result of the navigational practices on both ships on that day.
The incident
On the morning of 23 September 2020, the Marshall Islands-registered refrigerated general cargo ship ICE ROSE collided with the anti-submarine ship 311 KAZANETS of the Russian Navy in the Sound, Denmark. The collision happened as ICE ROSE and 311 KAZANETS were passing on crossing courses while navigating in a dense fog.
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Due to the restricted visibility, both ships’ navigation relied on instrumentation only. Neither of the ships identified the other ship until a few minutes before the collision, and neither ship managed to avoid the collision once the risk of collision was recognized.
Probable causes
DMAIB concludes that the collision happened as a result of the navigational practices on both ships on that day. On ICE ROSE, several coinciding factors contributed to the bridge team not recognizing the risk of the collision until 311 KAZANETS was at close quarters. Those factors included bridge layout, radar settings, and the division of work within the bridge team.
Radar settings made it difficult to distinguish 311 KAZANETS from stationary objects on the radar and was not identified as a target, until there were only a few minutes left to decide on a manoeuvre to avoid the collision.
Conclusions
- ICE ROSE and 311 KAZANETS collided while underway in restricted visibility in a narrow geographical area constricted by shallow waters. The crew on both ships, therefore, relied on navigating by instrumentation only.
- During the investigation, DMAIB did not find any information which suggested that either ship experienced instrumentation failures or mechanical malfunction which impeded the ships’ manoeuvrability. The collision thus happened as a result of the navigational practices on both ships on that day.
- DMAIB visited and collected data from ICE ROSE, but only received a formal written statement from the master of 311 KAZANETS, which proved insufficient for an analysis of the events unfolding on 311 KAZANETS prior to the collision. The investigation, therefore, focused on the events on ICE ROSE.
- On ICE ROSE several coinciding factors contributed to the bridge team not recognizing the risk of collision until 311 KAZANETS was at close quarters. Those factors included the layout of the bridge, the configuration of the X-band radar, and the division of work between the master and third officer.
Those factors resulted in only one person monitoring the radar, and when he missed the visual cues on the radar there was only a few minutes left to decide on a manoeuvre to avoid the collision.
- Once the ships were at close quarters, a quick decision had to be made based on uncertain information about 311 KAZANETS’ course and, more importantly, its intentions. That uncertainty caused the master to hesitate to make a large course alteration, and when 311 KAZANETS did not make a clear course alteration, the collision was a reality.
Actions taken
The operator of ICE ROSE has informed DMAIB that the company has issued a fleet circular acknowledging the inexpedient positioning of the radars on some of the company’s vessels. However, the company has found that the problems associated with the ergonomics of the bridge can be mitigated by instructing the bridge watchkeepers on specific practices regarding watchkeeping in confined waters, which includes rearranging the division of work among the bridge watchkeepers and how the radars are used.
