During the 2025 SAFETY4SEA Hamburg Forum, Lennart Ripke, Senior Consultant and Commercial Director, Green Jakobsen, discussed how organizational safety often neglects the role of human factors in systems, processes and equipment, leading to gaps in overall safety performance.
Data from the AMSA Marine Casualty and Incident Report 2024, covering the years from 2014 to 2023, shows that overall incident trends in the maritime industry have remained largely unchanged.
Although there has been a slight decrease in fatalities, following a temporary increase, figures consistently remain below 100.
Statistically, this figure is not highly significant, as a single major incident could quickly raise the total, nevertheless, the data suggests that meaningful improvements across the industry have not yet been realized.
What actions are typically taken following incidents and why have these measures not resulted in measurable improvements?
The standard industry response tends to focus on training, often limited to technical or general safety instruction. However, such training often overlooks critical human factors and contexts, such as the decision-making, cognitive biases and situational pressures that contribute to the incidents.
It is widely understood that no one intentionally causes an accident, yet root cause analyses often do not fully capture these underlying human dimensions. For example, in response to a specific incident, all Chief Officers and Masters were required to retake Bridge Resource Management (BRM) training, regardless of their current qualifications or recent participation.
This approach, typically mandated by regulatory authorities, reflects a procedural compliance mindset rather than a tailored or effective safety intervention. It is representative of a broader pattern that does not reduce incident rates in a meaningful way.
Comparable trends are clear in other sectors. In Germany, for instance, traffic accident rates have remained relatively stable over time, despite increases in vehicle numbers, road usage and an aging driving population.
However, unlike the maritime sector, drivers do not have to complete regular refresher training. Nonetheless, safety outcomes have not deteriorated.
Designing for real human behavior
Furthermore, across all industries, it is common for individuals to circumvent safety systems, it is an inherent aspect of human nature. Therefore, effective design must account for this and aim to create intuitive and robust safety measures, still, the maritime sector continues to struggle in this regard.
One example is the use of radar/AIS overlay systems. On such displays, radar targets are commonly marked with AIS symbols, which can cause operators to mistakenly associate all radar contacts with AIS data.
This design choice is convenient but can be misleading, reducing situational awareness and removing a critical safety layer.
When safety barriers are quietly eroded, concerns are sometimes raised by personnel. These individuals, often labeled negatively or dismissed within the organization, may not provide accurate predictions of when incidents will occur but they highlight increased risk. Because incidents do not follow immediately, those warnings are often ignored, leading to the marginalization of safety-critical voices.
This pattern is consistently seen across various incidents and organizations. Concerns are raised not as specific predictions, but as warnings of elevated risk due to weakened safeguards.
Furthermore, in virtually every major disaster, retrospective analyses show that warnings were issued but not acted upon because of uncertainty about timing or impact.
People who voice their concerns are often ignored because they predict that something will happen. They are most often wrong… until they are not.
Recognizing and acting on these early warnings is essential to preventing loss of life, financial damage as well as reputational harm.
Moreover, rather than relying on vague forecasts, organizations should focus on acknowledging when risk levels increase such as through the removal of safety measures.
The “devil’s advocate” model
The shift in perspective requires dedicated training and systemic support, which are currently lacking in many operational environments.
Critical feedback must be normalized and encouraged, not suppressed.
A historical example of this practice is found in the Catholic Church’s canonization process, which involved appointing a “devil’s advocate”, someone who is tasked with identifying flaws and challenging the prevailing view. This role was vital to preserving institutional credibility. The “devil’s advocate” serves as a constant safety stress test and is also a role model.
However, the maritime industry lacks a comparable mechanism. There is no formal role assigned to challenge new procedures or stress-test safety systems before implementation. Additionally, psychological safety is often insufficient.
Without it, personnel are unlikely to raise valid safety concerns, especially when those concerns conflict with perceived efficiency or convenience. By institutionalizing roles that support constructive dissent, such as assigning a formal devil’s advocate, organizations can create a culture where critical evaluation is not only accepted but expected.
Regularly implementing such practices promotes psychological safety, embeds feedback into decision-making and strengthens overall organizational resilience. Ultimately, embedding these human factors into safety systems and encouraging open dialogue leads to more adaptive, reliable and safer operations.
Above article has been edited from Lennart Ripke’s presentation during the 2025 SAFETY4SEA Hamburg Forum.
Explore more by watching his video presentation here below
The views presented are only those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of SAFETY4SEA and are for information sharing and discussion purposes only.
