The International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots (MM&P) in collaboration with Dalhousie University issued a study focusing on the complexity of safety onboard given that it is difficult to follow a safety culture between the vessel and the management, affected from a variety of maritime factors as Flag Administrations, commercial pressures and the reluctance of addressing any safety problems.
Namely, the study ‘Spotlight: Why accidents are often not accidental’ highlights that the safety culture, between the ship and management, is hard to get to due to the fact that the master and the crew might not share safety information with management.
In some cases there are commercial pressures in shipping markets that may lead to accidents, as for instance ‘a marine inspector pressured by their superiors to ‘look the other way’.
Moreover, the study notes that the IMO provides a forum for oversight and debate on amendments for the shipping industry. The Organization is not in the position to enforce power. Enforcement remains at the national level, under the purview of the administration of each flag state.
The challenge comes when the flags don’t have the technical experience, manpower or global coverage needed to follow all IMO requirements to conduct surveys and inspections.
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Because the ship owner is free to choose which FOC flag state and class society to use, there is commercial pressure on flag states and class societies to satisfy their clients.
The above results to the fact that on a domestic level, operators in all shipping markets are understandably reluctant to forgo income while a ship is pulled out of service to be repaired.
Yet, in international shipping, where the flag-of-convenience system dominates, owners are free to choose which flag state and class society to use. This results in commercial pressure on flag states and class societies, which may decide to turn a blind eye to safety problems as a way to attract and retain clients.
In the meantime, concerning Port State Control, the inspection of foreign ships began as a back up to flag’s inspections. However, they are effective mostly in cases in which the regulatory organizations (flag state, class society) have not fully met their obligations.
The ISM Code provides that deficiencies be reported to a Designated Person Ashore, and is designed to inform managers and bring them into the circle of responsibility. However, there is often a tendency to discourage reporting so as to maintain management’s immunity from personal liability. It is difficult to establish a shared safety culture between the ship and management when the future careers of the master and crew may depend on not sharing safety information with management.
Overall, SAFETY4SEA recently launched a list of accidents related to ISM Code failures, highlighting that it’s not a matter of who to blame but a matter of responsibility.
Concluding, the study presents how the above factors play a role to a variety of marine accidents that shocked the shipping industry and resulted to significant loss of live and environmental disasters.
To explore more on the study click on the PDF herebelow